United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
|
U.S. Application Serial No. 88569251
Mark: PREMIER PASS
|
|
|
Correspondence Address:
|
|
|
Applicant: Celebrity Cruises Inc.
|
|
|
Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
|
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: November 11, 2019
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SUMMARY OF ISSUES:
REFUSAL UNDER SECTION 2(d) – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark PREMIER PASS is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark PREMIER TRAVEL PASS in U.S. Registration Nos. 5724062 and 5724061. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registrations both owned by Holiday Systems International of Nevada.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the services, and similarity of the trade channels of the services. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Similarity of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F. 3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In the present case, applicant's applied-for mark, PREMIER PASS is confusingly similar to the registered mark PREMIER TRAVEL PASS as both marks contain the identical matter PREMIER and PASS in appearance, meaning and sound. Applicant has merely removed generic matter registrant’s marks. Although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark. See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)). Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion. See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.
Even if potential purchasers realize the apparent differences between the marks, they could still reasonably assume, due to the overall similarities in sound, appearance, connotation, and commercial impression in the respective marks, that applicant's services sold under the PREMIER PASS mark constitute a new or additional product line from the same source as the services sold under the PREMIER TRAVEL PASS mark with which they are acquainted or familiar, and that applicant’s mark is merely a variation of the registrant’s mark. See, e.g., SMS, Inc. v. Byn-Mar Inc. 228 USPQ 219, 220 (TTAB 1985) (applicant’s marks ALSO ANDREA and ANDREA SPORT were “likely to evoke an association by consumers with opposer’s preexisting mark [ANDREA SIMONE] for its established line of clothing.”).
Consequently, the marks are confusingly similar and consumers will believe they identify the same source.
Relatedness of the Services
With respect to applicant’s and registrant’s services, the question of likelihood of confusion is determined based on the description of the services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
The applicant’s identified services are: “Cruise ship services” and “Travel agency services, namely, making reservations and booking for temporary lodging; Providing information in the field of temporary accommodations for travelers” in Reg. no. 5724062 and “Coordinating travel arrangements for individuals and for groups; Travel agency services, namely, making reservations and bookings for transportation; Travel agency services, namely, making reservations and bookings for cruises; Travel information” in Reg. no. 5724061.
The attached Internet evidence from http://www.carnival.com/, http://disneycruise.disney.go.com/ and http://www.royalcaribbean.com consists of third parties that proffer cruises ship services in addition to providing information about accommodations, coordinating travel and providing travel information and establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures/produces/provides the relevant services and markets the services under the same mark. Moreover, applicant’s identified services are broadly stated such that it could encompass registrant’s more narrowly identified services. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
Conclusion
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Upon encountering PREMIER PASS and PREMIER TRAVEL PASS, both used on the respective identified services, consumers are likely to be confused and mistakenly believe that they emanate from a common source. Therefore, registration must be refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d).
Applicant should note the additional grounds for refusal below.
REFUSAL UNDER SECTION 2(e)(1) – MARK IS MERELY DESCRIPTIVE
A mark is merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of an applicant’s goods and/or services. TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re TriVita, Inc., 783 F.3d 872, 874, 114 USPQ2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920)).
The determination of whether a mark is merely descriptive is made in relation to an applicant’s goods/services, not in the abstract. DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1254, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1757 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re The Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re Polo Int’l Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1061, 1062-63 (TTAB 1999) (finding DOC in DOC-CONTROL would refer to the “documents” managed by applicant’s software rather than the term “doctor” shown in a dictionary definition); In re Digital Research Inc., 4 USPQ2d 1242, 1243-44 (TTAB 1987) (finding CONCURRENT PC-DOS and CONCURRENT DOS merely descriptive of “computer programs recorded on disk” where the relevant trade used the denomination “concurrent” as a descriptor of a particular type of operating system).
“Whether consumers could guess what the product is from consideration of the mark alone is not the test.” In re Am. Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985).
In the present case, applicant has applied to register the mark PREMIER PASS for use in connection with “Cruise ship services”. The terms are defined as follows:
PREMIER: first in position, rank, or importance
PASS: a means by which access to a place may be gained; or a permit or ticket allowing free transportation or free admission
See attached from http://www.merriam-webster.com.
The mark is merely laudatory and describes a feature of the identified services, namely, that broadly stated services feature a permit or ticket touted as being first in importance. “Marks that are merely laudatory and descriptive of the alleged merit of a product [or service] are . . . regarded as being descriptive” because “[s]elf-laudatory or puffing marks are regarded as a condensed form of describing the character or quality of the goods [or services].” DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1256, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1759 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re The Boston Beer Co., 198 F.3d 1370, 1373, 53 USPQ2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); see In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1342, 57 USPQ2d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding THE ULTIMATE BIKE RACK merely laudatory and descriptive of applicant’s bicycle racks being of superior quality); In re The Boston Beer Co., 198 F.3d at 1373-74, 53 USPQ2d at 1058-59 (holding THE BEST BEER IN AMERICA merely laudatory and descriptive of applicant’s beer and ale being of superior quality); TMEP §1209.03(k). In fact, “puffing, if anything, is more likely to render a mark merely descriptive, not less so.” DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d at 1256, 103 USPQ2d at 1759.
Thus, applicant has merely formed their mark by combining two merely descriptive and possibly generic sets of words. Generally, if the individual components of a mark retain their descriptive meaning in relation to the goods and/or services, the combination results in a composite mark that is itself descriptive and not registrable. In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1516 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Tower Tech, Inc., 64 USPQ2d 1314, 1317-18 (TTAB (2002)); TMEP §1209.03(d); see, e.g., Apollo Med. Extrusion Techs., Inc. v. Med. Extrusion Techs., Inc., 123 USPQ2d 1844, 1851 (TTAB 2017) (holding MEDICAL EXTRUSION TECHNOLOGIES merely descriptive of medical extrusion goods produced by employing medical extrusion technologies); In re Cannon Safe, Inc., 116 USPQ2d 1348, 1351 (TTAB 2015) (holding SMART SERIES merely descriptive of metal gun safes); In re King Koil Licensing Co., 79 USPQ2d 1048, 1052 (TTAB 2006) (holding THE BREATHABLE MATTRESS merely descriptive of beds, mattresses, box springs, and pillows).
Only where the combination of descriptive terms creates a unitary mark with a unique, incongruous, or otherwise nondescriptive meaning in relation to the goods and/or services is the combined mark registrable. See In re Colonial Stores, Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 551, 157 USPQ 382, 384 (C.C.P.A. 1968); In re Positec Grp. Ltd., 108 USPQ2d 1161, 1162-63 (TTAB 2013). In this case, both the individual components and the composite result are descriptive of applicant’s services and do not create a unique, incongruous, or nondescriptive meaning in relation to the services. This is buttressed by the attached evidence from http://tickets.vistafleet.com/event/56d0a67f1ec79610d8aec597016bc227, http://magicinsiders.com/disney-premier-passport/, http://www.royalcaribbean.com/faq/questions/what-are-culturally-enriching-cruises-from-mainland-china, http://www.futuretravelexperience.com/2018/11/royal-caribbean-cruises-biometrics-check-in-boarding/, and http://www.coppercolorado.com/plan-your-trip/season-passes/premier-pass demonstrating that the use in the relevant industry makes the meaning immediate.
Moreover, the attached third party website advertising applicant’s services illustrates that the phrase “premier pass” is merely descriptive of the identified services featuring a means to gain access to different experiences and perks and that such access is important or “innovative” and “unique”. See attached from http://www.cruisehabit.com/celebrity-cruises-perks-packages
Accordingly, the proposed mark PREMIER PASS is merely descriptive, and registration is properly refused on the Principal Register under Section 2(e)(1).
RESPONSE OPTION: SUPPLEMENTAL REGISTER – INTENT TO USE APPLICATION
Although an amendment to the Supplemental Register would normally be an appropriate response to this refusal, such a response is not appropriate in the present case. The instant application was filed under Trademark Act Section 1(b) and is not eligible for registration on the Supplemental Register until an acceptable amendment to allege use meeting the requirements of 37 C.F.R. §2.76 has been timely filed. 37 C.F.R. §2.47(d); TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03.
If applicant files an acceptable allegation of use and also amends to the Supplemental Register, the application effective filing date will be the date applicant met the minimum filing requirements under 37 C.F.R. §2.76(c) for an amendment to allege use. TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03; see 37 C.F.R. §2.75(b). In addition, the undersigned trademark examining attorney will conduct a new search of the USPTO records for conflicting marks based on the later application filing date. TMEP §§206.01, 1102.03.
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. However, if applicant responds to the refusal(s), applicant must also respond to the requirement(s) set forth below.
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
(1) Fact sheets, instruction manuals, brochures, advertisements and pertinent screenshots of applicant’s website as it relates to the services in the application, including any materials using the terms in the applied-for mark. Merely stating that information about the or services is available on applicant’s website is insufficient to make the information of record.;
(2) If these materials are unavailable, applicant should submit similar documentation for goods and services of the same type, explaining how its own product or services will differ. If the services feature new technology and information regarding competing services is not available, applicant must provide a detailed factual description of the goods and/or services. Factual information about the goods must make clear how they operate, salient features, and prospective customers and channels of trade. For services, the factual information must make clear what the services are and how they are rendered, salient features, and prospective customers and channels of trade. Conclusory statements will not satisfy this requirement.; and
(3) Applicant must respond to the following questions:
a. Do applicant’s services feature/include providing access to perks or experiences?
b. Do applicant’s services feature a tangible ticket or pass?
c. Do applicant’s services feature an intangible ticket or pass?
d. Do applicant’s competitors use the phrase “PREMIER PASS” to advertise similar services?
See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §§814, 1402.01(e).
Failure to comply with a request for information is grounds for refusing registration. In re Harley, 119 USPQ2d 1755, 1757-58 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §814.
ASSISTANCE
Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action. Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action
/Heather A. Sales/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 122
(571) 272-7835
Heather.Sales@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE
