Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  January 03, 2020

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF THE ISSUES:

 

-       Section 2(d) Likelihood of Confusion – Refusal

-       Section 2(e)(1) Merely Descriptive – Refusal

-       Mark is Possibly Generic – Advisory

 

SECTION 2(d) LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION – REFUSAL

 

Applicant seeks registration of the mark GRAAS. Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4528908.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Applicant seeks registration of the mark GRAAS for “Software as a service (SAAS) services featuring software for data management.”

 

The registered mark is GRASS for “Personal computer for monitoring and analyzing electroencephalographic and polysomnographic information; computer software for recording and analyzing physiological data; digital video/audio software used to display video of patients in synchronization with waveforms from the electroencephalographic and polysomnographic signals of the patient; computer program for detection of spikes and seizures in the monitoring of long term epilepsy; computer software for facilitating review of electroencephalograph and polysomnograph recordings on any computer; and electronic data recorder for monitoring epilepsy; computer software for acquiring, reviewing and analyzing epilepsy data; polygraphs for recording physiologic data; electrical connectors for medical equipment.”

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1323, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). 

 

In the present case, Applicant’s GRAAS mark is confusingly similar to Registrant’s GRASS mark in terms of appearance. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). Here, Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks are entirely comprised of nearly identical terms; thus, they appear nearly identical.

 

Further, these marks are essentially phonetic equivalents and thus sound similar. Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).

 

Moreover, please note that when comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar. 

 

Relatedness of the Goods and Services

 

The compared goods and services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

 

Here, the goods and services of the parties are related because they are encompassing. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Specially, the application uses broad wording to describe its software for data management, which presumably encompasses all goods and services of the type described, including Registrant’s more narrowly-defined computer software for acquiring, reviewing and analyzing epilepsy and physiological data. Thus, Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods and services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

Conclusion

 

Because Applicant's and Registrant's marks are similar and because the goods and services are related, Applicant's mark must be refused registration pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act.

 

Although Applicant's mark has been refused registration, Applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. However, if Applicant responds to the refusal, Applicant must also respond to the refusal set forth below.

 

SECTION 2(e)(1) MERELY DESCRIPTIVE – REFUSAL

 

Registration is refused because the applied-for GRAAS mark merely describes the nature or a feature or characteristic of Applicant’s services. Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); see TMEP §§1209.01(b), 1209.03 et seq.

 

An abbreviation, initialism, or acronym is merely descriptive when it is generally understood as “substantially synonymous” with the descriptive words it represents.  See In re Thomas Nelson, Inc., 97 USPQ2d 1712, 1715 (TTAB 2011) (citing Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504, 506, 110 USPQ 293, 295 (C.C.P.A. 1956)) (holding NKJV substantially synonymous with merely descriptive term “New King James Version” and thus merely descriptive of bibles); In re BetaBatt Inc., 89 USPQ2d 1152, 1155 (TTAB 2008) (holding DEC substantially synonymous with merely descriptive term “direct energy conversion” and thus merely descriptive of a type of batteries and battery related services); TMEP §1209.03(h).

 

A mark consisting of an abbreviation, initialism, or acronym will be considered substantially synonymous with descriptive wording if:

 

(1)    the applied-for mark is an abbreviation, initialism, or acronym for specific wording;

 

(2)    the specific wording is merely descriptive of Applicant’s services; and

 

(3) a relevant consumer viewing the abbreviation, initialism, or acronym in connection with Applicant’s services will recognize it as the equivalent of the merely descriptive wording it represents.

 

TMEP §1209.03(h); see In re Thomas Nelson, Inc., 97 USPQ2d at 1715-16 (citing In re Harco Corp., 220 USPQ 1075, 1076 (TTAB 1984)).

 

In the present case, Applicant’s GRAAS mark, which is an acronym for the wording GOLDEN RECORD AS A SERVICE, is merely descriptive of the nature or a feature or characteristic of Applicant’s services. As demonstrated by the attached evidence, the applied-for mark is an acronym for wording that refers to technology solutions featuring capabilities that combine data from multiple sources into a single view that’s more accurate, more complete, and truer than the data from any single source. See:

 

-       http://www.dqglobal.com/2018/02/06/golden-record/ (“The Golden Record is the ultimate prize in the data world. A fundamental concept within Master Data Management (MDM) defined as the single source of truth; one data point that captures all the necessary information we need to know about a member, a resource, or an item in our catalogue – assumed to be 100% accurate.”)

-       http://www.redpointglobal.com/blog/what-is-a-golden-record/ (“A golden record combines meaningful, reliable data from multiple systems into a single view that’s ideally more accurate, more complete and truer than the data from any single source.”)

-       http://www.blumshapiro.com/insights/6-steps-for-creating-golden-records/ (“What is a Golden Record? A Golden Record is the most accurate, complete and comprehensive representation of a master data asset (i.e. Customer, Product, Vendor). Golden Records are created by pulling together incomplete data about some “thing” from the systems in which they were entered.”)

-       http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/As_a_service (“aaS is an acronym for as a service (e.g., X as a service), and refers to something being made available to a customer as a service,[1] always in the context of cloud computing.”)

-       http://searchcloudcomputing.techtarget.com/definition/XaaS-anything-as-a-service (“XaaS is a general, collective term that refers to the delivery of anything as a service. It recognizes the vast number of products, tools and technologies that vendors now deliver to users as a service over a network -- typically the internet -- rather than provide locally or on-site within an enterprise.”)

-       http://itknowledgeexchange.techtarget.com/quality-assurance/data-accuracy-2/ (article describing Applicant’s services: “With its recent launch of the next generation of its complete data accuracy platform Naveego has set itself at a much higher stand as compared to its counterparts in the market. It comes bundled with self-service Master Data Management (MDM) and Golden-Record-as-a-Service (GRaaS).”)

 

Applicant is engaged in providing “Software as a service (SAAS) services featuring software for data management.” Thus, the relevant consumers viewing Applicant’s GRAAS mark in connection with the identified services would recognize it as the equivalent of the descriptive wording GOLDEN RECORD AS A SERVICE and they would immediately understand that Applicant provides software solutions featuring capabilities that combine data from multiple sources into a single view that’s more accurate, more complete, and truer than the data from any single source. Accordingly, the applied-for mark is merely descriptive of Applicant’s services.

 

Lastly, Applicant should note that the fact that an applicant may be the first or only user of certain merely descriptive wording does not necessarily render that wording distinctive; as in this case, the evidence shows that the applied-for mark is merely descriptive.  See In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1514 (TTAB 2016); In re Phoseon Tech., Inc., 103 USPQ2d 1822, 1826 (TTAB 2012); TMEP §1209.03(c). Moreover, vocabulary used in the computer and electronics fields is particularly noted for changing rapidly.  In re Sun Microsystems, Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1084, 1088 (TTAB 2001); In re Styleclick.com Inc., 57 USPQ2d 1445, 1448 (TTAB 2000) (noting “a year or two is an eternity in ‘Internet time,’ given the rapid advancement of the Internet into every facet of daily life”). Accordingly, the applied-for mark is merely descriptive of Applicant’s services.

 

Conclusion

 

Based on the evidence and analysis above, Applicant’s applied-for mark is merely descriptive and must be refused registration pursuant to Section 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act.

 

Although Applicant's mark has been refused registration, Applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. Applicant should also note the advisory below.

 

MARK IS POSSIBLY GENERIC – ADVISORY

 

In addition to being merely descriptive, the applied-for mark appears to be generic in connection with the identified services and, therefore, incapable of functioning as a source-identifier for Applicant’s services.  In re The Am. Acad. of Facial Plastic & Reconstructive Surgery, 64 USPQ2d 1748 (TTAB 2002); In re A La Vieille Russie, Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1895 (TTAB 2001); see TMEP §§1209.01(c) et seq., 1209.02(a).  Under these circumstances, neither an amendment to proceed under Trademark Act Section 2(f) nor an amendment to the Supplemental Register can be recommended.  See TMEP §1209.01(c).

 

ASSISTANCE

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about Applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide Applicant with additional explanation about the refusal and requirements in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.    

 

 

/Xheneta Ademi/

Xheneta Ademi

Trademark Attorney

Law Office 130/Innovation Lab

571-272-7151

xheneta.ademi@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on January 03, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88595662

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Xheneta Ademi/

Xheneta Ademi

Trademark Attorney

Law Office 130/Innovation Lab

571-272-7151

xheneta.ademi@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from January 03, 2020, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”