Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  April 16, 2020

 

Introduction

 

In the initial Office action, examining attorney refused registration of applicant’s trademark under Trademark Act Section 2(d) and required applicant to submit an amended identification of services and a U.S. street address.

 

Examining attorney notes the requirement to submit an amended identification of services has been satisfied.  See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04.

 

For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Section 2(d) and the requirement to submit a U.S. street address are now made FINAL.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).

 

Summary of Issues:

• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
• U.S. Street Address Required

 

Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

 

Registration was refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), because the mark for which registration is sought so resembles the mark shown in U.S. Registration No. 4535538, as to be likely, when used on the identified goods and/or services, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.  The examining attorney has considered the applicant’s arguments carefully, but has found them unpersuasive.  For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No. 4535538.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Applicant’s mark is KINFOLK (standard characters) for “Hotel accommodation services; Hotel and motel services; Providing hotel accommodation; Providing temporary accommodation at HOTEL; Resort hotel services” in International Class 043.

 

Registrant’s mark is KINFOLK (standard characters) for “Restaurant services; bar services” in International Class 043.

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In the initial Office action, examining attorney found the marks to be identical.

 

In response, applicant did not address the similarity of the marks.

 

Therefore, examining attorney again asserts that in the present case, applicant’s mark is KINFOLK and registrant’s mark is KINFOLK.  These marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services.  Id.

 

Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Comparison of the Services

 

The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

In the initial Office action, examining attorney provided evidence from The Cosmopolitan, The Driskill, and Fitzgerald’s showing applicant’s and registrant’s services being provided under the same marks, indicating these services frequently emanate from a common source.  See evidence attached to Office action dated April 7, 2020.

 

In response, applicant did not address the relatedness of the services.

 

Therefore, examining attorney again asserts that the services are related because they are commonly provided under the same marks, indicating the same entities commonly provide these services.  The attached evidence from Hard Rock, The Landing, Longfellows, The Mark, and National Hotel and Restaurant further demonstrates this relationship.

 

Common Control

 

Applicant states in its response that applicant “are affiliates of and are under common control with Kinfolk LLC.”  First, examining attorney notes that the registrant in this case is Kinfolk Inc, so applicant’s relationship to Kinfolk LLC does not appear to be relevant.  Furthermore, a legal relationship between parties is insufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion unless the parties constitute a “single source.”  That is, the legal relationship between the parties must exhibit a “unity of control” over the nature and quality of the goods and/or services in connection with which the trademarks and/or service marks are used, and a “unity of control” over the use of the trademarks and/or service marks.  See In re Wella A.G., 5 USPQ2d 1359, 1361 (TTAB 1987); see also TMEP §1201.07.

 

Unity of control is presumed in instances where, absent contradictory evidence, one party owns (1) all of another entity, or (2) substantially all of another entity and asserts control over the activities of that other entity.  See TMEP §1201.07(b)(i)-(ii).  Such ownership is established, for example, when one party owns all or substantially all of the stock of another or when one party is a wholly owned subsidiary of another.  See In re Wella A.G., 5 USPQ2d at 1361; TMEP §1201.07(b)(i)-(ii).  It is additionally presumed when, absent contradictory evidence, applicant is shown in USPTO records as a joint owner of the cited registration, or the owner of the registration is listed as a joint owner of the application, and applicant submits a written statement asserting control over the use of the mark by virtue of joint ownership.  TMEP §1201.07(b)(ii). 

 

However, in most other situations, additional evidence is required to show unity of control.  For example, if the parties are sister corporations or if the parties share certain stockholders, directors or officers in common, additional evidence must be provided to show how the parties constitute a single source.  See In re Pharmacia, Inc., 2 USPQ2d 1883, 1884 (TTAB 1987); TMEP §1201.07(b)(iii). 

 

Therefore, applicant must provide a written statement explaining the nature of the legal relationship between the parties.  In addition, if neither party owns all or substantially all of the other party, and USPTO records do not show their joint ownership of the application or cited registration, applicant must provide a detailed written explanation and documentary evidence showing the parties’ “unity of control” over the nature and quality of the goods and/or services in connection with which the trademarks and/or service marks are used, and the parties’ “unity of control” over the use of the trademarks and/or service marks.  See TMEP §1201.07(b)(i)-(iii).  This statement and, if necessary, explanation must be verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20.  TMEP §1201.07(b)(ii)-(iii); see 37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(1).  However, if one party owns all of the other entity, and there is no contradictory evidence of record, the written statement need not be verified.  TMEP §1201.07(b)(i).

 

Co-existence Agreement

 

Finally, applicant states “there is a co-existence agreement with Kinfolk Inc with another trademark.”  As an initial matter, this statement is unclear as to what parties are involved in the agreement and what it covers.  More importantly, no agreement has been submitted.

 

If applicant submits a consent agreement that (1) indicates the registrant’s consent to the use and registration of the mark, and (2) addresses the factors listed below, this refusal will be reconsidered.  However, consent agreements are but one factor to be taken into account with all of the other relevant circumstances bearing on a likelihood of confusion determination.  In re N.A.D. Inc., 754 F.2d 996, 999, 224 USPQ 969, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re E. I. du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361, 177 USPQ at 567; TMEP §1207.01(d)(viii); see also In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d 1958, 1963 (TTAB 2016).

 

Factors to be considered in weighing a consent agreement include the following:

 

(1)        Whether the consent shows an agreement between both parties;

 

(2)        Whether the agreement includes a clear indication that the goods and/or services travel in separate trade channels;

 

(3)        Whether the parties agree to restrict their fields of use;

 

(4)        Whether the parties will make efforts to prevent confusion, and cooperate and take steps to avoid any confusion that may arise in the future; and

 

(5)        Whether the marks have been used for a period of time without evidence of actual confusion.

 

See In re Four Seasons Hotels Ltd., 987 F.2d 1565, 1569, 26 USPQ2d 1071, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Mastic, 829 F.2d at 1117-18, 4 USPQ2d at 1295-96; cf. Bongrain Int’l (Am.) Corp. v. Delice de Fr., Inc., 811 F.2d 1479, 1485, 1 USPQ2d 1775, 1779 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

 

However, applicant is advised that a consent agreement and evidence of unity of control have opposite purposes.  Evidence of unity of control is evidence that two marks owned by different entities in fact function as a single source because of the nature of how they are controlled, therefore consumers will not be deceived by thinking one is related to the other.

 

A consent agreement is an agreement between two different sources who believe that consumers will not confuse two different sources because of the conditions in the marketplace.  If the two sources in fact have common ownership and are related in some manner, then a consent agreement would be inappropriate.

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

For these reasons, the refusal under Section 2(d) is now made FINAL.

 

U.S. Street Address Required

 

In the initial Office action, examining attorney required applicant to provide a U.S. street address.  In response, applicant did not address this requirement, therefore, it is now made FINAL.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).

 

All applications must include the applicant’s domicile address, and domicile dictates whether an applicant is required to have an attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a U.S. state or territory represent the applicant at the USPTO.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.2(o)-(p), 2.11(a), 2.189; Requirement of U.S.-Licensed Attorney for Foreign-Domiciled Trademark Applicants & Registrants, Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A. (Rev. Sept. 2019). 

 

An individual applicant’s domicile is the place a person resides and intends to be the person’s principal home.  37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.  A juristic entity’s domicile is the principal place of business, i.e., headquarters, where a juristic entity applicant’s senior executives or officers ordinarily direct and control the entity’s activities.  37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.  An applicant whose domicile is located outside of the United States or its territories is foreign-domiciled and must be represented at the USPTO by a U.S.-licensed attorney qualified to practice before the USPTO under 37 C.F.R. §11.14.  37 C.F.R. §2.11(a).

 

The application record lists applicant as a juristic entity and specifies applicant’s domicile as “c/o” or in “care of” another party’s address.  In most cases, an address that is listed as “c/o” or in “care of” another party’s address is not acceptable as a domicile address because it does not identify the location of applicant’s headquarters where the entity’s senior executives or officers ordinarily direct and control the entity’s activities.  See37 C.F.R. §§2.2(o)-(p), 2.189; Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.3.  Thus, applicant must provide its domicile street address.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.189.  Alternatively, an applicant may demonstrate that the listed address is, in fact, the applicant’s domicile.  Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.3.

 

To provide documentation supporting applicant’s domicile.  Open the correct TEAS response form and enter the serial number, answer “yes” to wizard question #3, and on the “Additional Statement(s)” page, below the “Miscellaneous Statement” field, click the button below the text box to attach documentation to support the address.

 

To provide applicant’s domicile street address.  After opening the correct TEAS response form and entering the serial number, answer “yes” to wizard question #5, and provide applicant’s street address on the “Owner Information” page.  Information provided in the TEAS response form will be publicly viewable. 

 

If applicant wants to hide its domicile address from public view because of privacy or other concerns, applicant must have a mailing address that can be made public and differs from its domicile address.  In this case, applicant must follow the steps below in the correct order to ensure the domicile address will be hidden:

 

(1)        First submit a TEAS Change Address or Representation (CAR) form.  Open the form, enter the serial number, click “Continue,” and

(a)        Use the radio buttons to select “Attorney” for the role of the person submitting the form;

(b)        Answer “Yes” to the wizard question asking, “Do you want to UPDATE the mailing address, email address, phone or fax number(s) for the trademark owner/holder?” and click “Continue;”

(c)        On the “Owner Information” page, if the previously provided mailing address has changed, applicant must enter its new mailing address in the “Mailing Address” field, which will be publicly viewable;

(d)       On the “Owner Information” page, uncheck the box next to “Domicile Address” and enter the new domicile address in the text box immediately below the checkbox. 

(2)        Then submit a TEAS response form to indicate the domicile address has been changed.  Open the form and

(a)        Answer “yes” to wizard question #3 and click “Continue;”

(b)        Click on the “Miscellaneous Statement” box on the “Additional Statement(s)” page, and enter a statement in the text box immediately below the checkbox that the domicile address was previously changed in the CAR form. 

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a request for reconsideration of this final Office action that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals and/or click to file a timely appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) with the required filing fee(s).

 

 

John Sullivan

/John Sullivan/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 114

(571) 272-9519

john.sullivan@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on April 16, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88765203

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

John Sullivan

/John Sullivan/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 114

(571) 272-9519

john.sullivan@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from April 16, 2020, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”