United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88606889
Mark: DUKE BADLANDS
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Correspondence Address: |
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Applicant: piggyshop LLC
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: November 27, 2019
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
Applicant’s applied-for mark is DUKE BADLANDS in standard characters for “After-shave balms; Bar soap; Body lotion.”
Registrants’ marks are:
· Reg. No. 3682716: DUKE in standard characters for goods including “shampoos”;
· Reg. No. 2091535: DUKE as a typed drawing for goods including “after shave lotions, skin lotion, and hair cleaning… and grooming…preparations”;
· Reg. No. 0868244: DUKE as a typed drawing for goods including “HAIR SHAMPOO”; and
· Reg. No. 5146796: BADLANDS in standard characters for goods including “Dry shampoos.”
The same entity owns Reg. Nos. 3682716, 2091535 and 0868244.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
As it pertains to Reg. Nos. 3682716, 2091535 and 0868244, applicant’s applied-for mark and registrant’s marks contain the shared wording DUKE. As it pertains to Reg. No. 5146796, applicant’s applied-for mark and registrant’s mark contain the shared wording BADLANDS. This shared wording creates a similar overall commercial impression in the compared marks.
In addition, as it pertains to Reg. Nos. 3682716, 2091535 and 0868244, the entirety of registrant’s marks, DUKE, is incorporated within applicant’s applied-for mark, DUKE BADLANDS. As it pertains to Reg. No. 5146796, the entirety of registrant’s mark, BADLANDS, is incorporated within applicant’s applied-for mark, DUKE BADLANDS. Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). In the present case, the marks are identical in part.
Moreover, even if potential purchasers realize the apparent differences between the marks, they could still reasonably assume, due to the overall similarities in appearance, sound, meaning, connotation and commercial impression in the respective marks, that applicant's goods provided under the DUKE BADLANDS mark constitute a new or additional line of products from the same source as the goods provided under the previous DUKE and BADLANDS marks with which they are acquainted or familiar, and that applicant’s mark is merely a variation of the registrants’ marks. See, e.g., SMS, Inc. v. Byn-Mar Inc. 228 USPQ 219, 220 (TTAB 1985) (applicant’s marks ALSO ANDREA and ANDREA SPORT were “likely to evoke an association by consumers with opposer's preexisting mark [ANDREA SIMONE] for its established line of clothing.”).
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b). Here, the compared marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their overall commercial impression that consumers who encounter the marks are likely to assume a connection between the parties.
Based on the foregoing, the applicant’s applied-for mark and registrants’ marks are sufficiently similar to find a likelihood of confusion.
Comparison of the Goods
In this case, the application uses broad wording to describe “Body lotion,” which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including registrant’s “skin lotion” in Reg. No. 2091535. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, these goods of applicant and the registrant are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, the above-mentioned goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, these goods of applicant and the registrant are related.
Here, applicant’s after-shave balms, bar soap and body lotion are related to registrants’ shampoos, after shave lotions, and hair cleaning and grooming preparations because it is common for the same entity to produce and sell applicant’s goods as well as registrants’ goods. Therefore, consumers encountering applicant’s applied-for mark and registrants’ marks used in connection with the respective goods are likely to believe that the goods emanate from the same source.
The attached Internet evidence consists of web pages from the websites of The Body Shop, Clinique, and L’Oreal, showing that these entities produce and sell body lotion, after-shave balms or lotions and bar soaps or other skin cleansers, as well as shampoos and hair cleaning and grooming preparations. This evidence establishes that the same entity commonly produces the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark, and that the relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use. Thus, applicant’s and registrants’ goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
Based on the attached evidence and the analysis above, applicant’s and registrants’ goods are related.
Because applicant’s and registrants’ marks are similar and the goods are related, there is a likelihood of confusion and applicant’s applied-for mark must be refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
Name of Living Individual - Inquiry
Applicant must clarify whether the name DUKE BADLANDS in the mark identifies a particular living individual. See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §§813, 1206.03. In this case, the application neither specifies whether the name in the mark identifies a particular living individual nor includes a written consent. See TMEP §§813.01(a)-(b), 1206.04(a), 1206.05.
To register a mark that consists of or comprises the name of a particular living individual, including a first name, pseudonym, stage name, or nickname, an applicant must provide a written consent personally signed by the named individual. 15 U.S.C. §1052(c); TMEP §§813, 1206.04(a).
Accordingly, if the name in the mark does not identify a particular living individual, applicant must submit a statement to that effect (e.g., “The name shown in the mark does not identify a particular living individual.”).
However, if the name in the mark does identify a particular living individual, applicant must submit both of the following:
(1) The following statement: “The name(s) shown in the mark identifies a living individual(s) whose consent(s) to register is made of record.” If the name is a pseudonym, stage name, or nickname, applicant must provide the following statement: “Duke Badlands identifies {specify actual name of individual}, a living individual whose consent is of record.”
(2) A written consent, personally signed by the named individual(s), as follows: “I, Duke Badlands, consent to the use and registration of my name, Duke Badlands, as a trademark and/or service mark with the USPTO.”
For an overview of the requirements pertaining to names appearing in marks, and instructions on how to satisfy this requirement online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) response form, please go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/law/consent.jsp.
Failure to comply with a request for information is grounds for refusing registration. In re Harley, 119 USPQ2d 1755, 1757-58 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §814.
For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
Because of the legal technicalities and strict deadlines of the trademark application process, applicant may wish to hire a private attorney who specializes in trademark matters to assist in the process. The assigned trademark examining attorney can provide only limited assistance explaining the content of an Office action and the application process. USPTO staff cannot provide legal advice or statements about an applicant’s legal rights. TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Leslie Ann Thomas-Riggs/
Leslie Ann Thomas-Riggs
Trademark Examining Attorney
USPTO, Law Office 125
(571) 272-5469
leslie.thomas-riggs@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE