United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88639519
Mark: EVER REST
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Correspondence Address: |
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Applicant: MlilyUSA, Inc
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Reference/Docket No. 74896.M1
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: January 07, 2020
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.
REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION UNDER SECTION 2(D)
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 1160035. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registration.
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Determining likelihood of confusion is made on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). However, “[n]ot all of the [du Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1366, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601. F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir 2010)). The USPTO may focus its analysis “on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see TMEP §1207.01.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
In the instant matter, applicant seeks registration of the EVER REST for Mattresses; Adjustable beds; Adjustable bed base; Beds; Infant beds; Mattress toppers; Mattress cushions; Neck pillows; Pillows; Sleeping pads , in Class 20. Registrant’s mark is EVEREST for Sleep Products-Namely, Mattresses and Box Springs, in Class 20.
Similarities between the Marks
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead ‘whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression’ such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” In re U.S. Warriors Ice Hockey Program, Inc., 122 USPQ2d 1790, 1795 (TTAB 2017) (citing Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d 1958, 1960 (TTAB 2016) (citing Spoons Rests. Inc. v. Morrison Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1735, 1741 (TTAB 1991), aff’d per curiam, 972 F.2d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
For comparison purposes, the marks are set forth below:
EVER REST Applicant’s mark
EVEREST Registrant’s mark
Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, at’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). It is noted that the wording EVER REST and EVEREST is confusingly similar for the purposes of determining likelihood of confusion as this wording establishes the same overall commercial impression and meaning. See, e.g., Seaguard Corp. v. Seaward Int’l, Inc., 223 USPQ 48, 51 (TTAB 1984) (“[T]he marks ‘SEAGUARD’ and ‘SEA GUARD’ are, in contemplation of law, identical [internal citation omitted].”); In re Best W. Family Steak House, Inc., 222 USPQ 827, 827 (TTAB 1984) (“There can be little doubt that the marks [BEEFMASTER and BEEF MASTER] are practically identical”); Stock Pot, Inc., v. Stockpot Rest., Inc., 220 USPQ 52, 52 (TTAB 1983), aff’d 737 F.2d 1576, 222 USPQ 665 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“There is no question that the marks of the parties [STOCKPOT and STOCK POT] are confusingly similar. The word marks are phonetically identical and visually almost identical.”).
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Comparison of Goods
Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
In the instant matter, applicant’s identified goods are for Mattresses; Adjustable beds; Adjustable bed base; Beds; Infant beds; Mattress toppers; Mattress cushions; Neck pillows; Pillows; Sleeping pads , in Class 20. Registrant’s identified goods are Sleep Products-Namely, Mattresses and Box Springs, in Class 20.
The trademark examining attorney has attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of a number of third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar goods as those of both applicant and registrant in this case. This evidence shows that the goods listed therein, namely, beds, adjustable bed bases, mattresses, box springs, and pillows are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark. See In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1737 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).
Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
Accordingly, the goods of the parties are related goods which will share the same trade channels.
The Trademark Act not only guards against the misimpression that the senior user is the source of a junior user’s goods, but it also protects against “reverse confusion,” where a significantly larger or prominent junior user is perceived as the source of a smaller, senior user’s goods such that the “senior user may experience diminution or even loss of its mark’s identity and goodwill due to extensive use of a confusingly similar mark by the junior user” for related goods. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1329, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1752 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indust., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 474-75, 31 USPQ2d 1592, 1597-98 (3d Cir. 1994).
Conclusion
Since the marks of the parties create the same general overall commercial impression and the goods of the parties are related and share the same trade channels, there is a likelihood of confusion between the marks and the registration must be refused.
RIGHT TO RESPOND
CLOSING
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/William H. Dawe, III/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 108
(571) 272-9337 voice
(571) 273-9337 fax
Bill.Dawe@USPTO.GOV (not for fomal responses)
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