Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  December 03, 2019

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

 

Summary of Issues that Applicant Must Address

 

1.     Trademark Act Section 2(d) Refusal - Likelihood of Confusion

2.     Applicant Cannot Assert Section 1(a) and Section 1(b) Basis for Identical Goods

3.     Requirement to Provide Applicant’s Domicile Address

 

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 4680050 and 5180038.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  Please see the enclosed registrations at Attachment 1.  Reg. No. 4680050 is TALBOTS for “perfume, eau de toilette.”  Reg. No. 5180038 is DR. TALBOT’S ORIGINAL SINCE 1933 & design for “Medicated diaper rash ointments and lotions; Medicated skin preparation for use in treating diaper rash.”

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34).

 

Reg. No. 4680050

 

Applicant’s mark is DR. TALBOT’S and registrant’s mark is TALBOTS.  The mark are very similar in appearance, sound, and connotation because the surname comprising the registered mark, TALBOTS, is almost identical to the surname in the applicant’s mark, TALBOT.  Because the surname in applicant’s mark is in possessive form, it sounds the same as a surname in the registered mark.  Although applicant’s mark includes the title “DR.”, consumers are likely to focus on the name TALBOT’S in the applied-for mark in calling for applicant’s goods, rather than the title “DR.”.  For these reasons, applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark convey a similar overall commercial impression.

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Reg. No. 5180038

 

Applicant’s mark is DR. TALBOT’S in standard characters and DR. TALBOT’S ORIGINAL SINCE 1933 & design.  The wording “DR. TALBOT’S” is the dominant portion of the registered mark because it appears in the center of the mark in the largest font, and because the other wording in the mark is merely descriptive or informational, and thus less likely to be focused on by consumers in calling for registrant’s goods.  Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of, or generic for, a party’s goods is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).

 

Thus, applicant’s mark is identical in appearance, sound and connotation to the dominant wording in the registered mark, and creates a very similar overall commercial impression.

 

The design elements in the registered mark function as a background carrier and do not create a separate commercial impression.  Moreover, when evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).  It is also noted that applicant’s mark is in standard characters and could be displayed in a similar manner to the registered mark.  In fact, applicant’s specimen comprising packaging for lip balm displays the mark in the same stylization as the registered mark with the same design elements.

 

Thus, even if potential purchasers realize the apparent differences between the marks, they could still reasonably assume, due to the overall similarities in sound, appearance, connotation, and commercial impression in the respective marks, that applicant’s goods sold under the DR. TALBOT’S mark constitute new or additional goods from the same source as the goods sold under the DR. TALBOT’S ORIGINAL SINCE 1933 & design mark with which they are acquainted or familiar, and that applicant’s proposed mark is merely a variation of the registrant’s mark.  See, e.g., SMS, Inc. v. Byn-Mar Inc., 228 USPQ 219, 220 (TTAB 1985) (applicant’s marks ALSO ANDREA and ANDREA SPORT were “likely to evoke an association by consumers with opposer's preexisting mark [ANDREA SIMONE] for its established line of clothing.”).

 

Relatedness of the Goods

 

The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the descriptions of the goods stated in the application and registrations at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

 

The compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Reg. No. 4680050

 

In the present case, applicant’s goods comprise various personal care products, such as body wash and skin creams, gels, and lotions.  The goods in the cited registration consist of perfume and eau de toilette.  The goods of the parties are closely related in that they consist of personal care products that commonly originate from a single source under the same mark.  Attachments 2-5 comprise evidence showing that perfumes and eau de toilette are commonly offered under the same mark as skin creams, lotions, gels and body washes, and may even have the same scent.  This evidence establishes that the same entity commonly produces the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark, that the relevant goods are sold through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use, and that the goods are complementary in terms of purpose or function.  Thus, applicant’s goods and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

Reg. No. 5180038

 

Applicant’s goods include “Baby powder; Baby powders” and the goods in the cited registration comprise “Medicated diaper rash ointments and lotions; Medicated skin preparation for use in treating diaper rash.”  These goods are highly related in that they both consist of baby care products used when changing a diaper, as shown by the descriptions of Burt’s Bees diaper cream and baby powder at Attachment 6. 

 

Applicant’s goods such as face and body lotion, shampoo, and body wash are also highly related to medicated diaper rash preparations because they are personal care products for babies that may be used together in caring for a baby’s skin, and that commonly originate from a single source under the same mark.  Attachments 6-8 contain evidence showing products from Burt’s Bees, Honest, and Cetaphil, which demonstrate that the same entity commonly produces the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark, that the relevant goods are sold through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use, and that the goods are similar or complementary in terms of purpose or function.  Thus, applicant’s goods and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d at 1202-04; In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d at 1268-69, 1271-72.

 

Summary

 

Because applicant’s mark is very similar to registrant’s mark, and because applicant’s goods are closely related to registrant’s goods, there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the goods.

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Ownership of One of the Cited Registrations

 

The same address is listed for applicant and the owner of Reg. No. 5180038.  If the mark in that cited registration is owned by applicant, applicant may provide evidence of ownership of the mark by satisfying one of the following:

 

(1)       Record the assignment with the USPTO’s Assignment Recordation Branch (ownership transfer documents such as assignments can be filed online at http://etas.uspto.gov) and promptly notify the trademark examining attorney that the assignment has been duly recorded.

 

(2)       Submit copies of documents evidencing the chain of title.

 

(3)       Submit the following statement, verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20:  “Applicant is the owner of U.S. Registration No. 5180038.”  To provide this statement using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), use the “Response to Office Action” form; answer “yes” to wizard questions #3 and #10; then, continuing on to the next portion of the form, in the “Additional Statement(s)” section, find “Active Prior Registration(s)” and insert the U.S. registration number in the data fields; and follow the instructions within the form for signing.  The form must be signed twice; a signature is required both in the “Declaration Signature” section and in the “Response Signature” section.

 

TMEP §812.01; see 15 U.S.C. §1060; 37 C.F.R. §§2.193(e)(1), 3.25, 3.73(a)-(b); TMEP §502.02(a).

 

Recording a document with the Assignment Recordation Branch does not constitute a response to an Office action.  TMEP §503.01(d).

 

 

Applicant Cannot Assert Section 1(a) and Section 1(b) Basis for Identical Goods

 

Applicant has asserted both use of the mark in commerce under Section 1(a) and a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce under Section 1(b) for particular identical goods.  Notably, the following goods with a Section 1(a) basis are considered non-medicated because they are classified in International Class 3: “Lip balm; Lip balm; Skin cream; Skin creams; Skin creams in liquid and in solid form; Skin creams in liquid and solid; Skin creams in liquid and solid form”.  These goods are legally identical to the following goods with a Section 1(b) basis: “Cosmetic creams for skin care; Non-medicated balms for use on lips; Non-medicated lip balms; Non-medicated skin creams; Non-medicated skin care creams and lotions; Non-medicated skin care preparations, namely, creams, lotions; Non-medicated skin care preparations, namely, creams.” 

 

However, an applicant may not assert both use and intent to use for identical goods in the same application.  37 C.F.R. §2.34(b).  Accordingly, applicant must either (1) delete one of these bases for these goods or (2) divide these goods between the two bases, as appropriate.  See TMEP §806.02(b).

 

 

Requirement to Provide Applicant’s Domicile Address

 

Applicant must provide applicant’s domicile address.  All applications must include the applicant’s domicile address, and domicile dictates whether an applicant is required to have an attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a U.S. state or territory represent the applicant at the USPTO.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.2(o)-(p), 2.11(a), 2.189; Requirement of U.S.-Licensed Attorney for Foreign-Domiciled Trademark Applicants & Registrants, Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A. (Rev. Sept. 2019). 

 

An individual applicant’s domicile is the place a person resides and intends to be the person’s principal home.  37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.  A juristic entity’s domicile is the principal place of business, i.e. headquarters, where a juristic entity applicant’s senior executives or officers ordinarily direct and control the entity’s activities.  37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.  An applicant whose domicile is located outside of the United States or its territories is foreign-domiciled and must be represented at the USPTO by a U.S.-licensed attorney qualified to practice before the USPTO under 37 C.F.R. §11.14.  37 C.F.R. §2.11(a).

 

The application record lists applicant as a juristic entity and specifies applicant’s domicile as applicant’s attorney’s address.  In most cases, an address that is in care of another party’s address is not acceptable as a domicile address because it does not identify the location of applicant’s headquarters where the entity’s senior executives or officers ordinarily direct and control the entity’s activities.  See37 C.F.R. §§2.2(o)-(p), 2.189; Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.3.  Thus, applicant must provide its domicile street address.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.189.  Alternatively, an applicant may demonstrate that the listed address is, in fact, the applicant’s domicile.  Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.3.

 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.    

 

 

If applicant has any questions about this Office action, please contact the undersigned examining attorney.

 

/Linda Lavache/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 106

p. 571.272.7187

linda.lavache@uspto.gov

 

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on December 03, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88597762

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Linda Lavache/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 106

p. 571.272.7187

linda.lavache@uspto.gov

 

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from December 03, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”