To: | Roblox Corporation (trademarks@wsgr.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88609292 - BLOXY COLA - 30663-TM1021 |
Sent: | December 11, 2019 11:56:05 AM |
Sent As: | ecom127@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88609292
Mark: BLOXY COLA
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Correspondence Address: WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
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Applicant: Roblox Corporation
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Reference/Docket No. 30663-TM1021
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: December 11, 2019
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
This refusal only applies to the goods in Class 9.
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4998681. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registration.
In the present case, applicant seeks to register BLOXY COLA in standard characters for “video game software; computer software for interactive games” in Class 9.
The mark in Registration No. 4998681 is BLOXI in standard characters for “Downloadable mobile applications for creating and sharing interactive content presented in a question and answer format; Downloadable software in the nature of a mobile application for social networking and information and media uploading, viewing, searching and sharing; Downloadable software in the nature of a mobile application allowing users to quiz other users on a variety of topics of general interest with the ability to keep score of correct answers and user rankings” in Class 9.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Similarity of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Here, Applicant’s mark is BLOXY COLA in standard characters and registrant’s mark is BLOXI in standard characters. The wording BLOXY is substantially identical in appearance and commercial impression to the wording BLOXI in the cited registration. Additionally, this wording is phonetically identical. The marks are essentially phonetic equivalents and thus sound similar. Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).
The addition of the wording COLA in the applicant’s mark does not obviate the similarities between the marks, because the first and dominant feature of Applicant’s mark is so similar to the entirety of the cited registration. Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).
Here, the first word in Applicant’s mark is the word BLOXY which is substantially identical in sound, appearance and commercial impression to the registrant’s full mark.
Because the dominant portion of applicant’s mark is substantially identical in sound, appearance and commercial impression to the entirety of the cited registration, consumers are likely to believe the marks identify the same source of goods.
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
Relatedness of the Goods
Here, applicant’s software are related to registrant’s software.
In this case, the application use(s) broad wording to describe “computer software for interactive games”, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including registrant’s more narrow “Downloadable software in the nature of a mobile application allowing users to quiz other users on a variety of topics of general interest with the ability to keep score of correct answers and user rankings.” See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.
Accordingly, when consumers encounter applicant’s goods and registrant’s goods offered under highly similar marks, they are likely to be confused as to the source of the goods.
In summary, the marks are confusingly similar and the goods are related. Therefore, consumers are likely to be confused as to the source of the goods. Thus, registration is refused pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS AND SERVICES
The wording in the identification of goods and services identified with corrections below is indefinite and must be clarified for the reasons indicated. See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01.
Specifically, Applicant needs to specify if the video game software and computer software is downloadable or recorded.
Applicant may adopt the following wording, if accurate:
Class 9
{Indicate if software is downloadable or recorded} video game software; {Indicate if software is downloadable or recorded} computer software for interactive games
Class 41 – No Change
For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual. See TMEP §1402.04.
For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
In such case, the application will then proceed with the following class only: Class 41. See TMEP §718.02(a).
Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action. Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
Samantha Moskowitz
/Samantha J. Moskowitz/
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 127
samantha.moskowitz@uspto.gov
571-272-3183
RESPONSE GUIDANCE