Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

Issue date:  April 25, 2020

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
• Section 2(e)(2) Refusal – Primarily Geographically Descriptive
• Request for Additional Information
• Identification of Goods Requirement

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 3291827, STAX; 3293214, STAX; and 4859296, STAX.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations.

 

Applicant’s mark is STACK USA, for “Dietary and nutritional supplements; medicated oils”, in Class 05, “Nut-based food bars; Dried fruit-based snacks; Soy-based food bars; Dairy-based beverages; Jerky; Snack mix consisting of processed seeds, dehydrated fruit and processed nuts”, in Class 29, “Cereal based energy bars; High-protein cereal bars”, in Class 30, and “Energy drinks; Concentrates for use in the preparation of energy drinks”, in Class 32.

 

Registration No. 3291827 is STAX, stylized, for “Potato chips; Potato crisps; Potato-based snack foods”, in Class 29.

 

Registration No. 3293214 is STAX, for “Potato chips; Potato crisps; Potato-based snack foods”, in Class 29.

 

Registration No. 4859296 is STAX, plus a design, for “Retail stores featuring dietary and nutritional supplements”, in Class 35.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

 

1. Comparison of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Here, applicant’s mark STACK USA and all of the registered marks, STAX, share a visually and phonetically equivalent dominant element: STACK. While registrant’s STAX is spelled different than registrant’s STACK, they are phonetic equivalents, and thus the marks sound and appear similar. The marks have their differences, however, these differences do not obviate the likelihood of confusion.

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

First, for Registration No. 4859296, when evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Here, the design element conveys the vague impression of a letter being partially replaced with a man flexing, and is insufficiently distinctive to alter the applied-for mark's overall commercial impression from that engendered by the mark's literal element, STAX. Further, despite the mark's design element, consumers will use STAX to refer to or request the associated services. Thus, STAX is this registered mark’s dominant element and source indicating essence.

 

Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).

 

Here, the entirety of each registered mark, STAX, is the phonetic equivalent to the plural of thefirst wording in applicant’s mark, STACK. An applied-for mark that is the singular or plural form of a registered mark is essentially identical in sound, appearance, meaning, and commercial impression, and thus the marks are confusingly similar.  Swiss Grill Ltd., v. Wolf Steel Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 2001, 2011 n.17 (TTAB 2015) (holding “it is obvious that the virtually identical marks [the singular and plural of SWISS GRILL] are confusingly similar”); Weider Publ’ns, LLC v. D & D Beauty Care Co., 109 USPQ2d 1347, 1355 (TTAB 2014) (finding the singular and plural forms of SHAPE to be essentially the same mark) (citing Wilson v. Delaunay, 245 F.2d 877, 878, 114 USPQ 339, 341 (C.C.P.A. 1957) (finding no material difference between the singular and plural forms of ZOMBIE such that the marks were considered the same mark).

 

Thus, the dominant element of each of the marks are essentially phonetic equivalents and thus sound similar.  Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv). While applicant’s mark includes the additional wording USA, this wording is less significant in creating the overall commercial impression of the mark within which they are contained because of their subordinate position as the second part of the mark.

 

Therefore, for all of the marks concerned, the part of the mark consumers are most likely to focus on and recall is the same: STACK.  From the foregoing, it follows that both applicant’s mark and the registered marks engender an overall commercial impression that is highly similar.

 

In short, the marks are identical in part, sharing the visually and phonetically similar dominant element: STACK/STAX. None of the design element, applicant’s plural form of applicant’s phonetic equivalent wording, or the additional wording in applicant’s mark changes the overall commercial impression of these marks.

 

Thus, when compared in their entireties, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

2. Comparison of the Goods and Services

 

The goods and services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

The compared goods and services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

The attached Internet evidence, consisting of website screenshots, establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures, produces, or provides the relevant goods and services and markets the goods or services under the same mark and the relevant goods or services are sold or provided through the same trade channels. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

Registration Nos. 3291827 and 3293214

 

Looking at the goods, applicant’s jerky and snack mix goods are related to registrant’s potato chips and other potato based snack foods, in that it is common for entities to provide these goods, together under the same mark and in the same trade channels. The attached evidence from Essential Everyday, J. Higgs, and Utz show entities that provide both snack mix and potato based snacks, together under the same mark and in the same channels of trade.

 

Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.

 

Registration No. 4859296

 

The use of similar marks on or in connection with both products and retail-store services has been held likely to cause confusion where the evidence showed that the retail-store services featured the same type of products.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding the use of similar marks for various clothing items, including athletic uniforms, and for retail shops featuring sports team related clothing and apparel likely to cause confusion); In re House Beer, LLC, 114 USPQ2d 1073, 1078 (TTAB 2015) (holding the use of identical marks for beer and for retail store services featuring beer likely to cause confusion); In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d 1021, 1023 (TTAB 2006) (holding the use of similar marks for jewelry and for retail-jewelry and mineral-store services likely to cause confusion); TMEP §1207.01(a)(ii).

