To: | Regimbal, Mark (markareg@gmail.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88642279 - MELT - N/A |
Sent: | January 16, 2020 07:23:25 PM |
Sent As: | ecom108@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 Attachment - 24 Attachment - 25 Attachment - 26 Attachment - 27 Attachment - 28 Attachment - 29 Attachment - 30 Attachment - 31 Attachment - 32 Attachment - 33 Attachment - 34 Attachment - 35 Attachment - 36 Attachment - 37 Attachment - 38 Attachment - 39 Attachment - 40 Attachment - 41 Attachment - 42 Attachment - 43 Attachment - 44 Attachment - 45 Attachment - 46 Attachment - 47 Attachment - 48 Attachment - 49 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88642279
Mark: MELT
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: Regimbal, Mark
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SUMMARY OF ISSUES:
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 5146508 and 5607473. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registrations.
Applicant has applied to register the mark MELT for “hats; sweatshirts; t-shirts” in International Class 25.
The cited marks are listed below:
Reg. No. |
MARK |
OWNER |
RELEVANT GOODS AND/OR SERVICES |
CLASS |
5146508 |
MELT |
Rose Valley Glass, LLC |
online retail store services and retail store services featuring . . . t-shirts |
35 |
5607473 |
FULL MELT |
Green Brands LLC |
clothing, namely, t-shirts and shirts |
25 |
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
In the present case, the following factors are most relevant: similarity of the marks, relatedness of the goods and services, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods and services.
Comparison of the Marks
In the present case, applicant’s mark is confusingly similar with the registered marks because the marks share the wording MELT. First, marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).
Applicant also should note that the applied-for mark does not avoid a likelihood of confusion with the registered marks even though applicant’s mark is stylized with design elements and the registered marks are in standard characters. Marks in typed or standard characters, as the registered marks are in this case, may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element, as the applied-for mark is in this case, generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display. See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).
In Re: Reg. No. 5146508
In the present case, the literal element of applicant’s mark is MELT and the literal element of registrant’s mark is MELT. The literal elements of the compared marks are identical in sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Additionally, because the literal elements of the marks are substantially similar, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services. Id
In Re: Reg. No. 5607473
The trademark examining attorney further notes that when comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b). In this case, the common wording in the compared marks, that is MELT renders the marks sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that consumers who encounter the marks in relation to their respective goods would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.
Accordingly, applicant’s mark and the registered marks are confusingly similar.
Relatedness of the Goods and Services
Applicant has applied to register the mark MELT for “hats; sweatshirts; t-shirts” in International Class 25.
The cited marks are listed below:
Reg. No. |
MARK |
OWNER |
RELEVANT GOODS AND/OR SERVICES |
CLASS |
5146508 |
MELT |
Rose Valley Glass, LLC |
online retail store services and retail store services featuring . . . t-shirts |
35 |
5607473 |
FULL MELT |
Green Brands LLC |
clothing, namely, t-shirts and shirts |
25 |
In addition, determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
In Re: Reg. No 5607473
In this case, the registration uses broad wording “clothing, namely, t-shirts and shirts”, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including applicant’s more narrow “t-shirts”. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods here are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Because the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers, they are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
In Re: Reg. Nos. 5146508 and 5607473
In this case, applicant’s “hats” and “sweatshirts” are commercially related to the “online retail store services and retail store services featuring . . . t-shirts” in Reg. No. 5146508, and “clothing, namely, t-shirts and shirts” in Reg. No. 5607473 because the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods and services emanate from the same source. As the attached internet evidence from the third-party websites for Calvin Klein, Nike, Ralph Lauren and Under Armour demonstrates, entities commonly provide the relevant goods and services under the same mark to the same classes of customers in the same channels of trade. See:
Thus, applicant’s goods and the goods and services of the registrants are sufficiently related for purposes of the likelihood of confusion analysis.
Conclusion
Since applicant’s mark and the registered marks are confusingly similar and their goods and services are sufficiently related, registration of applicant’s mark must be refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d).
ADVISORY - POTENTIAL SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL BASED UPON PRIOR-FILED APPLICATION
Serial No. |
MARK |
OWNER |
RELEVANT GOODS AND/OR SERVICES |
CLASS |
88622417 |
MELT FIT |
Ashley Garner |
Leggings; Sports bra |
25 |
As set forth above, Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Thus, if the mark in the referenced application registers, applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion with the registered mark. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq. Therefore, upon receipt of applicant’s response to this Office action, action on this application may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed referenced application.
In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the mark in the referenced application. Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.
However, if applicant responds to present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the marks in the referenced registrations and application, applicant also must respond to the requirement set forth below.
REQUIREMENT TO AMEND DESCRIPTION OF THE MARK
The following description is suggested, if accurate: The mark consists of “MELT” spelled out with the letter E backwards, surrounded by a rounded-edge rectangular border.
RESPONSE GUIDELINES
For this application to proceed further, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. In addition, because applicant filed a TEAS Plus application, applicant must respond online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) to avoid incurring an additional fee. See 37 C.F.R. §2.22(b)(1), (c). Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
SUGGEST HIRING TRADEMARK COUNSEL
Because of the legal technicalities and strict deadlines of the trademark application process, applicant may wish to hire a private attorney who specializes in trademark matters to assist in the process. The assigned trademark examining attorney can provide only limited assistance explaining the content of an Office action and the application process. USPTO staff cannot provide legal advice or statements about an applicant’s legal rights. TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Oreoluwa Alao/
Oreoluwa Alao
Examining Attorney
Law Office 108
(571) 270-7210
oreoluwa.alao@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE