To: | U.S. Patent Innovations, LLC (info@24ipusa.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88873042 - CANADY HELIOS - 9101.131 |
Sent: | July 08, 2020 01:13:23 PM |
Sent As: | ecom127@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88873042
Mark: CANADY HELIOS
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: U.S. Patent Innovations, LLC
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Reference/Docket No. 9101.131
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: July 08, 2020
· Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
· Sections 1 and 45 Refusal – Mark Not Shown Used in Commerce
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3999419. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registration.
Standard of Analysis for Section 2(d) Refusal
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity of the goods and/or services, and similarity of trade channels of the goods and/or services. See In re Opus One, Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 2001); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593 (TTAB 1999); In re Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1209 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Comparison of the Marks:
Applicant’s mark is CANADY HELIOS in standard character form.
Registrant’s mark is CANADY PLASMA in standard character form.
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Here, the marks share an identical initial element that forms the dominant portion of the respective marks. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34). Here, the word “CANADY” appears first in each mark, with the same spelling, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.
In the case of the applicant, the word CANADY appears first, and thus, forms the dominant impression of the applicant’s mark. Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).
In the case of the registration, the word CANADY is the only element of the mark registrable on its own. The wording “PLASMA” has been disclaimed as descriptive of the goods. Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
Comparison of Goods
Applicant’s goods are “Medical and surgical apparatus and instruments for use in general surgery, namely, electrosurgical generators, inert gas supply units, probes, electrodes, and handpieces for cold atmospheric plasma medical procedures; medical devices, namely, flexible probes, in particular endoscopic and bronchoscopic probes for cold atmospheric plasma medical procedures” in International Class 10.
Registrant’s goods are “Medical and surgical apparatus and instruments for use in general surgery, namely, electrosurgical generators, probes, electrodes, and handpieces for electrosurgery; high frequency electrosurgical argon generators and probes, handpieces and electrodes sold therewith; electrosurgical generators with argon capabilities for use in general surgery; medical devices, namely, flexible probes, in particular endoscopic and bronchoscopic probes” in International Class 10.
The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).
In this case, the application uses broad wording to describe “Medical and surgical apparatus and instruments for use in general surgery, namely, electrosurgical generators, inert gas supply units, probes, electrodes, and handpieces for cold atmospheric plasma medical procedures; medical devices, namely, flexible probes, in particular endoscopic and bronchoscopic probes for cold atmospheric plasma medical procedures,” which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including registrant’s more narrow “Medical and surgical apparatus and instruments for use in general surgery, namely, electrosurgical generators, probes, electrodes, and handpieces for electrosurgery; high frequency electrosurgical argon generators and probes, handpieces and electrodes sold therewith; electrosurgical generators with argon capabilities for use in general surgery; medical devices, namely, flexible probes, in particular endoscopic and bronchoscopic probes.” See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.
Thus, a consumer familiar with the mark and goods of applicant or registrant, upon encountering the mark and the goods of the other, is likely to mistakenly believe that the goods emanate from a common source.
Accordingly, registration is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
If the mark in the cited registration is owned by applicant, applicant may provide evidence of ownership of the mark by satisfying one of the following:
(1) Record the assignment with the USPTO’s Assignment Recordation Branch (ownership transfer documents such as assignments can be filed online at http://etas.uspto.gov) and promptly notify the trademark examining attorney that the assignment has been duly recorded;
(2) Submit copies of documents evidencing the chain of title; or
(3) Submit the following statement, verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20: “Applicant is the owner of U.S. Registration No. 3999419.” To provide this statement using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), use the “Response to Office Action” form; answer “yes” to wizard questions #3 and #9; then, continuing on to the next portion of the form, in the “Additional Statement(s)” section, find “Active Prior Registration(s)” and insert the U.S. registration numbers in the data fields; and follow the instructions within the form for signing. The form must be signed twice; a signature is required both in the “Declaration Signature” section and in the “Response Signature” section.
TMEP §812.01; see 15 U.S.C. §1060; 37 C.F.R. §§2.193(e)(1), 3.25, 3.73(a)-(b); TMEP §502.02(a).
Recording a document with the Assignment Recordation Branch does not constitute a response to an Office action. TMEP §503.01(d).
Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.
SECTIONS 1 AND 45 REFUSAL – MARK NOT SHOWN USED IN COMMERCE
Specifically, applicant submitted instructions for use of Applicant’s device using the mark and an article from 2014 reporting on use of the device bearing the mark. These images do not bear the mark on the goods, or their packaging, nor do they offer a point-of-sale for the goods identified. Accordingly, the specimen cannot be accepted.
Advertising is not acceptable as a specimen for goods. See In re Siny Corp., 920 F.3d 1331, 1336, 2019 USPQ2d 127099, at *2-3 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Powermatics, Inc. v. Globe Roofing Prods. Co., 341 F.2d 127, 130, 144 USPQ 430, 432 (C.C.P.A. 1965)); see also Avakoff v. S. Pac. Co., 765 F.2d 1097, 1098, 226 USPQ 435, 436 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §904.04(b), (c). Advertising includes online advertising banners appearing on search-engine results pages or in social media, advertising circulars and brochures, price lists, and business cards. See TMEP §904.04(b).
Examples of specimens. Specimens for goods include a photograph of (1) the actual goods bearing the mark; (2) an actual container, packaging, tag or label for the goods bearing the mark; or (3) a point-of-sale display showing the mark directly associated with the goods. See 37 C.F.R. §2.56(b)(1), (c); TMEP §904.03(a)-(m). A webpage specimen submitted as a display associated with the goods must show the mark in association with a picture or textual description of the goods and include information necessary for ordering the goods. TMEP §904.03(i); see 37 C.F.R. §2.56(b)(1), (c). Any webpage printout or screenshot submitted as a specimen must include the webpage’s URL and the date it was accessed or printed. 37 C.F.R. §2.56(c).
Response options. Applicant may respond to this refusal by satisfying one of the following for each applicable international class:
(1) Submit a different specimen (a verified “substitute” specimen) that (a) was in actual use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of an amendment to allege use and (b) shows the mark in actual use in commerce for the goods identified in the application or amendment to allege use. A “verified substitute specimen” is a specimen that is accompanied by the following statement made in a signed affidavit or supported by a declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20: “The substitute (or new, or originally submitted, if appropriate) specimen(s) was/were in use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of the amendment to allege use.” The substitute specimen cannot be accepted without this statement.
(2) Amend the filing basis to intent to use under Section 1(b) (which includes withdrawing an amendment to allege use, if one was filed), as no specimen is required before publication. This option will later necessitate additional fee(s) and filing requirements, including a specimen.
For an overview of the response options referenced above and instructions on how to satisfy these options using the online Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, see the Specimen webpage.
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
Response guidelines. For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Joseph P. McCarthy/
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 127
Phone: (571) 272-0458
joseph.mccarthy@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE