| To: | Shenzhen Qianhai Yahee E-commerce Co., L ETC. (dayro@alfonsoestevez.net) |
| Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88592901 - SMILE MART - N/A |
| Sent: | November 26, 2019 04:45:17 PM |
| Sent As: | ecom113@uspto.gov |
| Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
|
U.S. Application Serial No. 88592901
Mark: SMILE MART
|
|
|
Correspondence Address:
|
|
|
Applicant: Shenzhen Qianhai Yahee E-commerce Co., L ETC.
|
|
|
Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
|
NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: November 26, 2019
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SECTION 2(D) – PARTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION REFUSAL
Applicant has applied to register the mark SMILE MART for use in connection with “Chairs; Cupboards; . . . Furniture; Furniture of metal; Office furniture; Pet furniture; Scratching posts for cats; Shelves for storage; Tables; Television stands; Upholstered furniture” in Class 20.
The registered mark is SMILE (stylized characters) for use in connection with, in relevant part, “furniture, mirrors, picture frames;” in Class 20.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin's Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Similarity of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b). Moreover, although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34).
Here, applicant’s mark, SMILE MART, is confusingly similar to the registered mark SMILE. As an initial matter, the dominant term SMILE is identical in sound and meaning, nigh identical in appearance, “and ha[s] the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner” in each mark. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Additionally, because they are virtually identical, these terms are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods. Id. Therefore, as the dominant term SMILE is virtually identical in each mark, the marks are confusingly similar.
The addition of the word MART does not obviate the likelihood of confusion. As explained below, mart is merely descriptive matter that must be disclaimed. See Disclaimer Required, infra. Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Moreover, consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”). Accordingly, consumers encountering SMILE MART would focus on the prominent distinctive word SMILE, not the descriptive word MART, when calling for or recalling the mark. The addition of MART thus does not obviate the confusing similarity of the marks.
The stylization and design elements of the marks similarly do not obviate the confusing similarity of the marks. In regards to stylization, both marks are in stylized fonts. These stylized fonts merely emphasize the text of the marks – they do not add or create an additional commercial impression. Applicant’s mark is merely in bubble letters, while registrant’s mark is in a serif font. Consumers would rely on the text of the marks, not these minor font changes, when calling for or recalling the mark. This is especially so given that registrant’s mark is barely stylized.
In regards to the design element, applicant’s mark sits on what appears to be a cloud. When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). This is particularly so in this case, given that applicant’s design merely acts as a carrier for applicant’s text. At best, the clouds emphasize the text in applicant’s mark – as such, consumers would rely on the text, not the design, when calling for or recalling the mark. Accordingly, the addition of a design element does not obviate the likelihood of confusion.
Ultimately, when purchasers call for the goods of applicant and registrant using SMILE, they are likely to be confused as to the sources of those goods and/or services by the similarities between the marks. Thus, the marks are confusingly similar.
Relatedness of the Goods
Here, applicant’s “Chairs; Cupboards; . . . Furniture; Furniture of metal; Office furniture; Pet furniture; Scratching posts for cats; Shelves for storage; Tables; Television stands; Upholstered furniture,” are closely related to registrant’s “furniture, mirrors, picture frames.”
Specifically, the registration uses the broad wording “furniture, mirrors, picture frames” which presumably encompasses all furniture items, including applicant’s various types of furniture. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Accordingly, because registrant’s broad language encompasses all of applicant’s furniture items, the parties’ goods are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)). Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.
Overall, when purchasers encounter the goods of applicant and registrant, they are likely to be confused as to the source of the goods by the relationship between them. Thus, the goods are closely related.
Therefore, because the marks are confusingly similar and the goods are closely related, purchasers encountering these goods are likely to believe, mistakenly, that they emanate from a common source. Accordingly, there is a likelihood of confusion and registration is PARTIALLY REFUSED for only “Chairs; Cupboards; . . . Furniture; Furniture of metal; Office furniture; Pet furniture; Scratching posts for cats; Shelves for storage; Tables; Television stands; Upholstered furniture” in Class 20 pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
Response to Section 2(d) – Likelihood of Confusion Refusal
Although the examining attorney has refused registration, the applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
REQUIREMENTS
If applicant chooses to respond to the refusal to register, then applicant must also respond to the following requirements:
SPECIMENS DO NOT SHOW USE IN COMMERCE – AMENDMENT REQUIRED
Registration is refused because the specimens in Class 20 appear to consist of a digitally altered images or a mock-ups of the mark on the goods or their packaging and do not show the applied-for mark in actual use in commerce. Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a).
An application based on Trademark Act Section 1(a) must include a specimen showing the applied-for mark in use in commerce for each international class of goods identified in the application or amendment to allege use. 15 U.S.C. §1051(a)(1); 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a). “Use in commerce” means (1) a bona fide use of the applied-for mark in the ordinary course of trade (and not merely to reserve a right in the mark), (2) the mark is placed in any manner on the goods, packaging, tags or labels affixed to the goods, or displays that directly associate the mark with the goods and have a point-of-sale nature, and (3) the goods are actually sold or transported in commerce. See 15 U.S.C. §1127.
An image of a product or packaging that has been digitally created or otherwise altered to include the mark does not show actual use of the mark in commerce. See 15 U.S.C. §1127; TMEP §§904.04(a), 904.07(a); cf. In re Chica, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1845, 1848 (TTAB 2007) (holding that “a mere drawing of the goods with an illustration of how the mark may be displayed” was not an acceptable specimen because it did not show actual use in commerce); In re The Signal Cos., 228 USPQ 956, 957-58 n.4 (TTAB 1986) (noting that a printer’s proof of an advertisement would not be an acceptable specimen because it does not show actual use in commerce).
In this case, applicant’s specimens consist of images of a cat scratching post and an office chair. In each image, the mark is printed on a small piece of white paper attached to the item by means of a red string. As an initial matter, the tag itself does not include any information that would be expected on a tag, such as the price or a description of the goods. Moreover, on review of the tag, it appears that the same printed tag is used in each of applicant’s specimens. The tag is merely tied to the goods (with an easily untied knot), and the location of the string is identical in each tag. The tag even appears to be the same tag used in applicant’s copending application (Serial Number 88593040). The specimens thus suggest that the tag on which the mark appears is not sold with the items in commerce. Rather, it appears that the tag is a mere mockup of the mark not intended to be transported with the goods. Accordingly, as the tag containing the mark appears to be a mere mock-up, the submitted specimens do not show use in commerce.
Response options. Applicant may respond to the refusal of registration due to the specimen’s failure to show actual use in commerce by amending the filing basis to allege intent to use the mark in commerce, for which no specimen is required now. See 37 C.F.R. §2.34. This option will later necessitate additional fee(s) and filing requirements such as providing a specimen.
Alternatively, applicant may also respond to the refusal by submitting a different specimen (a “verified substitute specimen”) that (a) was in actual use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of an amendment to allege use and (b) shows the mark in actual use in commerce for the goods identified in the application or amendment to allege use. A “verified substitute specimen” is a specimen that is accompanied by the following statement made in a signed affidavit or supported by a declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20: “The substitute (or new, or originally submitted, if appropriate) specimen(s) was/were in use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of the amendment to allege use.” The substitute specimen cannot be accepted without this statement.
For an overview of these response options and instructions on how to satisfy either option online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, see the Specimen webpage.
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION – INFORMATION ABOUT SPECIMENS REQUIRED
To permit proper examination of the application record for compliance with use in commerce requirements, applicant must respond to the following requests for information and documentation about the specimens. See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §814. Answer for each specimen/photograph/image previously provided. For any website source submitted as supporting evidence, provide a digital copy of the entire webpage from top to bottom, as rendered in an Internet browser, that includes the URL and access or print date. TMEP §710.01(b) (citing In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1733 (TTAB 2018)).
(1) Identify the particular good(s) listed in the application for which the specimens were submitted to show use of the mark.
(2) Was any specimen created for submission with this application? If so, specify the date each specimen was created. If applicant obtained the image(s) of the goods shown in the specimen(s) from a third-party website, provide the URL of the website and a digital copy of relevant webpage(s) for each image.
(3) Provide information about and examples of how applicant’s goods appear in the actual sales environment.
(a) If sold in stores, provide a representative sample of the name(s) of the stores and of photographs showing the goods for sale in the named stores, such as photographs of the sales displays or goods on shelves with the mark.
(b) If sold online, provide a representative sample of the name(s) of the online retailers, the website URL(s) for each named retailer, and a digital copy of the webpages showing the goods for sale on the named website.
(c) If sold in another type of sales environment (e.g., catalogs, trade shows), identify the environment and provide photographs and/or documentation showing the goods for sale in that environment.
(4) If the information in question (3) about how the goods appear in the actual sales environment is not available to applicant, please describe how applicant’s goods are sold or transported and provide photographs and other documentation showing how applicant’s mark appears on the goods and/or its packaging when the goods are sold or transported to or within the United States.
(5) For each category of sales environment specified in response to questions (3) and (4), specify when the goods bearing the mark were first available for purchase within the United States, the date of the first sale of the goods to or within the United States, and whether the goods are still for sale to or within the United States in that environment.
(6) For the goods identified in response to question (1), specify the dollar amount of sales with or within the United States and provide at least three invoices or other supporting documentation that show payments or other consideration made, redacting personal or private information of buyers as necessary.
Failure to comply with a requirement to furnish information is grounds for refusing registration. In re Harley, 119 USPQ2d 1755, 1757-58 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §814. Merely stating that evidence is available on applicant’s or a third party website or providing a hyperlink of such a website is an insufficient response and will not make the additional information or materials of record. See In re Planalytics, Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1453, 1457-58 (TTAB 2004). However, amending the application filing basis to intent-to-use under Section 1(b) will resolve the requirements for information and documentation.
Representative Specimens Required
Applicant has applied for a multitude of goods in Class 20. Note that if an identification is so broad that it encompasses a wide range of products and services, the applicant must submit evidence that it actually uses the mark on a wide range of products and services to obtain registration. See In re Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., 192 USPQ 84, recon. denied 192 USPQ 157 (TTAB 1976); 37 CFR §2.61(b); TMEP §§904.01(a) and 1402.03.
Applicant must submit a proper specimen for each of the following groups of goods:
1. Chairs;
2. Cupboards;
3. Dressmaker’s dummies;
4. Furniture and furniture of metal;
5. Office furniture;
6. Pet furniture and scratching posts
7. Shelves for storage;
8. Tables;
9. Television stands; and
10. Upholstered furniture.
Please note that applicant should delete all identifications of goods pertaining to goods that are not yet in use in commerce.
If applicant cannot submit proper specimens for the goods subject to this requirement, applicant may amend the filing basis to intent to use under Section 1(b), for which no specimen is required. This option will later necessitate additional fees and filing requirements such as providing a specimen. For an overview of this response option and instructions on how to satisfy this option online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, please go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/law/specimen.jsp.
DISCLAIMER REQUIRED
Applicant must disclaim MART because it is merely descriptive of an characteristic of applicant’s goods. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1251, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1755 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §§1213, 1213.03(a).
Specifically, MART, meaning “ a place where goods are sold; a store” immediately conveys that applicant’s goods are sold at a store. See attached American Heritage Dictionary definition of “Mart.” Consumers encountering MART would give it no source identifying significance – they would merely understand it as indicating that applicant’s goods are sold at a store. Accordingly, as MART is merely descriptive of applicant’s goods (specifically how or where they are sold), it must be disclaimed.
A “disclaimer” is a statement in the application record that an applicant does not claim exclusive rights to an unregistrable component of the mark. See Schwarzkopf v. John H. Breck, Inc., 340 F.2d 978, 979-80, 144 USPQ 433, 433 (C.C.P.A. 1965); TMEP §1213. A disclaimer does not physically remove the disclaimed matter from the mark or otherwise affect the appearance of the mark. See Schwarzkopf v. John H. Breck, Inc., 340 F.2d at 979, 144 USPQ2d at 433; TMEP §1213.
Applicant may respond to this issue by submitting a disclaimer in the following format:
No claim is made to the exclusive right to use “MART” apart from the mark as shown.
For an overview of disclaimers and instructions on how to satisfy this issue using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), see the Disclaimer webpage.
ADVISORY – TEAS PLUS AND TEAS RF REQUIREMENTS
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
RESPONSE GUIDELINES
For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Hunter Bayliss/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 113
571-272-6526
Hunter.Bayliss@USPTO.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE
