| To: | Lindsey, Lamar, Justice (justicelindsey@lovehateuniverse.com) |
| Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88587884 - LOVE HATE - N/A |
| Sent: | November 22, 2019 02:13:52 PM |
| Sent As: | ecom122@uspto.gov |
| Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
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U.S. Application Serial No. 88587884
Mark: LOVE HATE
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: Lindsey, Lamar, Justice
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: November 22, 2019
· Sections 1, 2 And 45 Refusal – Merely Ornamental
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Similarity of Marks
Applicant’s mark is “LOVE HATE” in stylized characters with a design element.
Registrant’s mark is “LOVEHATE LA” in standard characters.
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In the present case, the marks share the identical wording “LOVE” and “HATE”, and this shared identical wording is the dominant portion of each mark. As to the applied-for mark, the wording “LOVE HATE” is dominant because it is the only wording of the mark, and it is the portion of the mark consumers will use when referring to applicant’s goods. When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
Turning to the registered mark, the wording “LOVEHATE” is the dominant element of the mark because it is the first portion of the mark and the remaining wording, “LA”, has been disclaimed as descriptive of or generic for registrant’s goods. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”). Moreover, disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).
The fact that the words “LOVE” and “HATE” are compressed into one word in the registered mark but are separate words in the applied-for mark does not obviate the similarity of the marks. This wording in the compared marks is identical except for a slight difference in appearance. As such, the wording in the applied-for mark is identical in sound and virtually identical in appearance to the dominant wording of the registered mark, and the marks are thus confusingly similar for the purposes of determining likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., Seaguard Corp. v. Seaward Int’l, Inc., 223 USPQ 48, 51 (TTAB 1984) (“[T]he marks ‘SEAGUARD’ and ‘SEA GUARD’ are, in contemplation of law, identical [internal citation omitted].”); In re Best W. Family Steak House, Inc., 222 USPQ 827, 827 (TTAB 1984) (“There can be little doubt that the marks [BEEFMASTER and BEEF MASTER] are practically identical”); Stock Pot, Inc., v. Stockpot Rest., Inc., 220 USPQ 52, 52 (TTAB 1983), aff’d 737 F.2d 1576, 222 USPQ 665 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“There is no question that the marks of the parties [STOCKPOT and STOCK POT] are confusingly similar. The word marks are phonetically identical and visually almost identical.”).
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In this case, the dominant portions of the applied-for and registered marks are virtually identical in appearance, sound, and commercial impression. Thus, the average consumer is likely to become confused and mistakenly believe that applicant’s and registrant’s goods arise from the same source.
Accordingly, the marks are confusingly similar.
Relatedness of Goods
Applicant’s goods are hoodies. Registrant’s goods are shirts.
The attached Internet evidence consists of screenshots from www.oldnavy.com, www2.hm.com, and www.llbean.com, which provide a representative sampling of third parties that make and sell hoodies and shirts. This evidence establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark. Further, neither the application nor the registration contains any limitations regarding trade channels for the goods and therefore it is assumed that registrant’s and applicant’s goods are sold everywhere that is normal for such items, i.e., clothing and department stores. Thus, it can also be assumed that the same classes of purchasers shop for these items and that consumers are accustomed to seeing them sold under the same or similar marks. See Kangol Ltd. v. KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc., 974 F.2d 161, 23 USPQ2d 1945 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Smith & Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531 (TTAB 1994); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).
Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
In summary, applicant's and registrant's marks are confusingly similar and their respective goods are highly related. Therefore, consumers are likely to be confused and mistakenly believe that the goods originate from a common source. Accordingly, registration must be refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
Applicant also should note the existence of the following prior-filed applications.
PRIOR-FILED APPLICATIONS—ADVISORY
In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the marks in the referenced applications. Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.
Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.
SECTIONS 1, 2 AND 45 REFUSAL – MERELY ORNAMENTAL
The size, location, dominance, and significance of the alleged mark as used on the goods are all relevant factors in determining the commercial impression of the applied-for mark. See, e.g., In re Peace Love World Live, LLC, 127 USPQ2d 1400, 1403 (TTAB 2018) (quoting In re Hulting, 107 USPQ2d 1175, 1178 (TTAB 2013)); In re Lululemon Athletica Can. Inc., 105 USPQ2d at 1687 (quoting In re Right-On Co., 87 USPQ2d 1152, 1156 (TTAB 2008)); TMEP §1202.03(a).
With respect to clothing, consumers may recognize small designs or discrete wording as trademarks, rather than as merely ornamental features, when located, for example, on the pocket or breast area of a shirt. See TMEP §1202.03(a). Consumers may not, however, perceive larger designs or slogans as trademarks when such matter is prominently displayed across the front of a t-shirt. See In re Pro-Line Corp., 28 USPQ2d at 1142; In re Dimitri’s Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1666, 1667-68 (TTAB 1988); TMEP §1202.03(a), (b), (f)(i), (f)(ii).
In this case, the submitted specimen shows the applied-for mark, “LOVE HATE” and design, located directly on the upper-center area of the front of a hoodie, where ornamental elements often appear. See TMEP §1202.03(a), (b). Furthermore, the mark is displayed in a relatively large size on the clothing such that it dominates the overall appearance of the goods. Lastly, the applied-for mark appears to be a design element that is used in a merely decorative manner that would be perceived by consumers as having little or no particular source-identifying significance.
Therefore, consumers would view the applied-for mark as a decorative or ornamental feature of the goods, rather than as a trademark to indicate the source of applicant’s goods and to distinguish them from others.
In appropriate circumstances, applicant may overcome this refusal by satisfying one of the following options:
(1) Submit a different specimen (a verified “substitute” specimen) that was in actual use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application (or prior to the filing of an amendment to allege use) and that shows proper trademark use for the identified goods in International Class 25. Examples of acceptable specimens that show non-ornamental use on clothing include hang tags and labels used inside a garment.
(2) Amend to the Supplemental Register, which is a second trademark register for marks not yet eligible for registration on the Principal Register, but which may become capable over time of functioning as source indicators.
(3) Claim acquired distinctiveness under Trademark Act Section 2(f) by submitting evidence that the applied-for mark has become distinctive of applicant’s goods; that is, proof that applicant’s extensive use and promotion of the mark allowed consumers now directly to associate the mark with applicant as the source of the goods.
(4) Submit evidence that the applied-for mark is an indicator of secondary source; that is, proof that the mark is already recognized as a source indicator for other goods or services that applicant sells/offers.
(5) Amend the filing basis to intent to use under Section 1(b). This option will later necessitate additional fee(s) and filing requirements.
For an overview of the response options above and instructions on how to satisfy each option online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, see the Ornamental Refusal webpage.
ISSUE REGARDING APPLICANT’S ENTITY TYPE
If applicant is an individual, applicant should simply request that the legal entity be amended to “individual” and must indicate his/her country of citizenship for the record. TMEP §803.03(a). Alternatively, if applicant is a limited liability company, applicant must provide the correct name of the limited liability company and the U.S. state or foreign country of incorporation or organization. TMEP §803.03(h).
If, in response to the above request, applicant provides information indicating that it is not the owner of the mark, registration may be refused because the application was void as filed. See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(d); TMEP §§803.06, 1201.02(b). An application must be filed by the party who owns or is entitled to use the mark as of the application filing date. See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(d); TMEP §1201.02(b).
ADVISORY—APPLICANT MAY WISH TO CONSULT TRADEMARK COUNSEL
Because of the legal technicalities and strict deadlines of the trademark application process, applicant may wish to hire a private attorney who specializes in trademark matters to assist in the process. The assigned trademark examining attorney can provide only limited assistance explaining the content of an Office action and the application process. USPTO staff cannot provide legal advice or statements about an applicant’s legal rights. TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.
For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
Melissa S. Winter
/Melissa S. Winter/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 122
571-272-7913
Melissa.Winter@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE
