To: | Monica Awadalla (monica.awadalla@gmail.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88834582 - MONARK - 88834582 |
Sent: | July 16, 2020 07:47:46 PM |
Sent As: | ecom119@uspto.gov |
Attachments: |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88834582
Mark: MONARK
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Correspondence Address: |
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Applicant: Monica Awadalla
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Reference/Docket No. 88834582
Correspondence Email Address: |
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SUSPENSION NOTICE
No Response Required
Issue date: July 16, 2020
This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on 6/6/20.
The application is suspended for the reason(s) specified below. See 37 C.F.R. §2.67; TMEP §§716 et seq.
The pending application(s) below has an earlier filing date or effective filing date than applicant’s application. If the mark in the application(s) below registers, the USPTO may refuse registration of applicant’s mark under Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion with the registered mark(s). 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208.02(c). Action on this application is suspended until the prior-filed application(s) below either registers or abandons. 37 C.F.R. §2.83(c). Information relevant to the application(s) below was sent previously.
- U.S. Application Serial No(s). 87055725
Action on this application is SUSPENDED pending the disposition of the previously referenced potentially-conflicting pending application(s). 37 C.F.R. §2.83(c); TMEP §§716.02(c), 1208.02(c).
Applicant was previously provided information regarding pending U.S. Application Serial Nos. 87055725, which may present a bar to registration of applicant’s mark based on a likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d). See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq. In response, applicant argued that the mark in the pending application is not likely to cause confusion with applicant’s mark because “the other mark is presented with a butterfly and their original application was for Monarch (like the monarch butterfly)” that “[t]hey use a bright red bubble letter font and a large butterfly symbol next to their name”, that applicant’s mark “pre-dates the use of their mark”, that applicant’s mark “has a complete different spelling, appearance, look, feel, and connotation”, that applicant’s “logo is always used with the overlapping diamond shapes, is always in black, uses a very modern and minimalistic font and has a very different feel and connotation”, that the parties have “different products”, that the products have differences, that the way the products are sold and marketed are different, that the parties to whom the products are sold are different. Applicant’s arguments are not persuasive as detailed below.
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
The fact that the goods of the parties differ is not controlling in determining likelihood of confusion. The issue is not likelihood of confusion between particular goods, but likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of those goods. In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1316, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01.
The marks are compared as they appear in the drawing of the application and in the registration; the USPTO does not consider how an applicant and registrant actually use their marks in the marketplace. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1186 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1324, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
There is no correct pronunciation of a mark because it is impossible to predict how the public will pronounce a particular mark. See Embarcadero Techs., Inc. v. RStudio, Inc., 105 USPQ2d 1825, 1835 (TTAB 2013) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1367, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1912 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re The Belgrade Shoe Co., 411 F.2d 1352, 1353, 162 USPQ 227, 227 (C.C.P.A. 1969)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv). The marks in question could clearly be pronounced the same; such similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).
Applicant’s claim of priority of use is not relevant to this ex parte proceeding. See In re Calgon Corp., 435 F.2d 596, 168 USPQ 278 (C.C.P.A. 1971). Trademark Act Section 7(b), 15 U.S.C. §1057(b), provides that a certificate of registration on the Principal Register is prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, of the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods and/or services specified in the certificate. During ex parte prosecution, the trademark examining attorney has no authority to review or to decide on matters that constitute a collateral attack on the cited registration. TMEP §1207.01(d)(iv).
The presumption under Trademark Act Section 7(b) is that the registrant is the owner of the mark and that their use of the mark extends to all goods and/or services identified in the registration. 15 U.S.C. §1057(b). In the absence of limitations as to channels of trade or classes of purchasers in the goods and/or services in the registration, the presumption is that the goods and/or services move in all trade channels normal for such goods and/or services and are available to all potential classes of ordinary consumers of such goods and/or services. See In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1737 (TTAB 2018); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
The trademark examining attorney has found applicant’s arguments unpersuasive and still believes there may be a likelihood of confusion between applicant’s mark and the mark in the cited prior-pending application(s), should they register. Thus, this application is suspended.
The following requirement has been satisfied:
The following refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) is/are maintained and continued:
See id. The refusal and requirement will be made final once this application is removed from suspension, unless a new issue arises. See TMEP §716.01.
Suspension process. The USPTO will periodically check this application to determine if it should remain suspended. See TMEP §716.04. As needed, the trademark examining attorney will issue a letter to applicant to inquire about the status of the reason for the suspension. TMEP §716.05.
No response required. Applicant may file a response, but is not required to do so.
/John M.C. Kelly/
John M.C. Kelly
Examining Attorney
Law Office 119
571-272-9412
john.kelly@uspto.gov