Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  June 02, 2020

 

 

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

• Refusal – Section 2(d) Likelihood of Confusion
• Refusal – Section 2(e)(4) Primarily Merely a Surname
• Identification of Goods Amendment Required

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5903166 HYLANDA for “Alarm clocks; Atomic clocks; Buckles for watchstraps; Chronographs as watches; Clock cabinets; Clock housings; Clock and watch hands; Clocks; Clocks and watches; Clocks and watches, electric; Clockworks being clock parts; Floor clocks; Inexpensive non-jewelry watches; Jewellery, clocks and watches; Jewelry cases; Mechanical and automatic watches; Movements for clocks and watches; Parts for clocks; Parts for watches; Presentation boxes for watches; Sports watches; Wall clocks; Watch bracelets; Watch faces; Watch glasses; Watches; Watches containing a game function; Watches and clocks; Watches, clocks; Watches, clocks, jewellery and imitation jewellery; Watchstraps; Wristwatches” in International Class 014.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In the present case the respective marks, HYLAND and HYLANDA, are similar in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.  Although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.

 

Therefore, the marks are similar.

 

Relatedness of the Goods

 

Applicant’s goods are:

• “Jewelry” in International Class 014;
• “Handbags, tote bags, satchels, backpacks, wallets, clutches” in International Class 018;
• “Clothing, namely, shirts, skirts, shorts, pants, dresses, jackets, coats, belts, socks, scarves, hats, flip flops, tights, leggings, wraps, gloves, lingerie, bras, underwear, pajamas and footwear” in International Class 025.

 

Registrant’s goods are “Alarm clocks; Atomic clocks; Buckles for watchstraps; Chronographs as watches; Clock cabinets; Clock housings; Clock and watch hands; Clocks; Clocks and watches; Clocks and watches, electric; Clockworks being clock parts; Floor clocks; Inexpensive non-jewelry watches; Jewellery, clocks and watches; Jewelry cases; Mechanical and automatic watches; Movements for clocks and watches; Parts for clocks; Parts for watches; Presentation boxes for watches; Sports watches; Wall clocks; Watch bracelets; Watch faces; Watch glasses; Watches; Watches containing a game function; Watches and clocks; Watches, clocks; Watches, clocks, jewellery and imitation jewellery; Watchstraps; Wristwatches” in International Class 014.

 

The compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

In this case, the goods in the application and registration are identical as to jewelry.  Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and class of purchasers are the same for these goods.  See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1372, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.  

 

Furthermore, the attached Internet evidence consists of screenshots from the web sites of “Kate Spade New York”, “Christian Louboutin”, “Chanel”, “Ted Baker”, and “Tom Ford”.  Each of these entities manufactures clothing goods and handbags as well as jewelry and watches, all under the same mark.  This evidence establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

Because the marks are similar and the goods are identical in part and related, as discussed above, consumers are likely to be confused as to the source of the goods.  Accordingly, registration is refused pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.

 

SECTION 2(e)(4) REFUSAL – PRIMARILY MERELY A SURNAME

 

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark is primarily merely a surname.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(4), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(4); see TMEP §1211. 

 

An applicant’s mark is primarily merely a surname if the surname, when viewed in connection with the applicant’s recited goods and/or services, “‘is the primary significance of the mark as a whole to the purchasing public.’”  Earnhardt v. Kerry Earnhardt, Inc., 864 F.3d 1374, 1377, 123 USPQ2d 1411, 1413 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Hutchinson Tech. Inc., 852 F.2d 552, 554, 7 USPQ2d 1490, 1492 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); TMEP §1211.01.

 

The following five inquiries are often used to determine the public’s perception of a term’s primary significance:

 

(1)        Whether the surname is rare;

 

(2)        Whether anyone connected with applicant uses the term as a surname;

 

(3)        Whether the term has any recognized meaning other than as a surname;

 

(4)        Whether the term has the structure and pronunciation of a surname; and

 

(5)        Whether the term is sufficiently stylized to remove its primary significance from that of a surname.

 

In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1276, 1278 & n.2, 1282-83 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Benthin Mgmt. GmbH, 37 USPQ2d 1332, 1333-34 (TTAB 1995) for the Benthin inquiries/factors); TMEP §1211.01; see also In re Etablissements Darty et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 16-18, 225 USPQ 652, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 

 

These inquiries are not exclusive, and any of these circumstances – singly or in combination – and any other relevant circumstances may be considered when making this determination.  In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d at 1277-78; TMEP §1211.01.  For example, when the applied-for mark is not stylized, it is unnecessary to consider the fifth inquiry.  In re Yeley, 85 USPQ2d 1150, 1151 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1211.01.

