Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  February 28, 2020

 

 The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
• Prior Filed Applications
• Request for Information

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Applicant has applied for ZAGZ (SN: 88639105) for “Tobacco substitutes not for medical purposes; herbal hemp wraps for smoking made with a concentration of THC not more than 0.3 percent on a dry weight basis.”

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 0610530, 1127946, 1133291, 1472580, 1775416, 2122646, 2309274, 2309438, 2780643, 3867900, and 4393649.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by-case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods and/or services, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods and/or services.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

For the following reasons, the examining attorney concludes that there exists a likelihood of confusion between applicant’s proposed mark, ZAGZ (SN: 88639105) for “Tobacco substitutes not for medical purposes; herbal hemp wraps for smoking made with a concentration of THC not more than 0.3 percent on a dry weight basis” and:

1.      ZIG-ZAG (stylized), for “Cigarette paper”

2.      ZIG ZAG, for “Cigarette tobacco”

3.      ZIG ZAG, for “Cigarette papers”

4.      ZIG ZAG, for “Cigars”

5.      ZIG-ZAG (with design), for “smoking tobacco”

6.      ZIG ZAG GOLD STANDARD, for “Cigarette tobacco”

7.      ZIG-ZAG, for “Cigarette lighters (not of precious metals), pocket machines for rolling cigarettes, cigarette tubes and pocket machines for filling cigarette tubes”

8.      ZIG-ZAG, for “Filter tips for cigarettes”

9.      ZIG-ZAG, for “Cigars”

10.  ZIG ZAG CLASSIC AMERICAN BLEND, for “smoking tobacco”

11.  ZIG ZAG, for “electronic cigarettes”

Similarity of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The applied-for mark is ZAGZ.  The registered marks are ZIG ZAG and variations thereof.  The marks are very similar in terms of connotation and overall commercial impression because they feature terms that connote the same meaning and the remaining differences do not sufficiently distinguish the marks to avoid confusion. 

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Consumer confusion has been held likely for marks that do not physically sound or look alike but that convey the same idea, stimulate the same mental reaction, or may have the same overall meaning.  Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Conway, 419 F.2d 1332, 1336, 164 USPQ 301, 304 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (holding MISTER STAIN likely to be confused with MR. CLEAN on competing cleaning products); see In re M. Serman & Co., 223 USPQ 52, 53 (TTAB 1984) (holding CITY WOMAN for ladies’ blouses likely to be confused with CITY GIRL for a variety of female clothing); H. Sichel Sohne, GmbH v. John Gross & Co., 204 USPQ 257, 260-61 (TTAB 1979) (holding BLUE NUN for wines likely to be confused with BLUE CHAPEL for the same goods); Ralston Purina Co. v. Old Ranchers Canning Co., 199 USPQ 125, 128 (TTAB 1978) (holding TUNA O’ THE FARM for canned chicken likely to be confused with CHICKEN OF THE SEA for canned tuna); Downtowner Corp. v. Uptowner Inns, Inc., 178 USPQ 105, 109 (TTAB 1973) (holding UPTOWNER for motor inn and restaurant services likely to be confused with DOWNTOWNER for the same services); TMEP §1207.01(b). Attached evidence shows that the applied for mark is part of an exceedingly well known English turn of phrase, ZIG ZAG, which is the dominant element in all eleven of the applied for marks. Further, attached evidence also shows that in this industry the applied for mark is a known and used nickname for the registrant’s mark on the applied for goods.

 

Accordingly giving appropriate weight to each feature of the marks, the marks when considered in their entireties are sufficiently similar to create consumer confusion or mistake as to the source of the goods. 

 

Relatedness of the Goods

 

The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). 

 

The respective goods and/or services need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

The attached Internet evidence, consisting of third party websites, establishes that the relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use and that the goods are similar or complementary in terms of purpose or function.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

Other Considerations

 

Generally, the greater degree of similarity between the applied-for mark and the registered mark, the lesser the degree of similarity between the goods and/or services of the parties is required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.  In re C.H. Hanson Co., 116 USPQ2d 1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001)); In re Thor Tech, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1636 (TTAB 2009). 

 

The Trademark Act not only guards against the misimpression that the senior user is the source of a junior user’s goods and/or services, but it also protects against “reverse confusion,” where a significantly larger or prominent junior user is perceived as the source of a smaller, senior user’s goods and/or services such that the “senior user may experience diminution or even loss of its mark’s identity and goodwill due to extensive use of a confusingly similar mark by the junior user” for related goods and/or services.  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1329, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1752 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indust., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 474-75, 31 USPQ2d 1592, 1597-98 (3d Cir. 1994).

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Accordingly, use of ZAGZ and a variety of ZIG ZAG marks on the identified goods is likely to lead to consumer confusion or mistake as to the source of the goods. 

 

Accordingly, applicant is refused registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

PRIOR-FILED APPLICATION(S)

 

The filing dates of pending U.S. Application Serial Nos. 85414445, 87799245, and 88726169 precede applicant’s filing date.  See attached referenced applications.  If one or more of the marks in the referenced applications register, applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion with the registered mark(s).  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq.  Therefore, upon receipt of applicant’s response to this Office action, action on this application may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed referenced applications.

