To: | Tentie LLC (edwin@withrelay.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88645946 - ALTO - N/A |
Sent: | January 23, 2020 06:40:36 PM |
Sent As: | ecom117@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88645946
Mark: ALTO
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: Tentie LLC
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: January 23, 2020
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark “ALTORDER” in Reg. No. 4347416. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registration.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Comparison of the Marks
The marks are confusingly similar because both begin with and feature the wording “ALTO”. They are thus indistinguishable in sound, appearance, and meaning as to this key portion they share.
Applicant’s mark is “ALTO” and registrant’s is “ALTORDER”.
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
The registered mark has added on the letters “RDER” to the end of applicant’s mark. However, this holds less weight they appear at the end of the mark. This is important because consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).
Further, the prefix “ALTO” that both marks share has an English meaning: it is defined by the attached evidence from Merriam Webster Dictionary as “the second highest voice part in a 4-part chorus.” See attached. Since both marks begin with this distinctive term which has its own, independent meaning, it is the first (if not the only) thing to catch a consumer’s eye when viewing the marks considered. As such the marks have confusingly similar commercial impressions.
Since both marks begin with (and thus feature) the distinctive term “ALTO” which has its own independent meaning, the marks are confusingly similar.
Comparison of the Services
The services are closely related because both parties offer software that a business can use to manage sales, and also to receive orders or sales: applicant’s services are merely listed in broader language, and thus encompass those of registrant.
Applicant’s services are “Software as a service (SAAS) services featuring software for providing prospect data, sales intelligence, and sales automation via Email, SMS, and VOIP to sales organizations” in class 42. [Emphasis added].
Registrant’s are “Providing temporary use of online non-downloadable Interface software for accounting systems, maintenance of customer pricing and discounts, receiving and importing orders, invoicing, and management of sales, commissions and royalties” in class 42. [Emphasis added].
The services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).
Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
Applicant’s software provides “sales intelligence” while registrant’s software provides “management of sales.”
The attached evidence from TrustRadius explains that sales intelligence (as applicant’s software provides) includes and encompasses tasks such as “compiling lead activity in lead records” and “Tracking email and website interactions” and “Qualifying and prioritizing leads” all of which are examples of the “management of sales” as registrant’s software does. See attached. Likewise, the attached evidence from G2 explains, referring to “sales intelligence” software (such as that of applicant), that “this type of software is used by marketing and sales executives to define and implement sales strategies,” which is what registrant’s software does (in “management of sales”) as well. See attached.
Applicant’s software provides “sales automation” which encompasses registrant’s software that can “receive orders,” since receiving orders (via software) is one way to automate sales.
In this case, the application uses broad wording to describe software that provides sales intelligence and automates sales which presumably encompasses all services of the type described, including registrant’s more narrow software that manages sales and receives orders. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, the services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
Conclusion
The software of both applicant and registrant are offered to the same consumers for the same purposes, namely, to businesses for the purposes of receiving sales and/or orders, and managing the relevant data. For these reasons, consumers are likely to encounter the parties’ services in the same market channels. Given the strong similarities between the key elements of the parties’ marks, consumers encountering the marks in the same commercial contexts are likely to confuse the marks and mistake the underlying sources of related services provided under the marks. Registration is refused to prevent such confusion. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are related.
Applicant should also note the following advisory.
PRIOR PENDING APPLICATION
The filing date of pending U.S. Application Serial No(s). 88033276 precedes applicant’s filing date. See attached referenced application(s). If they/it register(s), applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion between the marks. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq. Therefore, upon receipt of applicant’s response to this Office action, action on this application may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed referenced application(s).
In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the mark(s) in the referenced application. Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.
Applicant should also note the following requirement.
IDENTIFICATION REQUIRES AMENDMENT
Some of the wording used to describe portions of applicant’s services in the identification is indefinite and too broad and could include services in other international classes. This wording must be clarified for the reasons listed below. See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01.
In class 42, the wording “prospect data” is indefinite and overbroad because it fails to specify the type of prospect, for example, prospective customers and/or prospective contacts.
Applicant may substitute and/or select from the following wording, if accurate:
Scope Advisory. Applicant may amend the identification to clarify or limit the services, but not to broaden or expand the services beyond those in the original application or as acceptably amended. See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06. Generally, any deleted services may not later be reinserted. See TMEP §1402.07(e).
ID Manual. For assistance with identifying and classifying services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual. See TMEP §1402.04.
Applicant should also note the following advisory.
CONSENT STATEMENT DELETED AS UNNECESSARY
Applicant’s consent statement is unnecessary, since the mark is not one that is reasonably perceived as identifying a particular living individual. As such, the consent statement will be deleted.
Applicant should also note the following advisory.
TRANSLATION STATEMENT DELETED AS UNNECESSARY
Applicant May Hire Trademark Counsel. Because of the legal technicalities and strict deadlines of the trademark application process, applicant may wish to hire a private attorney who specializes in trademark matters to assist in the process. The assigned trademark examining attorney can provide only limited assistance explaining the content of an Office action and the application process. USPTO staff cannot provide legal advice or statements about an applicant’s legal rights. TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.
Response guidelines. For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
Becker, Joseph (Trademark)
/Joseph Becker/
Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 117
United States PTO
(571) 270-5493
Joseph.Becker1@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE