Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  April 23, 2020

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

• SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
• PRIOR PENDING APPLICATIONS 
• IDENTIFICATION REQUIRES AMENDMENT
• MARK DESCRIPTION REQUIRES AMENDMENT

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark “ONE HOME” in U.S. Registration No. 4518376.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

The marks are confusingly similar because they are identical in sound and meaning, and confusingly similar in appearance.  

 

Applicant’s mark is “ONEHOME” and registrant’s mark is “ONE HOME”.

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The marks are identical in sound. The marks are essentially phonetic equivalents and thus sound similar.  Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).

 

Further, the word elements of the compared marks are identical except for a slight difference in appearance between applicant’s mark, which appears as a compound word with no space separating the words, that is, “ONEHOME” and registrant’s mark, which appears as multiple words with space separating the words, that is, “ONE HOME”.  As such, the marks are identical in sound and virtually identical in appearance, and are thus confusingly similar for the purposes of determining likelihood of confusion.  See, e.g., Seaguard Corp. v. Seaward Int’l, Inc., 223 USPQ 48, 51 (TTAB 1984) (“[T]he marks ‘SEAGUARD’ and ‘SEA GUARD’ are, in contemplation of law, identical [internal citation omitted].”); In re Best W. Family Steak House, Inc., 222 USPQ 827, 827 (TTAB 1984) (“There can be little doubt that the marks [BEEFMASTER and BEEF MASTER] are practically identical”); Stock Pot, Inc., v. Stockpot Rest., Inc., 220 USPQ 52, 52 (TTAB 1983), aff’d 737 F.2d 1576, 222 USPQ 665 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“There is no question that the marks of the parties [STOCKPOT and STOCK POT] are confusingly similar.  The word marks are phonetically identical and visually almost identical.”). 

 

Applicant’s mark does contain a design element, but this holds less weight. When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the services.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

 

Since the word elements of both marks are identical, except for a space in between the two shared terms, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Comparison of the Services

 

The services are closely related because they are complementary and overlap: they both offer online information about home renovations.

 

Applicant’s services are, in relevant part “a mobile application for providing consumers with information about home listings, insight about properties and location, and connecting the consumer with professionals to enable home buying, selling, renovation transactions” [emphasis added.]

 

Registrant’s services are, in relevant part, “Providing a searchable online advertising website…featuring the goods and services of other vendors via the internet in the fields of interior decoration, remodeling, and home décor.”

 

The services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

The compared services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

The services are closely related for at least two reasons.

 

First, they are complementary. In this case, applicant offers software that helps prospective home buyers buy houses and renovate them. This makes sense, since when purchasing home, many home buyers take that opportunity to renovate the home before, and even right after, they move in, to get it ready for living. That is why consumers who would use applicant’s services (for buying a home, and “renovation transactions”) would also use registrant’s website to find renovation ideas.

 

Second, the services overlap: they both offer online information about renovations. Applicant offers “a mobile application…connecting the consumer with professionals to enable…renovation transactions” while registrant offers “a website…featuring…vendors via the internet in the fields of interior decoration, remodeling, and home décor.” A consumer would use registrant’s site to find a renovator or contractor, and then use applicant’s site to “enable” the “renovation transaction.”

 

Further, where the marks of the respective parties are identical or virtually identical, as in this case, the degree of similarity or relatedness between the services needed to support a finding of likelihood of confusion declines.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993)), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017); TMEP §1207.01(a).

 

Finally, all of the services are closely related in their general purpose: they help consumers obtain a beautiful home to live in. (Applicant’s software helps consumers buy and renovate, while registrant’s helps consumers renovate.) As such, the services are closely related.

 

Conclusion

 

For these reasons, consumers are likely to encounter the parties’ services in the same market channels.  Given the strong similarities between the key elements of the parties’ marks, consumers encountering the marks in the same commercial contexts are likely to confuse the marks and mistake the underlying sources of related services provided under the marks.  Registration is refused to prevent such confusion.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Applicant should also note the following advisory.

 

PRIOR PENDING APPLICATIONS 

 

The filing date of pending U.S. Application Serial Nos. 88776856 and 88457662 precedes applicant’s filing date.  See attached referenced application(s). If they register, applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion between the marks.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq.  Therefore, upon receipt of applicant’s response to this Office action, action on this application may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed referenced application(s).

 

In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the mark(s) in the referenced application.  Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.

 

Applicant should also note the following requirement.

 

IDENTIFICATION REQUIRES AMENDMENT

 

Some of the wording used to describe portions of applicant’s services in the identification is indefinite and too broad and could include services in other international classes. This wording must be clarified for the reasons listed below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01. 

 

·         The wording “use of non-downloadable software in the nature of a mobile application” is not acceptable because mobile applications are downloadable. Applicant may fix this by deleting the wording “in the nature of a mobile application”.

·         While online non-downloadable software for real estate services does typically belong in class 42, such services provided merely through a website would belong in another class, such as class 35 (if promoting listings and/or merely connecting buyers and sellers) or 36 (if enabling real estate transactions and business).  Thus, it is suggested that applicant parse out the website services written in class 42, and move them into a class 35 or 36, which applicant could add for an additional fee, as discussed below. Or, applicant may delete such language.

o   The wording “Providing a website for connecting consumers and qualified service providers in the field of real property and real estate” should be moved to Class 35.

o   The wording “providing a website and non-downloadable computer software” should be parsed out into different classes.

·         The wording “service providers” is indefinite and overbroad, and can include internet service providers, content service providers, or otherwise. Thus, applicant must specify the type of service provider, such as real estate service providers.

·         The acronym “mls” should be clarified and spelled out, into the wording “multiple listing service.”

·         Each mention of “non-downloadable computer software” should be preceded by the wording “providing temporary use of online”.

 

Applicant may substitute and/or select from the following wording, if accurate:

 

• Class 35 [added]: Providing a website for connecting consumers and qualified service providers in the field of real property and real estate;

 

• Class 36 [added]: Providing a website that enables consumers to view and interact with digital real estate listings populated on multiple listing service platforms, allow realtors to send curated digital home listings to home buyer consumers, and engage digitally with realtors throughout the home buying and selling transaction;

 

• Class 42: Providing temporary use of non-downloadable software providing consumers with information about home listings, insight about properties and location, and connecting the consumer with professionals to enable home buying, selling, renovation transactions; Providing temporary use of non-downloadable software providing consumers with information about real estate service providers and for use in connecting service providers and consumers through referrals; Providing temporary use of online non-downloadable computer software that enables consumers to view and interact with digital real estate listings populated on multiple listing service platforms, allow realtors to send curated digital home listings to home buyer consumers, and engage digitally with realtors throughout the home buying and selling transaction;

 

Scope Advisory. Applicant may amend the identification to clarify or limit the services, but not to broaden or expand the services beyond those in the original application or as acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Generally, any deleted goods and/or services may not later be reinserted.  See TMEP §1402.07(e).

 

ID Manual. For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual.  See TMEP §1402.04.

 

Multiclass Advisory. The application identifies services in more than one international class; therefore, applicant must satisfy all the requirements below for each international class based on Trademark Act Section 1(b):

 

(1)        List the goods and/or services by their international class number in consecutive numerical order, starting with the lowest numbered class.

 

(2)        Submit a filing fee for each international class not covered by the fee(s) already paid (view the USPTO’s current fee schedule).  The application identifies services that are classified in at least 3 classes; however, applicant submitted a fee sufficient for only 1 class.  Applicant must either submit the filing fees for the classes not covered by the submitted fees or restrict the application to the number of classes covered by the fees already paid.

 

See 37 C.F.R. §2.86(a); TMEP §§1403.01, 1403.02(c).

 

For an overview of the requirements for a Section 1(b) multiple-class application and how to satisfy the requirements online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, see the Multiple-class Application webpage.

 

Applicant should also note the following requirement.

 

MARK DESCRIPTION REQUIRES AMENDMENT

 

Applicant must submit an amended description of the mark because the current one uses broad, vague language that does not accurately describe the mark.  37 C.F.R. §2.37; see TMEP §§808.01, 808.02.  Descriptions must be accurate and identify all the literal and design elements in the mark.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.37; TMEP §808.02. 

 

The following description is suggested, if accurate:  The mark consists of the stylized lowercase wording “ONEHOME” with an image of the top half of a house inside of the "O".

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although an examining attorney cannot provide legal advice, the examining attorney can provide additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. 

 

The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.    

 

 

Becker, Joseph (Trademark)

/Joseph Becker/

Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 117

United States PTO

(571) 270-5493

Joseph.Becker1@uspto.gov

 

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on April 23, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88823017

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

Becker, Joseph (Trademark)

/Joseph Becker/

Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 117

United States PTO

(571) 270-5493

Joseph.Becker1@uspto.gov

 

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from April 23, 2020, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”