 

Here, registrant’s retail stores featuring dietary supplements is related to applicant’s supplements, energy and cereal bars, and energy drinks, in that it is common for entities to provide the retail store services featuring dietary supplements, as well as other related goods, such as energy bars and energy drinks, together under the same mark and in the same channels of trade. The attached evidence from GNC, Redcon1, and Vitamin Shoppe show entities that provide retail store services featuring supplements, as well as the applicant’s various energy drinks, cereal bars, and supplement goods, together under the same mark and in the same channels of trade.

 

Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and services related.

 

3. Conclusion

 

Use of the confusingly similar marks in relation to the related goods and services would lead to a likelihood of confusion. Accordingly, given the similarity of applicant’s mark to registrant’s mark, and the related nature of the goods and services those marks identify, there is a likelihood of source confusion. Therefore, registration is refused pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.

 

SECTION 2(e)(2) REFUSAL – PRIMARILY GEOGRAPHICALLY DESCRIPTIVE

 

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark is primarily geographically descriptive of the origin of applicant’s goods and services.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(2); see TMEP §§1210, 1210.01(a).

 

A mark is primarily geographically descriptive when the following is demonstrated:

 

(1)        The primary significance of the mark to the purchasing public is a generally known location;

 

(2)        The goods originate in the place identified in the mark; and

 

(3)        The purchasing public would be likely to believe that the goods originate in the geographic place identified in the mark; that is, to make a goods-place or association.

 

TMEP §1210.01(a); see In re Societe Generale des Eaux Minerales de Vittel S.A., 824 F.2d 957, 959, 3 USPQ2d 1450, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re Hollywood Lawyers Online, 110 USPQ2d 1852, 1853 (TTAB 2014); see also In re Newbridge Cutlery Co., 776 F.3d 854, 860-61, 113 USPQ2d 1445, 1448-49 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

 

First, the attached evidence from Merriam-Webster Dictionary and Acronym Finder, establish that USA is a common acronym for the United States of America, which is a primarily well-known geographic place. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/USA; http://www.acronymfinder.com/USA.html. This evidence establishes that USA is a republic with a population of over 300 million people. Thus, USA is primarily a well-known geographic place.

 

The addition of generic or highly descriptive wording to a geographic word or term does not diminish that geographic word or term’s primary geographic significance.  TMEP §1210.02(c)(ii); see, e.g., In re Hollywood Lawyers Online, 110 USPQ2d 1852, 1853-54 (TTAB 2014) (holding HOLLYWOOD LAWYERS ONLINE primarily geographically descriptive of attorney referrals, online business information, and an online business directory); In re Cheezwhse.com, Inc., 85 USPQ2d 1917, 1920 (TTAB 2008) (holding NORMANDIE CAMEMBERT primarily geographically descriptive of cheese).

 

The wording STACK, per the attached industry evidence from BodyBuilding.com, http://www.bodybuilding.com/content/what-are-the-best-supplement-stacks.html (“What are the Best Supplement Stacks?” and “This stack is more than enough for most athletes to gain muscle mass quickly and easily”); Muscle and Fitness, http://www.muscleandfitness.com/supplements/build-muscle/best-supplement-stacks-every-goal/ (“You need to know which supplements are effective, and which works best together. The technical term for this is “stacking”, and here we will school you on creating some basic stacks for gaining muscle mass, increasing muscle strength, boosting testosterone levels, and dropping body fat.”; and Train Magazine, http://www.trainmag.com/infographic/supplement-food-stacks-infographic/ (“On this infographic, you’ll find supplement and food stacks that help with your health and fitness.”) shows that the wording STACK is commonly used to describe the combination of food and supplements to increase results. Thus, including the wording STACK in the mark does not obviate the Section 2(e)(2) refusal, as the wording is merely descriptive of a feature and characteristic of the goods.

 

Next, the application states that the applicant is based in New York, New York, which is a city in the United States. Goods are considered to originate from a geographic location when the record shows that the goods are sold there, manufactured or produced there, packaged and shipped from there, and/or contain a main ingredient or component derived from there.  See In re Jacques Bernier Inc., 894 F.2d 389, 391-92, 13 USPQ2d 1725, 1727 (Fed. Cir. 1990), opposition sustained sub nom. Fred Hayman Beverly Hills, Inc. v. Jacques Bernier Inc., 38 USPQ2d 1691 (TTAB 1996) (holding applicant’s perfume did not originate from RODEO DRIVE because, although goods did not have to be manufactured or produced at the geographic site and could “be sold there” to originate from the geographic location, there was insufficient evidence to show that perfume was sold on RODEO DRIVE); In re Joint-Stock Co. “Baik,” 80 USPQ2d 1305, 1310 (TTAB 2006) (holding applicant’s vodka originated from BAIKALSKAYA, a Russian word meaning “from Baikal,” because it was made from the water of Lake Baikal and applicant produced various vodkas from a location near Lake Baikal); In re JT Tobacconists, 59 USPQ2d 1080, 1083 (TTAB 2001) (holding applicant’s cigars, cigar cases, and humidors originated from MINNESOTA because they were packaged and shipped from MINNESOTA, and applicant’s business was located in MINNESOTA); In re Nantucket Allserve Inc., 28 USPQ2d 1144, 1145-46 (TTAB 1993) (holding applicant’s beverages originated from NANTUCKET because labels for applicant’s goods suggested a connection with NANTUCKET, additional evidence suggested that some ingredients came from NANTUCKET and that applicant’s goods were sold at applicant’s store located in NANTUCKET, and applicant’s corporate headquarters and research and development center were located in NANTUCKET); TMEP §1210.03.

 

Here, the record does not indicate where applicant’s goods are made, sold, packaged, or contain a main ingredient from; however, the applicant’s address indicates that applicant’s goods are, or will be, sold or provided at least in part in New York City. Thus, the evidence of record establishes that the applied-for goods originate in New York, New York.

 

Third, to establish a goods-place or services-place association, the trademark examining attorney’s evidence need only show a “reasonable basis” for concluding that the public is likely to believe that the mark identifies the place from which the goods and/or services originate.  See In re JT Tobacconists, 59 USPQ2d 1080, 1083-84 (TTAB 2001) (finding that nothing in the record suggested that it would be incongruous or unexpected for the purchasing public to believe that applicant’s cigars, cigar cases and humidors, “manufactured products which could have their origin practically anywhere,” came from the place named in the mark, as applicant was located in the place and the goods were packaged and shipped from the location, such that consumers would have a reasonable basis to believe the goods came from the place named in the mark); In re Cambridge Digital Sys., 1 USPQ2d 1659, 1661-62 (TTAB 1986) (finding that the location named in the mark was renowned for educational institutions and the record demonstrated the location was a manufacturing and commercial center producing related goods such that purchasers of applicant’s goods would reasonably believe they emanate from the place named in the mark); see also TMEP §1210.04; In re Loew’s Theatres, Inc., 769 F.2d 764, 768, 226 USPQ 865, 868 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

 

Here, the primary significance of the applied-for mark is a generally known geographic location, USA, and the goods associated with the applied-for mark appear to originate in New York, New York, a city in America. In total, the foregoing establishes a reasonable basis for concluding that the public is likely to believe that the mark identifies the place from which the goods originate.

 

Therefore, the applied-for mark is primarily geographically descriptive of the origin of applicant’s goods and services. Accordingly, registration of the applied-for mark is refused on the Principal Register under Section 2(e)(2) of the Trademark Act.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusals by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  However, if applicant responds to the refusals, applicant must also respond to the requirements set forth below.

 

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

 

To permit proper examination of the application, applicant must submit additional information about the applicant’s goods. See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §§814, 1402.01(e)

 

Specifically, applicant must also provide a written statement explaining whether the goods will be manufactured, packaged, shipped from, sold in or will have any other connection with the geographic location named in the mark.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §§814, 1210.03.  Failure to comply with a request for information is grounds for refusing registration.  In re Harley, 119 USPQ2d 1755, 1757-58 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §814. 

 

IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS REQUIREMENT

 

THIS PARTIAL REQUIREMENT APPLIES TO CLASS 05 ONLY

 

The wording “medicated oils” in the identification of goods in Class 05 is indefinite and must be clarified because it does not make clear the nature of the goods, namely, the purpose of the medicated oils or what the medicated oil contains.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01.

 

Applicant may substitute the following wording, if accurate, with changes highlighted in bold:

 

Class 05: Dietary and nutritional supplements; Medicated oils containing {indicate specific additives, e.g., vitamins, minerals}

 

Applicant’s goods may be clarified or limited, but may not be expanded beyond those originally itemized in the application or as acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Applicant may clarify or limit the identification by inserting qualifying language or deleting items to result in a more specific identification; however, applicant may not substitute different goods or add goods not found or encompassed by those in the original application or as acceptably amended.  See TMEP §1402.06(a)-(b).  The scope of the goods sets the outer limit for any changes to the identification and is generally determined by the ordinary meaning of the wording in the identification.  TMEP §§1402.06(b), 1402.07(a)-(b).  Any acceptable changes to the goods will further limit scope, and once goods are deleted, they are not permitted to be reinserted.  TMEP §1402.07(e).

 

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual.  See TMEP §1402.04.

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action.  For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above.  For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements.  Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although an examining attorney cannot provide legal advice, the examining attorney can provide additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. 

 

The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.    

 

 

/Josh Galante/

Joshua M. Galante

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 127

571-272-4310

Josh.Galante@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

 

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on April 25, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88777035

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Josh Galante/

Joshua M. Galante

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 127

571-272-4310

Josh.Galante@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from April 25, 2020, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”