To: | Johnson, Lauren (uspto@trademarks411.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88621189 - LOJO'S LOGIC - N/A |
Sent: | December 30, 2019 12:02:19 PM |
Sent As: | ecom108@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 Attachment - 24 Attachment - 25 Attachment - 26 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88621189
Mark: LOJO'S LOGIC
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: Johnson, Lauren
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: December 30, 2019
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5215380 (LOJO MEDIA). Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registration.
The applicant has applied to register the mark LOJO’S LOGIG, for “Branding services; branding consulting services; branding development services”. Registration is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with Registration No. 5215380 LOJO MEDIA for “Social media strategy and marketing consultancy focusing on helping clients create and extend their product and brand strategies by building virally engaging marketing solutions; Advertising and marketing services provided by means of indirect methods of marketing communications, namely, social media, search engine marketing, inquiry marketing, internet marketing, mobile marketing, blogging and other forms of passive, sharable or viral communications channels; Advertising and marketing services provided by means of indirect methods of marketing communications, namely, social media, search engine marketing, inquiry marketing, internet marketing, mobile marketing, blogging and other forms of passive, sharable or viral communications channels; Providing marketing consulting in the field of social media.”
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Similarity of the Marks
Applicant’s proposed mark, LOJO’S LOGIC, is highly similar to Registration No. 5215380 for LOJO MEDIA because both marks begin with the nearly identical wording LOJO and LOJO’s.
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Here, the applied-for mark begins with LOJO’S, which is nearly identical to LOJO in the registered mark, creating a highly similar commercial impression. See, e.g., In re Binion, 93 USPQ2d 1531, 1534 (TTAB 2009) (noting that “[t]he absence of the possessive form in applicant’s mark . . . has little, if any, significance for consumers in distinguishing it from the cited mark”); In re Curtice-Burns, Inc., 231 USPQ 990, 992 (TTAB 1986) (finding the marks McKENZIE’S and McKENZIE “virtually identical in commercial impression”); Winn’s Stores, Inc. v. Hi-Lo, Inc., 203 USPQ 140, 143 (TTAB 1979) (noting that “little if any trademark significance can be attributed to the apostrophe and the letter ‘s’ in opposer’s mark”).
The difference in the remainder of the wording in the marks does not obviate the overall similar commercial impression. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Here, the additional wording, MEDIA, is highly descriptive in the context of the registrant’s services and has been disclaimed, leaving LOJO the dominant feature of the mark consumers will recall when making purchasing decisions. Considering marks as a whole, consumers are likely to mistakenly believe that applicant’s services are simply a branding-focused line of services offered by registrant. Thus, it follows that the marks create a highly similar commercial impression.
Comparison of the Services
Applicant’s services are identified as “Branding services; branding consulting services; branding development services”. Registrant’s services are identified as “Social media strategy and marketing consultancy focusing on helping clients create and extend their product and brand strategies by building virally engaging marketing solutions; Advertising and marketing services provided by means of indirect methods of marketing communications, namely, social media, search engine marketing, inquiry marketing, internet marketing, mobile marketing, blogging and other forms of passive, sharable or viral communications channels; Advertising and marketing services provided by means of indirect methods of marketing communications, namely, social media, search engine marketing, inquiry marketing, internet marketing, mobile marketing, blogging and other forms of passive, sharable or viral communications channels; Providing marketing consulting in the field of social media.”
Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
In this case, applicant and registrant’s services are highly related. The application’s broad wording “Branding services; branding consulting services; branding development services” presumably encompasses all services of the type described, including brand development through registrant’s identified marketing methods. Additionally, registrant’s consulting in the field of social media, presumably includes all services of the type described, including consulting related to brand development via social media. Consistent with this, the attached webpages from http://www.loretold.com/services/, http://response.agency/work, http://www.lyfemarketing.com/, and http://borensteingroup.com/our-services/ provide representative examples demonstrating that branding, marketing, and social media related services are frequently provided by a single source under one mark. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are highly related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
In sum, upon encountering LOJO’S LOGIC, used in connection with “Branding services; branding consulting services; branding development services” and LOJO MEDIA, used in connection with “Social media strategy and marketing consultancy focusing on helping clients create and extend their product and brand strategies by building virally engaging marketing solutions; Advertising and marketing services provided by means of indirect methods of marketing communications, namely, social media, search engine marketing, inquiry marketing, internet marketing, mobile marketing, blogging and other forms of passive, sharable or viral communications channels; Advertising and marketing services provided by means of indirect methods of marketing communications, namely, social media, search engine marketing, inquiry marketing, internet marketing, mobile marketing, blogging and other forms of passive, sharable or viral communications channels; Providing marketing consulting in the field of social media.”, consumers are likely to be confused and mistakenly believe that the respective goods/services emanate from a common source.
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
If applicant responds to the refusal, applicant must also respond to the requirements set forth below
IDENTIFICATION OF SERVICES REQUIRE AMENDMENT
The identification of services is indefinite and must be clarified because it could include services in more than one International Class. See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01.
The USPTO has the discretion to determine the degree of particularity needed to clearly identify goods and/or services covered by a mark. In re Fiat Grp. Mktg. & Corp. Commc’ns S.p.A, 109 USPQ2d 1593, 1597 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re Omega SA, 494 F.3d 1362, 1365, 83 USPQ2d 1541, 1543-44 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). Accordingly, the USPTO requires the description of goods and/or services in a U.S. application to be specific, definite, clear, accurate, and concise. TMEP §1402.01; see In re Fiat Grp. Mktg. & Corp. Commc’ns S.p.A, 109 USPQ2d at 1597-98; Cal. Spray-Chem. Corp. v. Osmose Wood Pres. Co. of Am., 102 USPQ 321, 322 (Comm’r Pats. 1954).
The applicant insufficiently describes the following goods in Class 35:
If accurate, the applicant may adopt (any or all of) the following identifications of services. New information is in bold format. Deleted information is in strikethrough format. See TMEP §1402.01.
For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual. See TMEP §1402.04.
Multiple-Class Application Requirements
The application identifies goods and/or services in more than one international class; therefore, applicant must satisfy all the requirements below for each international class based on Trademark Act Section 1(b):
(1) List the goods and/or services by their international class number in consecutive numerical order, starting with the lowest numbered class.
(2) Submit a filing fee for each international class not covered by the fee already paid (view the USPTO’s current fee schedule). The application identifies services that are classified in at least 2 classes; however, applicant submitted a fee sufficient for only 1 class. Applicant must either submit the filing fee for the class not covered by the submitted fee or restrict the application to the number of classes covered by the fees already paid.
See 15 U.S.C. §§1051(b), 1112, 1126(e); 37 C.F.R. §§2.32(a)(6)-(7), 2.34(a)(2)-(3), 2.86(a); TMEP §§1403.01, 1403.02(c).
See an overview of the requirements for a Section 1(b) multiple-class application and how to satisfy the requirements online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form.
RESPONDING TO THE OFFICE ACTION
Response guidelines. For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Ashley D. Hayes/
Ashley D. Hayes
Examining Attorney
Law Office 108
(571) 272-2826
ashley.hayes@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE