To: | KCH Corporation (trademark@steinadlerlaw.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88597900 - CRYSTAL STYLE - N/A |
Sent: | November 01, 2019 12:53:38 PM |
Sent As: | ecom120@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 Attachment - 24 Attachment - 25 Attachment - 26 Attachment - 27 Attachment - 28 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88597900
Mark: CRYSTAL STYLE
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Correspondence Address: |
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Applicant: KCH Corporation
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: November 01, 2019
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 1943491. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registration.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and services of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Determining likelihood of confusion is made on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). However, “[n]ot all of the [du Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1366, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601. F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir 2010)). The USPTO may focus its analysis “on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods [and/or services].” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see TMEP §1207.01.
Applicant’s mark is “CRYSTAL STYLE” with the identification of “Cups; Disposable drinking cups; Plastic drinking glasses; Plastic stemware; Goblets” in Class 021.
The cited registration is “KRYSTAL” (Reg. No. 1943491) for “drinking glasses and bowls, not of leaded glass, coffee cups, mugs, paper cups, plastic cups, thermal insulated containers for beverages, squeeze bottles, ice chests and ice buckets distributed through 'Krystal and Krystal Kwik' restaurants” in Class 021.
Comparison of Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Where the goods and/or services of an applicant and registrant are identical or virtually identical, the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding that confusion is likely declines. See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Applying the above analysis, the marks are substantially similar. Here the applicant’s first word is is phonetically identical to the registrant’s mark. Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”). Hence, the wording CRYSTAL would be the portion of the applicant’s mark that consumers would be generally more inclined to focus on because it is the first word in the applicant’s mark.
Hence, the marks are essentially phonetic equivalents and thus sound similar. Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv). There is no correct pronunciation of a mark because it is impossible to predict how the public will pronounce a particular mark. See Embarcadero Techs., Inc. v. RStudio, Inc., 105 USPQ2d 1825, 1835 (TTAB 2013) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1367, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1912 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re The Belgrade Shoe Co., 411 F.2d 1352, 1353, 162 USPQ 227, 227 (C.C.P.A. 1969)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv). The marks in question could clearly be pronounced the same; such similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).
Therefore, when viewed as a whole, applicant’s mark is substantially similar in sound, appearance, connotation and commercial impression to the registered mark.
Comparison of the Goods
Applying the second half of the test, the goods are closely related. Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
In this case, the applicationuse(s) broad wording to describe Cups; Disposable drinking cups; Plastic drinking glasses; Plastic stemware; Goblets, which presumably encompasses all goods and/or services of the type described, including registrant(s)’s more narrow drinking glasses and bowls, not of leaded glass, coffee cups, mugs, paper cups, plastic cups, thermal insulated containers for beverages, squeeze bottles, ice chests and ice buckets distributed through 'Krystal and Krystal Kwik' restaurants. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, the goods and/or services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are related.
Because the marks are confusingly similar, and the goods are identical, overlapping, or otherwise related, a likelihood of confusion exists and registration is refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d).
Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.
SECTION 2(e)(1) REFUSAL - MERELY DESCRIPTIVE
“Whether consumers could guess what the product [or service] is from consideration of the mark alone is not the test.” In re Am. Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985).
Here, applicant has applied for the mark CRYSTAL STYLE with the identification of “Cups; Disposable drinking cups; Plastic drinking glasses; Plastic stemware; Goblets” in Class 021.
Applying the above test, the descriptive nature of applicant’s mark can be shown by defining each term of the mark and demonstrating how it relates to applicant’s services. CRYSTAL is defined as “quartz that is transparent or nearly so and that is either colorless or only slightly tinged.” See http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/crystal. STYLE is defined as “a distinctive quality, form, or type of something.” See http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/style. Viewing the mark in whole as CRYSTAL STYLE, the mark merely describes a good that is distinctive for being made of a type of quartz. Therefore, the mark CRYSTAL STYLE for “Cups; Disposable drinking cups; Plastic drinking glasses; Plastic stemware; Goblets” in Class 021 is descriptive because it describes the characteristic, quality, feature, and ingredients of how and what the goods are of. Thus the applicant’s mark is refused as being merely descriptive.
Generally, if the individual components of a mark retain their descriptive meaning in relation to the goods, the combination results in a composite mark that is itself descriptive and not registrable. In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1516 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Tower Tech, Inc., 64 USPQ2d 1314, 1317-18 (TTAB (2002)); TMEP §1209.03(d); see, e.g., Apollo Med. Extrusion Techs., Inc. v. Med. Extrusion Techs., Inc., 123 USPQ2d 1844, 1851 (TTAB 2017) (holding MEDICAL EXTRUSION TECHNOLOGIES merely descriptive of medical extrusion goods produced by employing medical extrusion technologies); In re Cannon Safe, Inc., 116 USPQ2d 1348, 1351 (TTAB 2015) (holding SMART SERIES merely descriptive of metal gun safes); In re King Koil Licensing Co., 79 USPQ2d 1048, 1052 (TTAB 2006) (holding THE BREATHABLE MATTRESS merely descriptive of beds, mattresses, box springs, and pillows).
Only where the combination of descriptive terms creates a unitary mark with a unique, incongruous, or otherwise nondescriptive meaning in relation to the goods and/or services is the combined mark registrable. See In re Colonial Stores, Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 551, 157 USPQ 382, 384 (C.C.P.A. 1968); In re Positec Grp. Ltd., 108 USPQ2d 1161, 1162-63 (TTAB 2013).
In this case, both the individual components and the composite result are descriptive of applicant’s goods and do not create a unique, incongruous, or nondescriptive meaning in relation to the goods. Specifically, CRYSTAL STYLE describes the specific ingredients and quality of the goods. Therefore, applicant’s mark is characteristic, quality, feature, and ingredients of applicant’s goods. Thus the applicant’s mark is refused as merely descriptive.
SUPPLEMENTAL REGISTER ADVISORY
In addition to being merely descriptive, the applied-for mark appears to be generic in connection with the identified goods, therefore, incapable of functioning as a source-identifier for applicant’s goods. In re The Am. Acad. of Facial Plastic & Reconstructive Surgery, 64 USPQ2d 1748 (TTAB 2002); In re A La Vieille Russie, Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1895 (TTAB 2001); see TMEP §§1209.01(c) et seq., 1209.02(a). Under these circumstances, neither an amendment to proceed under Trademark Act Section 2(f) nor an amendment to the Supplemental Register can be recommended. See TMEP §1209.01(c).
INFORMATION REQUEST AND ADVISORY
(1) A written statement explaining whether the goods do will contain, consist of, or comprise linen.
(2) A sample of advertisements or promotional materials featuring the goods and a photograph of the identified goods, or if such materials are not available, applicant must submit samples of advertisements or promotional materials and a photograph of similar goods.
(3) A written statement describing in detail the nature, purpose, and channels of trade of the goods.
See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §§814, 1402.01(e).
Failure to comply with a request for information is grounds for refusing registration. In re Harley, 119 USPQ2d 1755, 1757-58 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §814. Merely stating that information about the goods or services is available on applicant’s website is an insufficient response and will not make the relevant website information of record. See In re Planalytics, Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1453, 1457-58 (TTAB 2004).
Applicant is advised that, if applicant’s response to the request for information indicates that the goods identified in the application do not or will not contain, consist of, or comprise linen, registration may be refused on the ground that the applied-for mark is deceptive. Trademark Act Section 2(a), 15 U.S.C. §1052(a); see In re Budge Mfg. Co., 857 F.2d 773, 775-77, 8 USPQ2d 1259, 1260-62 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re ALP of S. Beach Inc., 79 USPQ2d 1009, 1010 (TTAB 2006); TMEP §1203.02-02(e).
IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENT
This feature or characteristic is considered desirable for applicant’s goods and/or services because consumers looking for a quality and type of cloth napkin typically seek out linen napkins for a more formal experience. However, if some or all of the goods and/or services do not (or will not) in fact have or exhibit this feature or characteristic, then registration may be refused because the mark consists of or includes deceptive matter in relation to the identified goods and/or services. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(a); In re Budge Mfg. Co., 857 F.2d 773, 8 USPQ2d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 1988); TMEP §1203.02-.02(b).
To avoid such refusal, applicant may amend the identification to specify that the goods and/or services possess this relevant feature or characteristic. See TMEP §§1203.02(e)(ii), (f)(i), 1402.05 et seq. However, merely amending the identification to exclude goods or services with the named feature or characteristic will not avoid a deceptiveness refusal. TMEP §1203.02(f)(i).
Therefore, applicant may amend the identification to the following, if accurate:
Class 021
Cups made of crystal; Disposable drinking cups made of crystal; Goblets made of crystal
For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual. See TMEP §1402.04.
Response guidelines. For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney. All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action
/Jules Dean/
Trademark Attorney
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Law Office 120
Phone: (571) 272-5322
Jules.Dean@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE