Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 no persons are required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control number. PTO Form 1957 (Rev 10/2011) |
OMB No. 0651-0050 (Exp 09/20/2020) |
Input Field |
Entered |
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SERIAL NUMBER | 88569531 |
LAW OFFICE ASSIGNED | LAW OFFICE 111 |
MARK SECTION | |
MARK FILE NAME | http://uspto.report/TM/88569531/mark.png |
LITERAL ELEMENT | THAT'S SMART! |
STANDARD CHARACTERS | NO |
USPTO-GENERATED IMAGE | NO |
ARGUMENT(S) | |
The Examining Attorney has refused the applied for stylized mark, THAT’S SMART!, Serial No. 88/569,531, for being confusingly similar to prior-pending mark, SMART, Serial No. 87/550,923. Applicant respectfully disagrees and submits the following amendment and remarks.
ARGUMENTS
THE OVERALL COMMERCIAL IMPRESSION IS DIFFERENT BETWEEN THE MARKS.
The mark cited by the Examining Attorney creates a different commercial impression to the consumer, such that it would not cause confusion. Considering the marks in their entirety, each mark suggests a different aspect of their product to the consumer which is distinct from each other.
1. THE OFFICE IMPROPERLY DISSECTS APPLICANT’S MARK—IGNORING A KEY IDENTIFIER
Under the anti-dissection rule, a composite mark is tested for its validity and distinctiveness by looking at it as a whole, rather than dissecting it into its component parts. 2 McCarthy on Trademarks, § 11:27 (1998).
As the United States Supreme Court stated: “The commercial impression of a trademark is derived from it as a whole, not from its elements separated and considered in detail. For this reason, it should be considered in its entirety.” Estate of Beckwith, Inc. v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 545-46 (1920). Here, the Office has completely removed and ignores a key source and feature identifier from Applicant’s mark, THAT’S SMART!. When read as a whole, THAT’S and the exclamation point provide additional connotation and a particular meaning of the mark is readily ascertainable as products that are a smart purchase.
Further, when read in completeness, the mark becomes a composite of two identifiers: (1) THAT’S (meaning that product for purchase) and (2) SMART!. A consumer would therefore read and understands that the (2) SMART is related to and deriving from THAT product and/or product line instead of merely ‘smart’ alone which does not convey anything other than the textbook definition of the word smart. Hence, in this case the source identifier is not SMART alone, but rather THAT’s SMART is more likely to be impressed upon the consumer when coming into contact with the marks than the terms SMART alone. Because the dominant portions of the marks are completely different and the Office has improperly dissected a key source identifier and distinguishing term from the Registrant’s mark, the marks are not likely to be confused. See Kampgrounds of America, Inc. v. North Delaware A-Ok Campground, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 1288 (D.C. Del. 1976).
Further, marks having similar elements have been found dissimilar because of the addition of a prefix or a suffix. For example, in In re Mana Product, Inc., the TTAB found that the marks COLOR THERAPY and ESSENTIAL COLOR THERAPY, when considered in their entireties, have differences that outweigh their similarities. (2002 TTAB LEXIS 722 *6-7). Likewise, in In re Coffey, the TTAB decided that the marks “RETRIEVER WORLD” and “RETRIEVER” looked and sounded dissimilar because of the use of the word “WORLD” by the Applicant. 2002 TTAB LEXIS 13 (TTAB 2002).
As can be seen from these decisions, the use of an extra word in a mark can cause the mark to be dissimilar from another mark that uses a common word or words. Thus, just as a suffix or prefix that had been added to common words in the previous cases caused the marks to be dissimilar causing no likelihood of confusion to be found, the use of the additional identifier THAT’S modifying SMART! creates an obvious difference in sound and appearance between the two marks and leaves a different impression in the minds of the consumers. Therefore, based on the differences of the marks there would not be a likelihood of confusion between the prior pending mark and the Applicant’s mark.
2. UNDER THE DU PONT FACTORS THE APPLIED-FOR MARK, THAT’S SMART!, IS NOT CONFUSINGINGLY SIMILAR
The two most weighted factors for the du Pont factor test in determining any likelihood of confusion analysis are: (1) similarity of the marks in their entireties as to sight, sound, meaning, and commercial impression; and (2) the relatedness of the goods or services as described in the application. In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (CCPA 1973). See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098 (CCPA 1976); In re Iolo Techs. LLC., 95 USPQ2d 1498, 1499 (TTAB 2010). Under the sight, sound, meaning, and commercial impression analysis, the marks are distinct and would not be likely to cause consumer confusion. The Marks Have Different Appearances
To begin, in response to the Examining Attorney’s citation of similar parts and phrases being a potential for confusion, Applicant respectfully submits that there are many instances wherein trademarks have used a similar word or words and have been used to describe identical goods and yet their use was not found to cause a likelihood of confusion among consumers. For example, the TTAB determined that the trademarks “LAWN-BOY” and “LAWN PUP” to described lawnmowers would not cause a likelihood of confusion. Toro Company v. Grassmasters, Inc., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 1032, 2003 TTAB LEXIS 42 (TTAB 2003). Similarly, the marks “HEALTHY CHOICE” and “HEALTH SELECTIONS” were held not likely to cause confusion among consumers wherein both marks were used on food products. Conarga, Inc. v. George A. Hormel & Company, 990 F.2d 368, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1316 (8th Cir. 1993). In Donsky v. Bandwagon, Inc., 193 U.S.P.Q. 336 (D. Mass. 1976) the marks “100-YEAR NITE-LITE” and “CENTURY NIGHT LIGHT” for night lights were not likely to confuse consumers because of the differences in the marks appearances. All three of these cases are similar to the present situation wherein a part of the Applicant’s mark is similar to that of the prior pending mark. Nonetheless, in all three cases, because of the differences in the appearance of the rest of the trademark, no likelihood of confusion was found between potential consumers.
Here, the marks are different in length, include non-identical characters, and are grammatically distinct. Additionally, where the prior pending mark terminates in no punctuation and therefore constitutes a definitive word, Applicant’s mark notably includes an additional modifier, “THAT’S” as well as the exclamatory inclination “!” that significantly changes the sight of the mark from the prior-pending application. Applicant respectfully notes that the Examining Attorney improperly dissects the marks into only their common features when determining whether the overall commercial impression is identical. As such, when taken as an overall commercial impression, the marks are very distinct to a consumer as the marks do not look similar in appearance. Therefore, this du Pont factor must weigh in favor of the Applicant.
The Marks Have Different Sounds
The present rejection indicates that the two marks sound similar because they have the same cadence. Applicant is unclear how the two have the same cadence as prior pending applicant’s mark is comprised of one syllable and Applicant’s has a total of two syllables with two words. Rather, THAT’S SMART provides for a very distinct overall sound. Also, Applicant’s deliberate incorporation of “!” creates a distinct sound with excitement rather than a plain word.
The Marks Have Different Meanings
The meaning of the mark must be determined in relation to the goods and services named in the mark and distinct meanings may create a distinct commercial impression such that there exists no likelihood of confusion. In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2 USPQ2d 1312, 1314 (TTAB 1987). The marks create a different commercial impression in the marketplace such that there would exist no likelihood of confusion.
Here, a singular SMART could mean that the product is a “smart” product such as a “smart phone”. THAT’S SMART!, in contrast, could proclaim “That’s a smart purchase!” “This product is created smartly!” This is a smart buy!” That’s a smart product to purchase because it is cheaper!” The additional THAT’S and ! aid in consumer decision making and provide enticing advertising where just SMART does not.
Given that the marks have distinct appearances, aural impressions, and meanings, a finding of a similar commercial impression is not possible. To reach the conclusion that the two marks have a similar commercial impression, the current rejection relies on a single similarity between two marks that otherwise are dissimilar on all levels. Such an approach is inappropriate as the marks must be considered in their entireties.
2. THE GOODS IN QUESTION TRAVEL IN DIFFERENT TRADE CHANNELS AND ARE NOT CONFUSINGLY SIMILAR.
If the goods are not related or marketed together that would cause a consumer to believe that the two goods originated from the same source, then, even if the marks were identical, confusion would not be likely. See Coach Serv., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC., 668 F.3d 1356, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP § 1207.01(a)(i). The marks do not have related goods and are marketed in entirely different channels such that no association or confusion would be likely. Here, the prior pending application’s goods are very limited to the narrow scope of coffee and coffee paraphernalia whereas Applicant’s goods are much more broad for both foodstuffs and non-foodstuffs and therefore would be more widely recognizable by customers. These goods are not shelved together, are not promoted together, and are not created by similar sources. Accordingly, the two marks represent different goods which are distinct in the marketplace that would not cause a likelihood of confusion among consumers.
3. THIRD-PARTY USE OF THE TERM SMART DILUTES THE PRIOR PENDING APPLICATION’S SCOPE OF PROTECTION AND APPLICANT’S MARK SHOULD BE ALLOWED FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND EQUITY PURPOSES.
"A real evidentiary value of third party registrations per se is to show the sense in which . . . a mark is used in ordinary parlance." 2 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 11:90 (4th ed. 2015) (emphasis added). "Third party registrations are relevant to prove that some segment of the composite marks which both contesting parties use has a normally understood and well-recognized descriptive or suggestive meaning, leading to the conclusion that that segment is relatively weak." Id.; see Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 917 (CCPA 1976) (even if "there is no evidence of actual use" of "third-party registrations," such registrations "may be given some weight to show the meaning of a mark in the same way that dictionaries are used").
Further, third-party use of a term in the marketplace may be offered as evidence of a term’s weakness and dilution with respect to a particular field and weighs in favor of narrowing the scope of its protection against subsequent applications. See Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Russo, 221 USPQ 281, 283 (TTAB 1983); Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1722, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Marks that are descriptive or highly suggestive are entitled to a narrower scope of protection, i.e., are less likely to generate confusion over source identification, than their more fanciful counterparts. See, e.g., Nat'l Data Corp. v. Computer Sys. Eng'g, Inc., 940 F.2d 676, Id. at *2 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (unpublished); Drackett Co. v. H. Kohnstamm & Co., 404 F.2d 1399, 1400, 56 C.C.P.A. 852 (CCPA 1969) ("The scope of protection afforded such highly suggestive marks is necessarily narrow and confusion is not likely to result from the use of two marks carrying the same suggestion as to the use of closely similar goods."). “Where a party chooses a trademark which is inherently weak, he will not enjoy the wide latitude of protection afforded the owners of strong trademarks.” Sure-Fit Products Co. v. Saltzson Drapery Co., 254 F.2d 158, 117 USPQ 295, 297 (CCPA 1958).
The term shared between the marks, SMART, have little or no source identifying significance because they are very highly suggestive and generic, respectively. The terms are conceptually weak and very highly suggestive with respect to the relevant laundry goods and services. There are at least 25+ live use-based third party marks on the trademark register that include the term SMART for various types of goods and services. As shown in Exhibit A and B, “smart coffee” is a descriptive term for coffee with additional “smart” features or created for weight loss. These third-party registrations serve as compelling evidence that the shared terms are extremely weak and diluted, such that it creates little source identifying significance that could contribute to any likelihood of confusion apart from the cited mark as a whole. As can be seen, SMART is broadly registered across a variety of goods and services and therefore Applicant’s mark for THAT’S SMART! should similarly be allowed because the prior-pending mark is diluted by third-party registration of the term SMART. CONCLUSION The marks of the Applicant and the Applicant of the prior pending mark are different in sight, sound, and meaning, such that they each create unique commercial impression in the marketplace. Where the prior pending mark is for a specific coffee products and non-edible products for processing coffee, Applicant’s mark is specifically for foodstuffs, kitchen cleaning supplies, and laundry supplies which happen to include ground coffee in one class. The distinct goods and trade channels separate the two marks so that no likelihood of confusion would exist as the marks would not be seen together or marketed together to cause any association, connection, or confusion as to the source of the goods. The Applicant respectfully requests the mark proceed to registration as there exists no likelihood of confusion with the Applicant of the prior pending mark. |
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EVIDENCE SECTION | |
EVIDENCE FILE NAME(S) | |
ORIGINAL PDF FILE | evi_9814287113-20191212130155946208_._Exhibit_A.pdf |
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DESCRIPTION OF EVIDENCE FILE | scanned web pages |
GOODS AND/OR SERVICES SECTION (003)(current) | |
INTERNATIONAL CLASS | 003 |
DESCRIPTION | |
Dish detergents, Laundry bleach, Fabric softener sheets, Cotton swabs for cosmetic purposes, Cotton balls for cosmetic purposes, Baby wipes impregnated with cleaning preparations | |
FILING BASIS | Section 1(a) |
FIRST USE ANYWHERE DATE | At least as early as 01/31/2019 |
FIRST USE IN COMMERCE DATE | At least as early as 01/31/2019 |
GOODS AND/OR SERVICES SECTION (003)(proposed) | |
INTERNATIONAL CLASS | 003 |
TRACKED TEXT DESCRIPTION | |
FINAL DESCRIPTION | |
Dish detergents, Laundry bleach, Fabric softener sheets for laundry use, Cotton swabs for cosmetic purposes, Cotton balls for cosmetic purposes, Baby wipes impregnated with cleaning preparations | |
FILING BASIS | Section 1(a) |
FIRST USE ANYWHERE DATE | At least as early as 01/31/2019 |
FIRST USE IN COMMERCE DATE | At least as early as 01/31/2019 |
GOODS AND/OR SERVICES SECTION (004)(no change) | |
GOODS AND/OR SERVICES SECTION (016)(current) | |
INTERNATIONAL CLASS | 016 |
DESCRIPTION | |
Plastic trash bags, Plastic sandwich bags, Plastic freezer bags, Trash bags, Paper coffee filters, Disposable table cloths | |
FILING BASIS | Section 1(a) |
FIRST USE ANYWHERE DATE | At least as early as 05/29/2019 |
FIRST USE IN COMMERCE DATE | At least as early as 05/29/2019 |
GOODS AND/OR SERVICES SECTION (016)(proposed) | |
INTERNATIONAL CLASS | 016 |
TRACKED TEXT DESCRIPTION | |
FINAL DESCRIPTION | |
Plastic trash bags, Plastic sandwich bags, Plastic freezer bags, Trash bags, Paper coffee filters, Disposable paper table cloths | |
FILING BASIS | Section 1(a) |
FIRST USE ANYWHERE DATE | At least as early as 05/29/2019 |
FIRST USE IN COMMERCE DATE | At least as early as 05/29/2019 |
GOODS AND/OR SERVICES SECTION (021)(no change) | |
GOODS AND/OR SERVICES SECTION (029)(current) | |
INTERNATIONAL CLASS | 029 |
DESCRIPTION | |
Butter and butter blends, Peanut butter, Lowfat milk, Chocolate milk, Evaporated milk, Sweetened condensed milk, Powdered milk, Sour cream, Eggs, Cheese substitutes, Cheese balls, Cream cheese, Grated cheese containing herbs, Cheeses, Canned foods, namely, chicken, pasta ravioli with beef, pasta rings, spaghetti with meat, chili with beans, meat spread, sausage, corned beef, pinto beans, pork and beans, beans and franks, kidney beans, green beans, sauerkraut, refried beans; Processed frozen potatoes, Processed frozen hash brown potatoes, Processed instant potatoes, Pickles, Pickle relish, Processed stuffed olives, ripe olives, Pork rinds; Processed meats, namely, ham, turkey, chicken, beef, and pork, Canned and frozen fish and seafood, Canned and frozen vegetables and fruit, Frozen whipped topping, Margarine, Maraschino cherries, Broth concentrates, Fruit-based filling for cakes and pies, Jellies and jams, Shortening, Animal fat-based snack foods, Processed fruits in unitary packages, Frozen chicken, namely, breaded chicken nuggets, chicken strips, chicken breasts, unbreaded and skinless chicken breasts, breaded popcorn chicken | |
FILING BASIS | Section 1(a) |
FIRST USE ANYWHERE DATE | At least as early as 01/31/2019 |
FIRST USE IN COMMERCE DATE | At least as early as 01/31/2019 |
GOODS AND/OR SERVICES SECTION (029)(proposed) | |
INTERNATIONAL CLASS | 029 |
TRACKED TEXT DESCRIPTION | |
FINAL DESCRIPTION | |
Butter and butter substitutes, peanut butter, lowfat milk, chocolate milk, evaporated milk, sweetened condensed milk, powdered milk, sour cream, eggs, cheese substitutes, cream cheese, grated cheese containing herbs, canned foods, namely, chicken, chili with beans, meat based spread, sausage meat, corned beef, dried pinto beans, canned pork and beans, canned beans and franks, canned kidney beans, canned green beans, sauerkraut, refried beans; processed frozen potatoes, processed frozen hash browns potatoes, processed instant potatoes, pickles, processed stuff olives, preserved ripe olives, pork rinds; processed meats, namely, ham, turkey, chicken, beef and pork, canned and frozen fish and sea food, canned and frozen vegetables and fruit, frozen whipped topping, margarine, maraschino cherries, broth concentrates, fruit-based filling for cakes and pies, jellies and jams, shortening, animal fat-based snack foods, processed fruits in unitary packages, frozen chicken, namely, breaded chicken nuggets, chicken strips, chicken breasts, unbreaded and skinless chicken breasts, breaded popcorn chicken, Coffee creamer | |
FILING BASIS | Section 1(a) |
FIRST USE ANYWHERE DATE | At least as early as 01/31/2019 |
FIRST USE IN COMMERCE DATE | At least as early as 01/31/2019 |
GOODS AND/OR SERVICES SECTION (030)(current) | |
INTERNATIONAL CLASS | 030 |
DESCRIPTION | |
Sugar substitutes, Processed cereals, Cookies, Ground caffeinated coffee, Ground decaffeinated coffee, Instant coffee, Coffee creamer, Frozen pizza, Bread rolls, Frozen bread, Sherbet, Frozen confections, Salsa, Snack mix consisting primarily of crackers, pretzels and/or popped popcorn, Cheese flavored snacks, namely, puffed cheese balls, Stuffing mixes containing bread, Frozen waffles, Steak sauce, Barbecue sauce, Worcestershire sauce, Honey, Rice, Tea, Mixes for making tea, Tea bags and loose tea, Marshmallows, Macaroni and cheese, Biscuits and biscuit mixes, Dry seasoning mixes for soups, Corn syrup, Pancake syrup, Instant oatmeal, Packaged meal kits consisting primarily of pasta or rice, Mustard, Molasses, Processed cereal-based food to be used as a breakfast food, snack food or ingredient for making other foods, Uncooked pasta noodles, Vinegar, Crackers, namely, saltine, graham and oyster, Cocoa mixes, Pasta sauce, Tomato sauce | |
FILING BASIS | Section 1(a) |
FIRST USE ANYWHERE DATE | At least as early as 05/31/2019 |
FIRST USE IN COMMERCE DATE | At least as early as 05/31/2019 |
GOODS AND/OR SERVICES SECTION (030)(proposed) | |
INTERNATIONAL CLASS | 030 |
TRACKED TEXT DESCRIPTION | |
FINAL DESCRIPTION | |
Sugar substitutes, processed cereals, cookies, ground caffeinated coffee, ground decaffeinated coffee, instant coffee, frozen pizza, bread rolls, frozen bread, sherbet, frozen confections, salsa, snack mix consisting primarily of crackers, pretzels and/or popped popcorn, Stuffing mixes containing bread, frozen waffles, steak sauce, barbecue sauce, Worcestershire sauce, honey, rice, tea, mixes for making tea, tea bags and loose tea, marshmallows, macaroni and cheese, biscuits and biscuit mixes, dry seasoning mixes for soups, corn syrup, pancake syrup, instant oatmeal, packaged meal kits consisting primarily of pasta or rice, mustard, molasses, processed cereal-based food to be used as a breakfast food, snack food or ingredient for making other foods, uncooked pasta noodles, vinegar, crackers, namely, saltine, graham and oyster, cocoa mixes, pasta sauce, tomato sauce, pasta ravioli with beef, pasta rings, spaghetti with meat; cheese flavored snacks, namely, puffed cheese balls, pickle relish | |
FILING BASIS | Section 1(a) |
FIRST USE ANYWHERE DATE | At least as early as 05/31/2019 |
FIRST USE IN COMMERCE DATE | At least as early as 05/31/2019 |
GOODS AND/OR SERVICES SECTION (031)(no change) | |
GOODS AND/OR SERVICES SECTION (032)(no change) | |
SIGNATURE SECTION | |
RESPONSE SIGNATURE | /Timothy J. Zarley/ |
SIGNATORY'S NAME | Timothy J. Zarley |
SIGNATORY'S POSITION | Attorney of record, Iowa bar member |
SIGNATORY'S PHONE NUMBER | 515-558-0200 |
DATE SIGNED | 12/12/2019 |
AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY | YES |
FILING INFORMATION SECTION | |
SUBMIT DATE | Thu Dec 12 13:09:09 EST 2019 |
TEAS STAMP | USPTO/ROA-XX.XXX.XX.XXX-2 0191212130909625652-88569 531-7009a3eadc9fae216d7e8 5cf366c8163a385f53732a9dd d31a1924f537492dcad78-N/A -N/A-20191212130155946208 |
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 no persons are required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control number. PTO Form 1957 (Rev 10/2011) |
OMB No. 0651-0050 (Exp 09/20/2020) |
The Examining Attorney has refused the applied for stylized mark, THAT’S SMART!, Serial No. 88/569,531, for being confusingly similar to prior-pending mark, SMART, Serial No. 87/550,923. Applicant respectfully disagrees and submits the following amendment and remarks.
ARGUMENTS
THE OVERALL COMMERCIAL IMPRESSION IS DIFFERENT BETWEEN THE MARKS.
The mark cited by the Examining Attorney creates a different commercial impression to the consumer, such that it would not cause confusion. Considering the marks in their entirety, each mark suggests a different aspect of their product to the consumer which is distinct from each other.
1. THE OFFICE IMPROPERLY DISSECTS APPLICANT’S MARK—IGNORING A KEY IDENTIFIER
Under the anti-dissection rule, a composite mark is tested for its validity and distinctiveness by looking at it as a whole, rather than dissecting it into its component parts. 2 McCarthy on Trademarks, § 11:27 (1998).
As the United States Supreme Court stated: “The commercial impression of a trademark is derived from it as a whole, not from its elements separated and considered in detail. For this reason, it should be considered in its entirety.” Estate of Beckwith, Inc. v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 545-46 (1920). Here, the Office has completely removed and ignores a key source and feature identifier from Applicant’s mark, THAT’S SMART!. When read as a whole, THAT’S and the exclamation point provide additional connotation and a particular meaning of the mark is readily ascertainable as products that are a smart purchase.
Further, when read in completeness, the mark becomes a composite of two identifiers: (1) THAT’S (meaning that product for purchase) and (2) SMART!. A consumer would therefore read and understands that the (2) SMART is related to and deriving from THAT product and/or product line instead of merely ‘smart’ alone which does not convey anything other than the textbook definition of the word smart. Hence, in this case the source identifier is not SMART alone, but rather THAT’s SMART is more likely to be impressed upon the consumer when coming into contact with the marks than the terms SMART alone. Because the dominant portions of the marks are completely different and the Office has improperly dissected a key source identifier and distinguishing term from the Registrant’s mark, the marks are not likely to be confused. See Kampgrounds of America, Inc. v. North Delaware A-Ok Campground, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 1288 (D.C. Del. 1976).
Further, marks having similar elements have been found dissimilar because of the addition of a prefix or a suffix. For example, in In re Mana Product, Inc., the TTAB found that the marks COLOR THERAPY and ESSENTIAL COLOR THERAPY, when considered in their entireties, have differences that outweigh their similarities. (2002 TTAB LEXIS 722 *6-7). Likewise, in In re Coffey, the TTAB decided that the marks “RETRIEVER WORLD” and “RETRIEVER” looked and sounded dissimilar because of the use of the word “WORLD” by the Applicant. 2002 TTAB
LEXIS 13 (TTAB 2002).
As can be seen from these decisions, the use of an extra word in a mark can cause the mark to be dissimilar from another mark that uses a common word or words. Thus, just as a suffix or prefix that had been added to common words in the previous cases caused the marks to be dissimilar causing no likelihood of confusion to be found, the use of the additional identifier THAT’S modifying SMART! creates an obvious difference in sound and appearance between the two marks and leaves a different impression in the minds of the consumers. Therefore, based on the differences of the marks there would not be a likelihood of confusion between the prior pending mark and the Applicant’s mark.
2. UNDER THE DU PONT FACTORS THE APPLIED-FOR MARK, THAT’S SMART!, IS NOT CONFUSINGINGLY SIMILAR
The two most weighted factors for the du Pont factor test in determining any likelihood of confusion analysis are: (1) similarity of the marks in their entireties as to sight, sound, meaning, and commercial impression; and (2) the relatedness of the goods or services as described in the application. In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (CCPA 1973). See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098 (CCPA 1976); In re Iolo Techs. LLC., 95 USPQ2d 1498, 1499 (TTAB 2010). Under the sight, sound, meaning, and commercial impression analysis, the marks are distinct and would not be likely to cause consumer confusion.
The Marks Have Different Appearances
To begin, in response to the Examining Attorney’s citation of similar parts and phrases being a potential for confusion, Applicant respectfully submits that there are many instances wherein trademarks have used a similar word or words and have been used to describe identical goods and yet their use was not found to cause a likelihood of confusion among consumers. For example, the TTAB determined that the trademarks “LAWN-BOY” and “LAWN PUP” to described lawnmowers would not cause a likelihood of confusion. Toro Company v. Grassmasters, Inc., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 1032, 2003 TTAB LEXIS 42 (TTAB 2003). Similarly, the marks “HEALTHY CHOICE” and “HEALTH SELECTIONS” were held not likely to cause confusion among consumers wherein both marks were used on food products. Conarga, Inc. v. George A. Hormel & Company, 990 F.2d 368, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1316 (8th Cir. 1993). In Donsky v. Bandwagon, Inc., 193 U.S.P.Q. 336 (D. Mass. 1976) the marks “100-YEAR NITE-LITE” and “CENTURY NIGHT LIGHT” for night lights were not likely to confuse consumers because of the differences in the marks appearances. All three of these cases are similar to the present situation wherein a part of the Applicant’s mark is similar to that of the prior pending mark. Nonetheless, in all three cases, because of the differences in the appearance of the rest of the trademark, no likelihood of confusion was found between potential consumers.
Here, the marks are different in length, include non-identical characters, and are grammatically distinct. Additionally, where the prior pending mark terminates in no punctuation and therefore constitutes a definitive word, Applicant’s mark notably includes an additional modifier, “THAT’S” as well as the exclamatory inclination “!” that significantly changes the sight of the mark from the prior-pending application. Applicant respectfully notes that the Examining Attorney improperly dissects the marks into only their common features when determining whether the overall commercial impression is identical. As such, when taken as an overall commercial impression, the marks are very distinct to a consumer as the marks do not look similar in appearance. Therefore, this du Pont factor must weigh in favor of the Applicant.
The Marks Have Different Sounds
The present rejection indicates that the two marks sound similar because they have the same cadence. Applicant is unclear how the two have the same cadence as prior pending applicant’s mark is comprised of one syllable and Applicant’s has a total of two syllables with two words. Rather, THAT’S SMART provides for a very distinct overall sound. Also, Applicant’s deliberate incorporation of “!” creates a distinct sound with excitement rather than a plain word.
The Marks Have Different Meanings
The meaning of the mark must be determined in relation to the goods and services named in the mark and distinct meanings may create a distinct commercial impression such that there exists no likelihood of confusion. In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2 USPQ2d 1312, 1314 (TTAB 1987). The marks create a different commercial impression in the marketplace such that there would exist no likelihood of confusion.
Here, a singular SMART could mean that the product is a “smart” product such as a “smart phone”. THAT’S SMART!, in contrast, could proclaim “That’s a smart purchase!” “This product is created smartly!” This is a smart buy!” That’s a smart product to purchase because it is cheaper!” The additional THAT’S and ! aid in consumer decision making and provide enticing advertising where just SMART does not.
Given that the marks have distinct appearances, aural impressions, and meanings, a finding of a similar commercial impression is not possible. To reach the conclusion that the two marks have a similar commercial impression, the current rejection relies on a single similarity between two marks that otherwise are dissimilar on all levels. Such an approach is inappropriate as the marks must be considered in their entireties.
2. THE GOODS IN QUESTION TRAVEL IN DIFFERENT TRADE CHANNELS AND ARE NOT CONFUSINGLY SIMILAR.
If the goods are not related or marketed together that would cause a consumer to believe that the two goods originated from the same source, then, even if the marks were identical, confusion would not be likely. See Coach Serv., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC., 668 F.3d 1356, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP § 1207.01(a)(i). The marks do not have related goods and are marketed in entirely different channels such that no association or confusion would be likely.
Here, the prior pending application’s goods are very limited to the narrow scope of coffee and coffee paraphernalia whereas Applicant’s goods are much more broad for both foodstuffs and non-foodstuffs and therefore would be more widely recognizable by customers. These goods are not shelved together, are not promoted together, and are not created by similar sources. Accordingly, the two marks represent different goods which are distinct in the marketplace that would not cause a likelihood of confusion among consumers.
3. THIRD-PARTY USE OF THE TERM SMART DILUTES THE PRIOR PENDING APPLICATION’S SCOPE OF PROTECTION AND APPLICANT’S MARK SHOULD BE ALLOWED FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND EQUITY PURPOSES.
"A real evidentiary value of third party registrations per se is to show the sense in which . . . a mark is used in ordinary parlance." 2 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 11:90 (4th ed. 2015) (emphasis added). "Third party registrations are relevant to prove that some segment of the composite marks which both contesting parties use has a normally understood and well-recognized descriptive or suggestive meaning, leading to the conclusion that that segment is relatively weak." Id.; see Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 917 (CCPA 1976) (even if "there is no evidence of actual use" of "third-party registrations," such registrations "may be given some weight to show the meaning of a mark in the same way that dictionaries are used").
Further, third-party use of a term in the marketplace may be offered as evidence of a term’s weakness and dilution with respect to a particular field and weighs in favor of narrowing the scope of its protection against subsequent applications. See Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Russo, 221 USPQ 281, 283 (TTAB 1983); Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1722, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Marks that are descriptive or highly suggestive are entitled to a narrower scope of protection, i.e., are less likely to generate confusion over source identification, than their more fanciful counterparts. See, e.g., Nat'l Data Corp. v. Computer Sys. Eng'g, Inc., 940 F.2d 676, Id. at *2 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (unpublished); Drackett Co. v. H. Kohnstamm & Co., 404 F.2d 1399, 1400, 56 C.C.P.A. 852 (CCPA 1969) ("The scope of protection afforded such highly suggestive marks is necessarily narrow and confusion is not likely to result from the use of two marks carrying the same suggestion as to the use of closely similar goods."). “Where a party chooses a trademark which is inherently weak, he will not enjoy the wide latitude of protection afforded the owners of strong trademarks.” Sure-Fit Products Co. v. Saltzson Drapery Co., 254 F.2d 158, 117 USPQ 295, 297 (CCPA 1958).
The term shared between the marks, SMART, have little or no source identifying significance because they are very highly suggestive and generic, respectively. The terms are conceptually weak and very highly suggestive with respect to the relevant laundry goods and services. There are at least 25+ live use-based third party marks on the trademark register that include the term SMART for various types of goods and services. As shown in Exhibit A and B, “smart coffee” is a descriptive term for coffee with additional “smart” features or created for weight loss.
These third-party registrations serve as compelling evidence that the shared terms are extremely weak and diluted, such that it creates little source identifying significance that could contribute to any likelihood of confusion apart from the cited mark as a whole. As can be seen, SMART is broadly registered across a variety of goods and services and therefore Applicant’s mark for THAT’S SMART! should similarly be allowed because the prior-pending mark is diluted by third-party registration of the term SMART.
CONCLUSION
The marks of the Applicant and the Applicant of the prior pending mark are different in sight, sound, and meaning, such that they each create unique commercial impression in the marketplace. Where the prior pending mark is for a specific coffee products and non-edible products for processing coffee, Applicant’s mark is specifically for foodstuffs, kitchen cleaning supplies, and laundry supplies which happen to include ground coffee in one class. The distinct goods and trade channels separate the two marks so that no likelihood of confusion would exist as the marks would not be seen together or marketed together to cause any association, connection, or confusion as to the source of the goods. The Applicant respectfully requests the mark proceed to registration as there exists no likelihood of confusion with the Applicant of the prior pending mark.