Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  August 18, 2020

 

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

 

• Refusal Under Section 2(d) – Likelihood of Confusion

·         Advisory: Prior-Filed Application

·         Refusal Under Section 2(e)(1) – Mark is Merely Descriptive

·         Controlled Substances Act Refusal

·         Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Refusal

 

REFUSAL UNDER SECTION 2(d) – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark, AMBROSIA is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark, AMBROSIA in U.S. Registration No. 5076569.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1323, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). 

 

In the present case, applicant’s mark is AMBROSIA and registrant’s mark is AMBROSIA.  These marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods.  Id.

 

Consequently, the marks are confusingly similar and consumers will believe they identify the same source.

 

Relatedness of the Goods

 

With respect to applicant’s and registrant’s goods, the question of likelihood of confusion is determined based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

The compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

In this case, the registration uses broad wording to describe “Dietary and nutritional supplements; Dietary supplements; Nutritional supplements”, which presumably encompasses ingredients such as applicant’s CBD and/or hemp dietary and nutritional supplements.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Moreover, the attached Internet evidence from http://www.pluscbdoil.com, http://www.gaiaherbs.com/, and http://store.barleans.com/storefront.aspx establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures, produces, or provides the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

Conclusion

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Upon encountering the identical marks, both used on the respective identified goods, consumers are likely to be confused and mistakenly believe that they emanate from a common source. Therefore, registration must be refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d).

 

Applicant should note the additional potential grounds for refusal under Section 2(d) below.

 

ADVISORY: PRIOR-FILED APPLICATION

 

The filing date of pending U.S. Application Serial No. 88384210 precedes applicant’s filing date.  See attached referenced application.  If the mark in the referenced application registers, applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion between the marks.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq.  Therefore, upon receipt of applicant’s response to this Office action, action on this application may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed referenced application.

 

In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the mark in the referenced application.  Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.

 

Applicant should note the additional grounds for refusal below.

 

REFUSAL UNDER SECTION 2(e)(1) – MARK IS MERELY DESCRIPTIVE

 

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark merely describes a feature or ingredient of applicant’s goods.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); see TMEP §§1209.01(b), 1209.03 et seq.

 

A mark is merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of an applicant’s goods and/or services.  TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re TriVita, Inc., 783 F.3d 872, 874, 114 USPQ2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920)). 

 

The determination of whether a mark is merely descriptive is made in relation to an applicant’s goods/services, not in the abstract.  DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1254, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1757 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re The Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re Polo Int’l Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1061, 1062-63 (TTAB 1999) (finding DOC in DOC-CONTROL would refer to the “documents” managed by applicant’s software rather than the term “doctor” shown in a dictionary definition); In re Digital Research Inc., 4 USPQ2d 1242, 1243-44 (TTAB 1987) (finding CONCURRENT PC-DOS and CONCURRENT DOS merely descriptive of “computer programs recorded on disk” where the relevant trade used the denomination “concurrent” as a descriptor of a particular type of operating system). 

 

“Whether consumers could guess what the product is from consideration of the mark alone is not the test.”  In re Am. Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985).

 

In the present case, applicant has applied to register the mark AMBROSIA for use in connection with “CBD oil for medical purposes; dietary and nutritional supplements containing CBD derived from hemp”. The mark merely describes an ingredient of applicant’s goods, namely, the goods contain parts or extracts from the specific strain of the Cannabis Sativa L Plant. The attached evidence illustrates the applied-for mark is the name of a type of strain of cannabis. To wit: http://www.leafly.com/strains/ambrosia, http://cannasos.com/strains/hybrid/ambrosia, and http://weedmaps.com/strains/ambrosia.

 

A term that describes an ingredient of the goods is merely descriptive.  TMEP §1209.01(b); see In re TriVita, Inc., 783 F.3d 872, 114 USPQ2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding NOPALEA merely descriptive of dietary and nutritional supplements containing nopal juice); In re Keebler Co., 479 F.2d 1405, 178 USPQ 155 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (holding RICH ‘N CHIPS merely descriptive of chocolate chip cookies); In re Andes Candies Inc., 478 F.2d 1264, 178 USPQ 156 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (holding CREME DE MENTHE merely descriptive of candy); In re Entenmann’s, Inc., 15 USPQ2d 1750 (TTAB 1990) (holding OATNUT merely descriptive of bread containing oats and hazelnuts); Flowers Indus., Inc. v. Interstate Brands Corp., 5 USPQ 2d 1580 (TTAB 1987) (holding HONEY WHEAT merely descriptive of bread containing honey and wheat).

 

Accordingly, the proposed mark AMBROSIA is merely descriptive, and registration is properly refused on the Principal Register under Section 2(e)(1).

 

In addition to being merely descriptive, the applied-for mark appears to be generic in connection with the identified goods.  “A generic mark, being the ‘ultimate in descriptiveness,’ cannot acquire distinctiveness” and thus is not entitled to registration on either the Principal or Supplemental Register under any circumstances.  In re La. Fish Fry Prods., Ltd., 797 F.3d 1332, 1336, 116 USPQ2d 1262, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 989, 228 USPQ 528, 530 (Fed. Cir. 1986)); see TMEP §§1209.01(c) et seq., 1209.02(a).  Therefore, the trademark examining attorney cannot recommend that applicant amend the application to proceed under Trademark Act Section 2(f) or on the Supplemental Register as possible response options to this refusal.  See TMEP §1209.01(c).

 

Applicant should note the additional grounds for refusal below.

 

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT REFUSAL

 

Use of a mark in commerce must be lawful use to be the basis for federal registration of the mark.   Gray v. Daffy Dan’s Bargaintown, 823 F.2d 522, 526, 3 USPQ2d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that “[a] valid application cannot be filed at all for registration of a mark without ‘lawful use in commerce’”); TMEP §907. Thus, the goods and/or services to which the mark is applied must comply with all applicable federal laws.  See In re Brown, 119 USPQ2d 1350, 1351 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Midwest Tennis & Track Co., 29 USPQ2d 1386, 1386 n.2 (TTAB 1993) (noting that “[i]t is settled that the Trademark Act’s requirement of ‘use in commerce,’ means a ‘lawful use in commerce’”)); In re Pepcom Indus., Inc., 192 USPQ 400, 401 (TTAB 1976); TMEP §907.

 

The application identifies a connection to CBD and CBD derived from hemp. CBD is a nonpsychoactive constituent of the cannabis plant. Goods containing CBD derived from cannabis that meets the definition of “marijuana” are illegal under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. §§801-971.  In addition, on December 20, 2018, the CSA was amended to remove “hemp” from the definition of “marijuana” and specifically exclude “tetrahydrocannabinols in hemp (as defined under section 297A of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946)” from Schedule I, 21 U.S.C. §812(c)(17). See the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-334 (the 2018 Farm Bill), which amends the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 (AMA).  Thus, certain goods containing or involving hemp, CBD derived from hemp, and/or CBD with less than .3% THC that were used in commerce or intend to be used in commerce on or after December 20, 2018 may be lawful under the CSA. 

 

The application is currently refused under the CSA because the applicant’s Identification of Goods does not identify the source of, and/or the THC content of, the applicant’s CBD. Thus, the application includes items or activities that are prohibited under the CSA, and as such applicant currently does not have a valid filing basis for any such items or activities. 

 

To the extent applicant’s goods or services involving goods are derived solely from cannabis plants that meet the current statutory definition of “hemp,” and were used or will be used on or after December 20, 2018, such goods may be lawful if applicant amends the identification of goods to specify that all cannabidiol-containing items and/or hemp derived items are:  “ ; all of the foregoing containing CBD solely derived from hemp with a delta-9 tetrahyrocannabinol (THC) concentration of not more than 0.3 percent on a dry weight basis.” 

 

SCOPE ADVISORY: Applicant may amend the identification to clarify or limit the goods and/or services, but not to broaden or expand the goods and/or services beyond those in the original application or as acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Generally, any deleted goods and/or services may not later be reinserted.  See TMEP §1402.07(e).

 

DATE OF FIRST USE IN COMMERCE ADVISORY: Applicant is advised that to avoid or overcome a refusal based on unlawful use prohibited by the CSA upon the filing an amendment to allege use or statement of use, the date of first use of the mark in commerce must be no earlier than December 20, 2018, the date on which the 2018 Farm Bill was signed into law.>

 

However, applicant is advised that the amendment indicated above will not obviate the FDCA Refusal below as regardless of whether a substance is hemp-derived, it is the FDA’s current view that it is unlawful to market goods to be ingested containing any cannabinoids, or to market goods that have a therapeutic or medical use, or any product that is intended to affect the structure or function of the body of humans or animals containing cannabinoids. See e.g., the FDA’s actions regarding companies illegally marketing products containing cannabidiol from http://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-warns-15-companies-illegally-selling-various-products-containing-cannabidiol-agency-details attached hereto.

 

FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT REFUSAL

 

Registration is refused because applicant does not have a bona fide intent to lawfully use the applied-for mark in commerce.  Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; see TMEP §907. 

 

To qualify for federal trademark/service mark registration, the use of a mark in commerce must be lawful.  Gray v. Daffy Dan’s Bargaintown, 823 F.2d 522, 526, 3 USPQ2d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that “[a] valid application cannot be filed at all for registration of a mark without ‘lawful use in commerce’”); TMEP §907; see In re Stellar Int’l, Inc., 159 USPQ 48, 50-51 (TTAB 1968); Coahoma Chemical Co., Inc. v. Smith, 113 USPQ 413 (Com’r Pat. & Trademarks 1957) (concluding that “use of a mark in connection with unlawful shipments in interstate commerce is not use of a mark in commerce which the [Office] may recognize.”).  Thus, the goods/services to which the mark is to be applied must comply with all applicable federal laws.  See In re Brown, 119 USPQ2d 1350, 1351 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Midwest Tennis & Track Co., 29 USPQ2d 1386, 1386 n.2 (TTAB 1993) (noting that “[i]t is settled that the Trademark Act’s requirement of ‘use in commerce,’ means a ‘lawful use in commerce’”)); In re Pepcom Indus., Inc., 192 USPQ 400, 401 (TTAB 1976); TMEP §907.

 

The items or activities listed in the application in connection with which the mark is intended to be used involve a per se violation of federal law.  See In re Brown, 119 USPQ2d at 1352.  The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) prohibits the introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of a food to which has been added a drug approved under Section 355 of the Act or a biological product licensed under 42 U.S.C. §262.  21 U.S.C. §331(ll); see also 21 U.S.C. §321(ff) (indicating that a dietary supplement is deemed to be a food within the meaning of the FDCA and does not include an article that is approved as a new drug under 21 U.S.C.  §355, certified as an antibiotic under 21 U.S.C. §357, or licensed as a biologic under 42 U.S.C.  §262).

 

Cannabidiol (CBD), a chemical constituent of the cannabis plant, was the subject of substantial clinical investigations before it was marketed in foods or as dietary supplements.  On June 25, 2018, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the first prescription pharmaceutical formulation of plant-derived CBD, Epidiolex®, for the treatment of two rare forms of epilepsy, Lennox-Gastaut syndrome and Dravet syndrome.  The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) placed Epidiolex® on schedule V of the CSA on September 27, 2018.  Nevertheless, marijuana and CBD derived from marijuana remain unlawful.  No other cannabis-derived drug products have been approved by the FDA.  Under the FDCA, any product intended to have a therapeutic or medical use, and any product (other than a food) that is intended to affect the structure or function of the body of humans or animals, is a drug.  21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)  An unapproved new drug cannot be distributed or sold in interstate commerce unless it is the subject of an FDA-approved new drug application (NDA) or abbreviated new drug application (ANDA). 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(d) and 355(a), (b), & (j); see also FDA Regulation of Cannabis and Cannabis-Derived Products: Questions and Answers http://www.fda.gov/news-events/public-health-focus/fda-regulation-cannabis-and-cannabis-derived-products-questions-and-answers copy attached

 

In the present case, the application identifies applicant’s goods as follows: “CBD oil for medical purposes; dietary and nutritional supplements containing CBD derived from hemp.” It is unlawful to introduce food to which CBD, an “article that is approved as a new drug,” has been added into interstate commerce or to market CBD as, or in, dietary supplements or in goods that are intended to affect the structure of function of the body of humans or animals, regardless of whether the substances are hemp-derived. 21 U.S.C. §§321(ff)(3)(B)(ii), 331(d), 355(a); see also 21 U.S.C.  §352(f)(1) regarding mislabeled drugs.  See also Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on signing of the Agriculture Improvement Act and the agency’s regulation of products containing cannabis and cannabis-derived compounds. http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm628988.htm copy attached.  Therefore, the applicant’s limitation statement indicating that the CBD is derived from hemp does not obviate this refusal.

 

In order for an application to have a valid basis that could properly result in a registration, the use of the mark has to be lawful.  See In re Pepcom Indus., Inc., 192 USPQ 400, 401 (TTAB 1976)  Because introduction of such goods into commerce was not lawful as of the filing date, applicant did not have a bona fide intent to use the applied-for mark in lawful commerce in connection with such goods and/or the identified services.  See e.g. In re JJ206, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1568, 1569 (TTAB 2016) (“where the identified goods are illegal under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), the applicant cannot use its mark in lawful commerce, and ‘it is a legal impossibility’ for the applicant to have the requisite bona fide intent to use the mark.”); see also In re Brown, 119 USPQ2d, 1351-1352; TMEP §907.   

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusals by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. 

 

ASSISTANCE

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.    

 

 

/Heather A. Sales/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 130

(571) 272-7835

Heather.Sales@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on August 18, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88600962

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Heather A. Sales/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 130

(571) 272-7835

Heather.Sales@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from August 18, 2020, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”