To: | Fortran Traffic Systems Limited (dwtrademarks@dickinsonwright.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88715923 - VECTOR - 42252-16 |
Sent: | March 04, 2020 02:57:14 PM |
Sent As: | ecom103@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88715923
Mark: VECTOR
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Correspondence Address: 1825 EYE STREET, N.W., SUITE 900
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Applicant: Fortran Traffic Systems Limited
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Reference/Docket No. 42252-16
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: March 04, 2020
The assigned examining attorney has reviewed the referenced application and determined the following.
SUMMARY OF ISSUES:
• Likelihood of confusion
• Foreign registration required
• Identification of goods indefinite
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL -- LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
The applicant has applied to register VECTOR for “Traffic detection hardware and systems namely, transponders, tolling detection, high occupancy tolling and vehicle occupancy detection.”
The registered mark is VANTAGE VECTOR for “Electronic traffic detection systems and equipment comprised of analog or digital cameras and radar detection systems, processors and input/output ports to detect the presence and motion characteristics of vehicles and traffic on roadways and intersections, and to provide outputs to traffic signal controllers, traffic management systems, or traffic information systems.”
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods and/or services, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods and/or services. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F. 3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
When comparing marks, the test is not whether the marks can be distinguished in a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their overall commercial impression that confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services offered under the respective marks is likely to result. Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d 1046, 1053, 103 USPQ2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1813 (TTAB 2014); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. United Global Media Grp., Inc. v. Tseng, 112 USPQ2d 1039, 1049, (TTAB 2014); L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (TTAB 2012); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In the present case, applicant’s mark is similar to the registered mark in sound, appearance and connotation. Applicant’s mark is identical to the VECTOR portion of the cited registration. VECATOR is also a strong, distinctive term in the field of traffic detection systems. Overall, the marks have the same commercial impression.
It is clear from the attached press release that VANTAGE is registrant’s house mark. The release begins “Iteris, Inc. (NYSE Amex: ITI), a leader in traffic management solutions, announced the introduction of Vantage Vector™, the latest addition to its portfolio of Vantage® vehicle detection solutions,” and the subhead says “Vantage Vector Extends the Depth of the Market Leading Vantage Detection Family.” (See attachment; emphasis added.)
Comparison of the Goods/Services
The goods are identical, at least in part, as both applicant and registrant make traffic detection systems. Accordingly, the goods would be sold to the same class of purchasers and encountered under circumstances leading one to mistakenly believe the goods originate from the same source.
Where the goods and/or services of an applicant and registrant are “similar in kind and/or closely related,” the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as in the case of diverse goods and/or services. In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987); see Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1242, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
APPLICATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 1(b) AND 44(d)
An application with a Section 44(e) basis must include a true copy, photocopy, certification, or certified copy of a foreign registration from an applicant’s country of origin. 15 U.S.C. §1126(e); 37 C.F.R. §2.34(a)(3)(ii); TMEP §§1004, 1004.01, 1016. In addition, an applicant’s country of origin must be a party to a convention or treaty relating to trademarks to which the United States is also a party, or must extend reciprocal registration rights to nationals of the United States by law. 15 U.S.C. §1126(b); TMEP §§1002.01, 1004.
Therefore, applicant must provide a copy of the foreign registration from applicant’s country of origin when it becomes available. TMEP §1003.04(a). A copy of a foreign registration must consist of a document issued to an applicant by, or certified by, the intellectual property office in applicant’s country of origin. TMEP §1004.01. If applicant’s country of origin does not issue registrations or Madrid Protocol certificates of extension of protection, applicant may submit a copy of the Madrid Protocol international registration that shows that protection of the international registration has been extended to applicant’s country of origin. TMEP §1016. In addition, applicant must also provide an English translation if the foreign registration is not written in English. 37 C.F.R. §2.34(a)(3)(ii); TMEP §1004.01(a)-(b). The translation should be signed by the translator. TMEP §1004.01(b).
If the foreign registration has not yet issued, or applicant requires additional time to procure a copy of the foreign registration (and English translation, as appropriate), applicant should so inform the trademark examining attorney and request that the U.S. application be suspended until a copy of the foreign registration is available. TMEP §§716.02(b), 1003.04(b).
If applicant cannot satisfy the requirements of a Section 44(e) basis, applicant may request that the mark be approved for publication based solely on the Section 1(b) basis. See 15 U.S.C. §§1051(b), 1126(e); 37 C.F.R. §2.35(b)(1); TMEP §§806.02(f), 806.04(b), 1003.04(b). Although the mark may be approved for publication on the Section 1(b) basis, it will not register until an acceptable allegation of use has been filed. See 15 U.S.C. §1051(c)-(d); 37 C.F.R. §§2.76, 2.88; TMEP §1103. Please note that, if the U.S. application satisfied the requirements of Section 44(d) as of the U.S. application filing date, applicant may retain the priority filing date under Section 44(d) without perfecting the Section 44(e) basis, provided there is a continuing valid basis for registration. See 37 C.F.R. §2.35(b)(3)-(4); TMEP §§806.02(f), 806.04(b).
Alternatively, applicant has the option to amend the application to rely solely on the Section 44(e) basis and request deletion of the Section 1(b) basis. See 37 C.F.R. §2.35(b)(1); TMEP §806.04. The foreign registration alone may serve as the basis for obtaining a U.S. registration. See 37 C.F.R. §2.34(a)(3); TMEP §806.01(d).
IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS/SERVICES
The identification of goods is indefinite and must be clarified as explained below. See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01. The USPTO has the discretion to determine the degree of particularity needed to clearly identify goods and/or services covered by a mark. In re Fiat Grp. Mktg. & Corp. Commc’ns S.p.A, 109 USPQ2d 1593, 1597 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re Omega SA, 494 F.3d 1362, 1365, 83 USPQ2d 1541, 1543-44 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). Accordingly, the USPTO requires the description of goods and/or services in a U.S. application to be specific, definite, clear, accurate, and concise. TMEP §1402.01; see In re Fiat Grp. Mktg. & Corp. Commc’ns S.p.A, 109 USPQ2d at 1597-98; Cal. Spray-Chem. Corp. v. Osmose Wood Pres. Co. of Am., 102 USPQ 321, 322 (Comm’r Pats. 1954).
Applicant must list the components which make up the “system,” and clarify the wording “tolling detection, high occupancy tolling and vehicle occupancy detection” which sounds like services, not goods. Applicant may substitute the following wording, if accurate:
Traffic detection hardware and TRAFFIC
DETECTION systems namely, COMPRISED OF transponders AND ELECTRONIC TERMINALS FOR tolling detection, high occupancy tolling and vehicle occupancy detection (Class
9).
Applicant’s goods and/or services may be clarified or limited, but may not be expanded beyond those originally itemized in the U.S. application or as acceptably amended. See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06. Applicant may clarify or limit the identification by inserting qualifying language or deleting items to result in a more specific identification; however, applicant may not substitute different goods and/or services or add goods and/or services not found in or encompassed by those in the original U.S. application or as acceptably amended. See TMEP §1402.06(a)-(b). The scope of the goods and/or services sets the outer limit for any changes to the identification and is generally determined by the ordinary meaning of the wording in the identification. TMEP §§1402.06(b), 1402.07(a)-(b). Any acceptable changes to the goods and/or services will further limit scope, and once goods and/or services are deleted, they are not permitted to be reinserted. TMEP §1402.07(e). Additionally, for U.S. applications filed under Trademark Act Section 44(e), the scope of the identification for purposes of permissible amendments may not exceed the scope of the goods and/or services identified in the foreign registration. 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); Marmark, Ltd. v. Nutrexpa, S.A., 12 USPQ2d 1843, 1845 (TTAB 1989) (citing In re Löwenbräu München, 175 USPQ 178, 181 (TTAB 1972)); TMEP §§1012, 1402.01(b).
For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual. See TMEP §1402.04.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/James T. Griffin/
Examining Attorney, Law Office 103
United States Patent & Trademark Office
571-272-9169
jim.griffin@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE