Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  July 15, 2020

 

INTRODUCTION

 

This Office action is supplemental to and supersedes the previous Office action issued on November 26, 2019 in connection with this application.  As the prior pending application for which Applicant was advised has now since registered, the trademark examining attorney now issues the following new refusal: Trademark Act Section 2(d) Refusal—Likelihood of Confusion.  See TMEP §§706, 711.02. 

 

In a previous Office action dated November 26, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1) Refusal due to the descriptive nature of the applied-for mark. In addition, Applicant was advised of a prior pending application and was required to provide information about the specimen and amend the Identification of Services.

 

Based on applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney notes that the following requirement has been satisfied: Applicant has amended the Identification of Services. See TMEP §713.02. 

 

Applicant has also provided some information about Applicant’s services, however these materials are incomplete and illegible, as a result, this requirement is maintained and continued. In addition, Applicant has provided arguments and evidence against the Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1) Refusal. These arguments and evidence have been examined and found unpersuasive. As a result,  The following is a SUMMARY OF ISSUES that applicant must address:

 

            •  NEW ISSUE:  Section 2(d) Refusal—Likelihood of Confusion

            •  Section 2(e)(1) Refusal—Merely Descriptive

            •  Request for Information

 

Applicant must respond to all issues raised in this Office action and the previous November 26, 2019 Office action, within six (6) months of the date of issuance of this Office action.  37 C.F.R. §2.62(a); see TMEP §711.02.  If applicant does not respond within this time limit, the application will be abandoned.  37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL—LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 6014328.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

 

Applicant’s mark is SMART SPECTRUM in standard characters for various data and software services for indoor farming facilities and equipment. Registrant’s mark is SMART SPECTRUM in standard characters for lighting devices and controls in International Class 9.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

 

 

Similarity of the Marks

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1323, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). 

 

In the present case, applicant’s mark is SMART SPECTRUM and registrant’s mark is SMART SPECTRUIM.  These marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services.  Id.

 

Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar. 

 

Relatedness of the Goods and Services

 

The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Consumers are likely to be confused by the use of similar marks on or in connection with goods and with services featuring or related to those goods.  TMEP §1207.01(a)(ii); see In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding retail shops featuring sports team related clothing and apparel related to various clothing items, including athletic uniforms); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding retail grocery and general merchandise store services related to furniture); In re United Serv. Distribs., Inc., 229 USPQ 237 (TTAB 1986) (finding distributorship services in the field of health and beauty aids related to skin cream); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (finding various items of men’s, boys’, girls’ and women’s clothing related to restaurant services and towels); Steelcase Inc. v. Steelcare Inc., 219 USPQ 433 (TTAB 1983) (finding refinishing of furniture, office furniture, and machinery related to office furniture and accessories); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Huskie Freightways, Inc., 177 USPQ 32 (TTAB 1972) (finding trucking services related to motor trucks and buses).

 

In this case, Applicant has identified their services as being data analysis and software services for indoor growing facilities, in particular for Internet of Things (IOT) connected devices which would by definition include the grow lights in such a setup. Registrant has identified their goods as lighting control apparatus. As a result, Applicant’s goods are of a type which would presumably be controlled by Applicant’s services.

 

Further, the attached evidence from ATOP lighting, Digital Lumens, IOT For All, Arrow, Techno FAQ, Toms on Electronics, and PlanetKO establishes that such services are regularly provided to interface with lighting controls of the type identified in the registration in Applicant’s field. As a result, Applicant’s services are closely related to Registrant’s goods.

 

Conclusion

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Where the marks of the respective parties are identical as in this case, the degree of similarity or relatedness between the goods and/or services needed to support a finding of likelihood of confusion declines.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993)), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017); TMEP §1207.01(a).

 

As Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks are identical and their goods and services related, registration of the applied-for mark must be refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d).  Applicant should note the following related refusal which is maintained and continued.

 

SECTION 2(e)(1) REFUSAL—MERELY DESCRIPTIVE

 

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark merely describes a feature of applicant’s services.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); see TMEP §§1209.01(b), 1209.03 et seq.

 

 

 

A mark is merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of an applicant’s goods and/or services.  TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re TriVita, Inc., 783 F.3d 872, 874, 114 USPQ2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920)). 

 

 

 

The attached definitions from the Collins dictionary establishes that the term “SMART” means a device which is able to do many of the things a computer does such as connect to the internet and use software and the term “SPECTRUM” means a range of light waves within particular frequencies. Applicant has specified in the identification of services submitted with the application that their services are focused on working with such capable devices in the indoor farming facilities. Finally, the attached evidence from Applicant’s website establishes that their services are for autonomously adjusting the spectrum of light

 

 

 

Generally, if the individual components of a mark retain their descriptive meaning in relation to the goods and/or services, the combination results in a composite mark that is itself descriptive and not registrable.  In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1516 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Tower Tech, Inc., 64 USPQ2d 1314, 1317-18 (TTAB (2002)); TMEP §1209.03(d); see, e.g., Apollo Med. Extrusion Techs., Inc. v. Med. Extrusion Techs., Inc., 123 USPQ2d 1844, 1851 (TTAB 2017) (holding MEDICAL EXTRUSION TECHNOLOGIES merely descriptive of medical extrusion goods produced by employing medical extrusion technologies); In re Cannon Safe, Inc., 116 USPQ2d 1348, 1351 (TTAB 2015) (holding SMART SERIES merely descriptive of metal gun safes); In re King Koil Licensing Co., 79 USPQ2d 1048, 1052 (TTAB 2006) (holding THE BREATHABLE MATTRESS merely descriptive of beds, mattresses, box springs, and pillows). 

 

 

 

Only where the combination of descriptive terms creates a unitary mark with a unique, incongruous, or otherwise nondescriptive meaning in relation to the goods and/or services is the combined mark registrable.  See In re Colonial Stores, Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 551, 157 USPQ 382, 384 (C.C.P.A. 1968); In re Positec Grp. Ltd., 108 USPQ2d 1161, 1162-63 (TTAB 2013).

 

 

 

In this case, both the individual components and the composite result are descriptive of applicant’s goods and/or services and do not create a unique, incongruous, or nondescriptive meaning in relation to the goods and/or services.  Specifically, the individual components describe that Applicant’s services focus on smart devices and light spectrums and the composite result describes that Applicant’s services are for calibrating and providing light spectrums through use of smart devices.

 

 

 

As a result, the applied-for mark must be refused under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1).

 

                         

 

SUPPLEMENTAL REGISTER ADVISORY

 

 

 

Although an amendment to the Supplemental Register would normally be an appropriate response to this refusal, such a response is not appropriate in the present case.  The instant application was filed under Trademark Act Section 1(b) and is not eligible for registration on the Supplemental Register until an acceptable amendment to allege use meeting the requirements of 37 C.F.R. §2.76 has been timely filed.  37 C.F.R. §2.47(d); TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03.

 

 

 

If applicant files an acceptable allegation of use and also amends to the Supplemental Register, the application effective filing date will be the date applicant met the minimum filing requirements under 37 C.F.R. §2.76(c) for an amendment to allege use.  TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03; see 37 C.F.R. §2.75(b).  In addition, the undersigned trademark examining attorney will conduct a new search of the USPTO records for conflicting marks based on the later application filing date.  TMEP §§206.01, 1102.03.

 

 

 

 

 

APPLICANT’S ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE

 

Applicant argues (1) the trademark examining attorney has focused on the wrong dictionary definition of SMART by focusing on the one relating to smart devices, (2) the trademark examining attorney has focused on the wrong dictionary definition of SPECTRUM by focusing on the definition that relates to light spectrums, and (3) the applied-for mark may have additional meanings which describe other things about Applicant’s services.

 

In support of Applicant’s first point, Applicant points to the many other definitions of SMART, such as well-dressed, and explains why each would not apply to Applicant’s services. However, in so doing it is unclear what Applicant is attempting to establish as the determination of whether a mark is merely descriptive is made in relation to an applicant’s goods and/or services, not in the abstract.  DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1254, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1757 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re The Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §1209.01(b).  “Whether consumers could guess what the product [or service] is from consideration of the mark alone is not the test.”  In re Am. Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985). As a result, unless Applicant can provide a reason why a consumer encountering Applicant’s Internet of Things services would rely on a definition regarding clothing rather than one directly applicable to Applicant’s smart IOT devices services, the existence of such definitions do not obviate the descriptive nature of the applied-for mark. Just as, the fact that ORGANIC may describe chemistry relating to carbon atoms does not obviate the descriptive nature of the term in connection to produce.

 

 

In support of Applicant’s second point, Applicant again points to multiple definitions that exist for the term SPECTRUM, such as a political spectrum. However, Applicant has again failed to establish why any of these definitions would be invoked by a consumer in relation to Applicant’s services. The fact that multiple meanings may exist for the individual terms does not establish that the combined wording is not descriptive or obviate the descriptive nature of the applied-for mark in relation to Applicant’s services. Applicant attempts to assert that in the abstract a consumer facing the individual terms of the applied-for mark “do not know what is being sold”. However, “Whether consumers could guess what the product [or service] is from consideration of the mark alone is not the test.”  In re Am. Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985).  The question is not whether someone presented only with the mark could guess what the goods and/or services are, but “whether someone who knows what the goods and[/or] services are will understand the mark to convey information about them.”  DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1254, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1757 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Tower Tech, Inc.,64 USPQ2d 1314, 1316-17 (TTAB 2002)); In re Mueller Sports. Med., Inc., 126 USPQ2d 1584, 1587 (TTAB 2018).

 

Finally, Applicant asserts that additional meanings may exist, however Applicant has not provided any of these meanings or asserted that a double entendre is created by them. A “double entendre” is an expression that has a double connotation or significance as applied to the goods and/or services.  TMEP §1213.05(c); see In re Colonial Stores Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 552-53, 157 USPQ 382, 384-85 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (finding SUGAR & SPICE a double entendre and not descriptive for bakery products because it evokes the nursery rhyme “sugar and spice and everything nice”).

 

A mark that comprises a “double entendre” will not be refused registration as merely descriptive if one of its meanings is not merely descriptive in relation to the goods and/or services.  TMEP §1213.05(c).  However, the multiple meanings that make an expression a “double entendre” must be well-recognized by the public and readily apparent from the mark itself.  See Robinson v. Hot Grabba Leaf, LLC, 2019 USPQ2d 149089, at *8 (TTAB 2019); In re Calphalon Corp., 122 USPQ2d 1153, 1163-64 (TTAB 2017) (quoting TMEP §1213.05(c)).

 

 

As Applicant’s arguments and evidence have been examine and found unpersuasive, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1) must be maintained and continued.

 

 

Applicant should note the following related requirement which is maintained and continued.

 

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

 

 

 

Due to the descriptive nature of the applied-for mark, applicant must provide the following information and documentation regarding the goods and/or services and wording appearing in the mark: 

 

 

 

(1)       Fact sheets, instruction manuals, brochures, advertisements and pertinent screenshots of applicant’s website as it relates to the goods and/or services in the application, including any materials using the terms in the applied-for mark.  Merely stating that information about the goods and/or services is available on applicant’s website is insufficient to make the information of record.; 

 

 

 

(2)       If these materials are unavailable, applicant should submit similar documentation for goods and services of the same type, explaining how its own product or services will differ.  If the goods and/or services feature new technology and information regarding competing goods and/or services is not available, applicant must provide a detailed factual description of the goods and/or services.  Factual information about the goods must make clear how they operate, salient features, and prospective customers and channels of trade.  For services, the factual information must make clear what the services are and how they are rendered, salient features, and prospective customers and channels of trade.  Conclusory statements will not satisfy this requirement.; and

 

 

 

(3)       Applicant must respond to the following questions: 

 

1. Do Applicant’s services feature smart devices?

 

2. Do Applicant’s services feature interconnected devices?

 

3. Do Applicant’s services feature devices which connect to the internet?

 

4. Do Applicant’s services feature calibrating or adjusting light spectrums?

 

 

 

See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §§814, 1402.01(e). 

 

 

 

Failure to comply with a request for information is grounds for refusing registration.  In re Harley, 119 USPQ2d 1755, 1757-58 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §814. 

 

 

Though Applicant has attempted to answer a number of these quest and provide some of the above materials, the text on a good deal of this evidence, in particular that from Applicant’s website is illegible. As a result, the above requirement must be maintained and continued.

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although an examining attorney cannot provide legal advice, the examining attorney can provide additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. 

 

The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.    

 

 

Riso, Mark

/Mark Riso/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 108

(571)272-0167

Mark.Riso@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on July 15, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88581702

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

Riso, Mark

/Mark Riso/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 108

(571)272-0167

Mark.Riso@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from July 15, 2020, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”