 

Please see the attached evidence from LEXISNEXIS®, establishing the surname significance of HYLAND.  This evidence shows the applied-for mark appearing over 15,000 times as a surname in the LEXISNEXIS® surname database, which is a weekly updated directory of cell phone and other phone numbers (such as voice over IP) from various data providers. 

 

Additionally, the attached Internet evidence shows that the term HYLAND is a common surname and has received media publicity as it is a surname for different public figures.  If a surname appears routinely in news reports or articles and receives media publicity so as to be broadly exposed to the general public, then such surname is not rare and its primary significance to purchasers would be that of a surname, such as in this case.  See In re Beds & Bars Ltd., 122 USPQ2d 1546, 1551 (TTAB 2017); In re Gregory, 70 USPQ2d at 1795; TMEP §1211.01(a)(v).

 

Furthermore, evidence that a term has no recognized meaning or significance other than as a surname is relevant to determining whether the term would be perceived as primarily merely a surname.  See In re Weiss Watch Co., 123 USPQ2d 1200, 1203 (TTAB 2017); In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1276, 1280 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §1211.02(b)(vi).  The attached evidence from “Wordnik” and “Your Dictionary” shows that HYLAND does not appear in the dictionary other than that of a surname.  Thus, this term appears to have no recognized meaning or significance other than as a surname. 

 

Accordingly, registration is refused on the Principal Register pursuant to Section 2(e)(4) of the Trademark Act. 

 

Advisory: Supplemental Register

 

This advisory applies only to the refusal pursuant to Section 2(e)(f) of the Trademark Act

 

Although an amendment to the Supplemental Register would normally be an appropriate response to refusal, such a response is not appropriate in the present case.  The instant application was filed under Trademark Act Section 1(b) and is not eligible for registration on the Supplemental Register until an acceptable amendment to allege use meeting the requirements of 37 C.F.R. §2.76 has been timely filed.  37 C.F.R. §2.47(d); TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03.

 

If applicant files an acceptable allegation of use and also amends to the Supplemental Register, the application effective filing date will be the date applicant met the minimum filing requirements under 37 C.F.R. §2.76(c) for an amendment to allege use.  TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03; see 37 C.F.R. §2.75(b).  In addition, the undersigned trademark examining attorney will conduct a new search of the USPTO records for conflicting marks based on the later application filing date.  TMEP §§206.01, 1102.03.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusals by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

If applicant responds to the refusals, applicant must also respond to the requirement set forth below.

 

IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS

 

Applicant must clarify some of the wording in the identification of goods because it is indefinite and too broad.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §§1402.01, 1402.03.  This wording is indefinite because it does not make clear the exact nature of the goods. 

 

Applicant should note that any wording in bold, in italics, underlined and/or in ALL CAPS below offers guidance and/or shows the changes being proposed for the identification of goods and/or services.  If there is wording in the applicant’s version of the identification of goods and/or services which should be removed, it will be shown with a line through it such as this: strikethrough.  When making its amendments, applicant should enter them in standard font, not in bold, in italics, underlined and/or in ALL CAPS.

 

Applicant may adopt the following identification, if accurate:

 

            International Class 014:          Identification of goods has been accepted

 

International Class 018:          Identification of goods has been accepted

 

International Class 025:          Clothing, namely, shirts, skirts, shorts, pants, dresses, jackets, coats, belts, socks, scarves, hats, flip flops, tights, leggings, clothing wraps, gloves, lingerie, bras, underwear, pajamas and footwear

 

Applicant may amend the identification to clarify or limit the goods and/or services, but not to broaden or expand the goods and/or services beyond those in the original application or as acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Generally, any deleted goods and/or services may not later be reinserted.  See TMEP §1402.07(e).

 

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual.  See TMEP §1402.04.

 

ASSISTANCE

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although an examining attorney cannot provide legal advice, the examining attorney can provide additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. 

 

The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.    

 

 

/Sahar Nasserghodsi/

Sahar Nasserghodsi

Examining Attorney

Law Office 115

(571)272-9192

Sahar.Nasserghodsi@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on June 02, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88830838

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Sahar Nasserghodsi/

Sahar Nasserghodsi

Examining Attorney

Law Office 115

(571)272-9192

Sahar.Nasserghodsi@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from June 02, 2020, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”