 

In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the marks in the referenced applications.  Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  However, if applicant responds to the refusal(s), applicant must also respond to the requirement(s) set forth below.

 

LAWFUL USE INQUIRY – MARIJUANA RELATED GOODS

 

Registration may be refused because applicant does not have a bona fide intent to lawfully use the applied-for mark in commerce. Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; see TMEP §907.

 

To qualify for federal trademark/service mark registration, the use of a mark in commerce must be lawful. Gray v. Daffy Dan’s Bargaintown , 823 F.2d 522, 526, 3 USPQ2d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that “[a] valid application cannot be filed at all for registration of a mark without ‘lawful use in commerce’”); TMEP §907; see In re Stellar Int’l, Inc. , 159 USPQ 48, 50-51 (TTAB 1968); Coahoma Chemical Co., Inc. v. Smith , 113 USPQ 413 (Com’r Pat. & Trademarks 1957) (concluding that “use of a mark in connection with unlawful shipments in interstate commerce is not use of a mark in commerce which the [Office] may recognize.”). Thus, the goods and/or services to which the mark is applied must comply with all applicable federal laws. See In re Brown , 119 USPQ2d 1350, 1351 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Midwest Tennis & Track Co. , 29 USPQ2d 1386, 1386 n.2 (TTAB 1993) (noting that “[i]t is settled that the Trademark Act’s requirement of ‘use in commerce,’ means a ‘lawful use in commerce’”)); In re Pepcom Indus., Inc. , 192 USPQ 400, 401 (TTAB 1976); TMEP §907.

 

In the present application, the applicant has applied for the mark “ZAGS”, which indicates on one of its two identified goods that hemp is involved.  Applicant must answer the following questions to permit proper examination of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §814.

 

The requested information should include fact sheets, brochures, advertisements, and/or similar materials relating to the goods. If such materials are not available, applicant must provide a detailed factual description of the goods and/or services. Any information submitted in response to this requirement must clearly and accurately indicate the nature of the goods identified in the application.

 

In addition, applicant must submit a written statement indicating whether the goods identified in the application comply with the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. §§801-971. See 37 C.F.R. §2.69; TMEP §907.

 

The CSA prohibits, among other things, manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or possessing certain controlled substances, including marijuana and marijuana-based preparations. 21 U.S.C. §§812, 841(a)(1), 844(a); see also 21 U.S.C. §802(16) (defining “[marijuana]”). The CSA also makes it unlawful to sell, offer for sale, or use any facility of interstate commerce to transport drug paraphernalia, i.e., “any equipment, product, or material of any kind which is primarily intended or designed for use in manufacturing, compounding, converting, concealing, producing, processing, preparing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance, possession of which is unlawful under [the CSA].” 21 U.S.C. §863.

 

Finally, applicant must provide written responses to the following questions:

 

1. Do/Will all of applicant’s identified goods include or contain marijuana, cannabis, hemp, marijuana-based preparations, cannabis-based preparations, hemp-based preparations, extracts or derivatives from marijuana, cannabis or hemp, including tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) or cannabidiol (CBD), synthetic marijuana, or any other controlled substance under the CSA?
2. Do/Will any of applicant’s identified goods include or contain CBD?
3. If the applicant’s goods contain CBD, is the CBD derived from hemp that complies with the 2018 Farm Bill?
4. If the answer to Question 3 above is “yes”, will the CBD be derived from hemp with a delta-9 THC concentration of not more than .3% on a dry weight basis”?
5. Do/Will any of applicant’s identified goods include or contain hemp or hemp oil?
6. Upon information and belief, do applicant’s identified goods and services comply with the Controlled Substances Act?

 

Please note, if applicant adopts the following identification, this inquiry will be withdrawn if all of applicant’s goods contain CBD, if applicant’s tobacco substitutes also include CBD:

 

International Class 3:  Tobacco substitutes not for medical purposes; herbal hemp wraps for smoking made with a concentration of THC not more than 0.3 percent on a dry weight basis; all of the foregoing containing hemp derived CBD from cannabis with a delta-9 THC concentration of not more than .3% on a dry weight basis.

 

Failure to satisfactorily respond to a requirement for information is a ground for refusing registration. See In re Cheezwhse.com, Inc. , 85 USPQ2d 1917, 1919 (TTAB 2008); In re Garden of Eatin’ Inc. , 216 USPQ 355, 357 (TTAB 1982); TMEP §814. Please note that merely stating that information about the goods and services is available on applicant’s website is an inappropriate response to the above requirement and is insufficient to make the relevant information properly of record. See In re Planalytics, Inc. , 70 USPQ2d 1453 , 1457-58 (TTAB 2004). Applicant is advised that, upon consideration of the information provided by applicant in response to the above requirement, registration of the applied-for mark may be refused on the ground that the mark, as used in connection with the identified goods and/or services, is not in lawful use in commerce. Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although an examining attorney cannot provide legal advice, the examining attorney can provide additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. 

 

The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.    

 

 

/Charles Hiser/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 130

(571) 272-7526

Charles.Hiser@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on February 28, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88639105

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Charles Hiser/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 130

(571) 272-7526

Charles.Hiser@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from February 28, 2020, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”