To: | South Cord Holdings LLC (damian.martin.esq@gmail.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88778119 - CATALYST - N/A |
Sent: | April 20, 2020 07:28:30 AM |
Sent As: | ecom124@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 Attachment - 24 Attachment - 25 Attachment - 26 Attachment - 27 Attachment - 28 Attachment - 29 Attachment - 30 Attachment - 31 Attachment - 32 Attachment - 33 Attachment - 34 Attachment - 35 Attachment - 36 Attachment - 37 Attachment - 38 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88778119
Mark: CATALYST
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Correspondence Address: 6700 PACIFIC COAST HWY, STE. 220
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Applicant: South Cord Holdings LLC
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NON-FINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: April 20, 2020
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark “Catalyst” is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 3292314 (Catalyst) and 3588840 (Catalist). Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registrations.
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
The applicant’s proposed mark, “Catalyst” is likely to be confused with the registered marks, “Catalyst (RN 3292314) and “Catalist” (RN 3588840). The applicant’s mark and the mark in RN 3292314 are identical, being the term “Catalyst” in standard character form. These marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods. Id. Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
As to the mark “Catalist” (RN 3588840), the only difference is the applicant’s use of a “y” (the correct spelling”) where the registrant uses an “i” in the mark, being the phonetic spelling of “catalyst”. See Dictionary.com, search of “catalyst,” http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/catalyst (April 20, 2020) (showing the pronunciation of “catalyst” as”kat-l-ist”). The marks are essentially phonetic equivalents and thus sound similar. Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).
Here, the applicant’s mark is identical to the mark in RN 3292314, and identical in sound and highly similar in appearance to the mark in RN 3588840. Therefore, source confusion is likely.
Comparing the Goods
The applicant’s goods are “Clothing, namely, shirts, jackets, t-shirts, tank tops, hats, beanies, sweatshirts, and hooded sweatshirts,” in Class 25, and “Smokeless cigarette vaporizer pipes, oral vaporizers for smoking purposes, electronic vaporizers, E-vaporizers, ashtrays, lighters for smokers, cigarette lighters not for land vehicles, electronic cigarette lighters, and ashtrays for smokers,” in Class 24. See application. The registrants’ goods are:
See attached registrations.
Comparison with RN 3588840
The underlined wording in Class 25 above shows goods in the application that are identical to goods in the registration. All of the clothing in the application is identical to the clothing in the registration.
In this case, the application uses the broad wording “t-shirts” and the registration uses the broad wording “”sweatshirts”, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including applicant’s more narrow “hooded sweatshirts” and registrant’s more narrow “Short-sleeved or long-sleeved t-shirts”. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related. Thus, source confusion regarding applicant’s clothing is likely.
Comparison with RN 3292314
The attached Internet evidence consists of the websites of retailers selling both cigars and e-cigarette products, specifically, Dosal, Moon Smoke Shop, and BnB Tobacco. This evidence establishes that the relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use, and the goods are similar or complementary in terms of purpose or function. Therefore, applicant’s and registrant’s goods in RN 3292314 are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
Evidence obtained from the Internet may be used to support a determination under Trademark Act Section 2(d) that goods and/or services are related. See, e.g., In re G.B.I. Tile & Stone, Inc., 92 USPQ2d 1366, 1371 (TTAB 2009); In re Paper Doll Promotions, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1660, 1668 (TTAB 2007).
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Accordingly, the applicant’s proposed mark, “Catalyst”, is refused for likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d).
Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.
NOTICE OF PRIOR PENDING APPLICATION
The filing date of pending U.S. Application Serial No. 88042286 (Vegan Catalyst) precedes applicant’s filing date. See attached referenced application. If the mark in the referenced application registers, applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion between the two marks. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq. Therefore, upon receipt of applicant’s response to this Office action, action on this application may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed referenced application.
In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the mark in the referenced application. Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.
Upon receipt of applicant’s response resolving the following requirement(s), action on this application will be suspended pending the disposition of Application Serial No. 88042286. 37 C.F.R. §2.83(c); TMEP §§716.02(c), 1208.02(c).
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. However, if applicant responds to the refusal(s), applicant must also respond to the requirement(s) set forth below.
IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS – CLASS 34 ONLY
Please note: Class 25 is accepted as written by the applicant.
The wording “electronic vaporizers, E-vaporizers” in the identification of goods is indefinite and must be clarified to indicate that these are oral vaporizers for smokers. See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01; see attached evidence from the U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual showing “oral vaporizers for smokers” in Class 34.
Applicant may substitute the following wording, showing the suggested amendments in bold type, if accurate:
Class 34
Smokeless cigarette vaporizer pipes, oral vaporizers for smoking purposes, electronic oral vaporizers for smokers, E-vaporizers being electronic oral vaporizers for smokers, ashtrays, lighters for smokers, cigarette lighters not for land vehicles, electronic cigarette lighters, and ashtrays for smokers
For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual. See TMEP §1402.04.
RESPONSE TO OFFICE ACTION
If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney. All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Alyssa Paladino Steel/
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 124
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
(571) 272-8808
alyssa.steel@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE