To: | Herbst, Cody (codyherbst17@gmail.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88628426 - FUZZ - PAW - N/A |
Sent: | December 30, 2019 07:39:42 AM |
Sent As: | ecom105@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88628426
Mark: FUZZ - PAW
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: Herbst, Cody
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: December 30, 2019
INTRODUCTION
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SUMMARY OF ISSUES:
· Section 2(d) – Likelihood of Confusion Refusal
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5830060. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registration.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. , 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd. , 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc. , 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Similarity of the Marks
In the present case, applicant’s mark is FUZZ-PAW and Paw Design. Registrant’s mark is FUZZBALL and Paw Design.
The marks create an overall similar commercial impression because they share the identical first term FUZZ and use the same Paw-Heart Design.
When the marks at issue are both design marks, similarity of the marks is determined primarily on the basis of visual similarity. See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Rose ‘Vear Enters., 592 F.2d 1180, 1183, 201 USPQ 7, 9 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (quoting In re ATV Network Ltd., 552 F.2d 925, 929, 193 USPQ 331, 332 (C.C.P.A. 1977)); Ft. James Operating Co. v. Royal Paper Converting Inc., 83 USPQ2d 1624, 1628 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(c). However, a side-by-side comparison is not the test. See Grandpa Pidgeon’s of Mo., Inc. v. Borgsmiller, 477 F.2d 586, 587, 177 USPQ 573, 574 (C.C.P.A. 1973). When comparing design marks, the focus is on the overall commercial impression conveyed by such marks, not on specific differences. See Grandpa Pidgeon’s of Mo., Inc. v. Borgsmiller, 477 F.2d at 587, 177 USPQ at 574; In re Triple R Mfg. Corp., 168 USPQ 447, 448 (TTAB 1970); TMEP §1207.01(c).
In this case, both applicant and registrant use the first syllable FUZZ and virtually identical design marks of a Heart at the bottom of a 4-toed Paw Print.
Thus, applicant’s mark FUZZ-PAW and Paw Design creates a confusingly similar commercial impression with the registered mark FUZZBALL and Paw Design, because a consumer would likely believe that the goods emanate from the same source.
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
Relatedness of the Goods
The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).
In this case, applicant’s goods are identified as “Disposable liner pads for animal litter boxes; Feeding vessels for pets; Pet feeding dishes; Pet feeding and drinking bowls; Whelping boxes for dogs” in Class 21. Registrant’s goods are identified as “Bed for household pets” in Class 20.
In this case, the applicant for the applied mark FUZZ-PAW and Paw Design and registrant for the registered mark FUZZBALL and Paw Design both use their marks on items for household pets.
Finally, because the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers, they are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
Accordingly, a likelihood of confusion exists between applicant’s applied-for mark and registrant’s registered mark, because the marks create a confusing similar commercial impression and the goods at issue are highly related.
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action. Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanations about the refusal and requirements in this Office action. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
Applicant May Wish to Hire Trademark Counsel
Because of the legal technicalities and strict deadlines of the trademark application process, applicant may wish to hire a private attorney who specializes in trademark matters to assist in the process. The assigned trademark examining attorney can provide only limited assistance explaining the content of an Office action and the application process. USPTO staff cannot provide legal advice or statements about an applicant’s legal rights. TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Karen Estilo Owczarski/
Trademark Attorney
Law Office 105
571-272-3758
karen.owczarski@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE