| To: | Nanox Medical Corp (dr.zhao.cheng@gmail.com) |
| Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88790833 - NANOX - N/A |
| Sent: | May 04, 2020 01:44:43 PM |
| Sent As: | ecom125@uspto.gov |
| Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
|
U.S. Application Serial No. 88790833
Mark: NANOX
|
|
|
Correspondence Address: |
|
|
Applicant: Nanox Medical Corp
|
|
|
Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
|
NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
ISSUE DATE: May 04, 2020
INTRODUCTION
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration Nos. 4378130, 4248033, and 2967860. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registrations.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by-case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Similarity of the Marks
Applicant’s mark is NANOX in standard character form.
Registrants’ marks are as follows:
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In this case, applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark create substantially similar commercial impressions because they share the arbitrary wording “NANO X.” Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).
In the present case, applicant’s mark is NANOX and registrants’ marks are NANO X. These marks are nearly identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Thus, the design element and/or the spacing the registered marks does not obviate the similarity between the marks.
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
Relatedness of Goods
Applicant’s goods are identified as “X-ray apparatus for dental imaging; X-ray apparatus for medical purposes; X-ray apparatus for medical use; X-ray apparatus for veterinary use; X-ray appliances for dental and medical use; X-ray CT scanners; X-ray diagnostic apparatus; X-ray photographs for medical purposes; X-ray tubes for medical purposes; CT scanner component, namely, integral component of the image chain of a CT scanner for capturing X-rays and converting them to information that creates the image; Fitted covers for patient x-ray radiation shields; Medical X-ray apparatus; Medical X-ray aprons; Mounts for X-ray negatives for medical purposes; Patient x-ray radiation shields”
Registrant’s good are identified as follows:
Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
In this case, the goods in the application and registration for NANOXRAY share identical goods for medical X-ray apparatus. Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and classes of purchasers are the same for these goods. See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1372, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.
In this case, the application uses broad wording to describe the relevant goods, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described in registrants’ narrower goods. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018). In the present case, Applicant’s goods for “x-ray apparatus for medical purposes” includes Registrants’ goods for contrast media for use with x-ray equipment and compact linear accelerators for radiation therapy because these goods can be used as an x-ray apparatus. Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
In summary, the applicant’s and registrant’s marks create the same commercial impression and the respective goods are highly related. Therefore, consumers are likely to be confused and mistakenly believe that these goods originate from a common source. Accordingly, registration must be refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. If applicant responds to the refusal, applicant must also respond to the requirements set forth below.
FILING BASIS REQUIRED
Applicant has not specified a filing basis in the application. An application must specify and meet the requirements of at least one filing basis. 37 C.F.R. §§2.32(a)(5), 2.34(a); TMEP §806. Accordingly, applicant must (1) amend the application to specify clearly at least one filing basis, and (2) satisfy all the requirements for the basis or bases asserted.
An applicant may add one or more of the following four bases to an application after filing:
(1) Use of the mark in commerce under Trademark Act Section 1(a);
(2) A bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce under Section 1(b);
(3) A foreign registration of the same mark for the same goods and/or services in an applicant’s country of origin, under Section 44(e); and/or
(4) A claim of priority based on an earlier-filed foreign application of the same mark for the same goods and/or services, which is filed within six months after the filing date of the foreign application, under Section 44(d).
Although an applicant may assert more than one basis, an applicant may not assert both Section 1(a) for use and Section 1(b) for intent to use for identical goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §2.34(b); TMEP §806.02(b).
For more information about the different legal requirements for each basis, for submitting more than one basis, and for instructions on how to satisfy these requirements online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, please go to the Basis webpage.
STATEMENT REQUIRED – SIGNIFICANCE OF WORDING IN THE MARK
(1) Explain whether the wording “NANOX” in the mark has any meaning or significance in the trade or industry in which applicant’s goods and/or services are manufactured or provided, any meaning or significance as applied to applicant’s goods and/or services, or if such wording is a term of art within applicant’s industry. See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §814.
Factual information about the goods must clearly indicate how they operate, their salient features, and their prospective customers and channels of trade. Conclusory statements will not satisfy this requirement for information.
Failure to comply with a request for information is grounds for refusing registration. In re AOP LLC, 107 USPQ2d at 1651 (citing In re Cheezwhse.com, Inc., 85 USPQ2d at 1919; In re DTI P’ship LLP, 67 USPQ2d 1699, 1701 (TTAB 2003); TMEP §814). Merely stating that information about the goods is available on applicant’s website is an insufficient response and will not make the relevant information of record. See In re Planalytics, Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1453, 1457-58 (TTAB 2004).
RESPONSE GUIDELINES
If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney. All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response. See 37 C.F.R. §2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Cristel John/
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 125
(571) 272-5412
cristel.john@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE
