To: | Wang Lexiang (huanyee@huanyee.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88564307 - PAPILLON - N/A |
Sent: | November 01, 2019 05:30:23 PM |
Sent As: | ecom112@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 Attachment - 24 Attachment - 25 Attachment - 26 Attachment - 27 Attachment - 28 Attachment - 29 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88564307
Mark: PAPILLON
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Correspondence Address: |
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Applicant: Wang Lexiang
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: November 01, 2019
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
· SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 4520462, 1879685 and 2403039. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the enclosed registrations.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods and/or services, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods and/or services. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
For the reasons discussed below, the examining attorney concludes that confusion as to the source of goods and/or services is likely between the applicant’s mark PAPILLON for Bodysuits; Brassieres; Capris; Coats; Dress suits; Gloves; Hats; Hosiery; Outer jackets; Panties; Pants; Scarfs; Shirts; Shoes; Shorts; Skirts; Suit coats; Sweatsuits; Swim trunks; Swimsuits; Underpants; Underwear, and the registrants’ marks, all PAPILLON for “Hats; Scarves,” “men's, women's, and children's clothing; namely, dresses, hats, jackets, pants, shirts, shorts, skirts, slippers, socks, sweatpants, sweatshirts, sweaters, T-shirts, tank tops, vests, and visors, all sold in connection with the promotion of helicopter and/or bus tour services,” AND “casual wear and sports wear, namely, ladies' dresses, skirts, blouses, pants, jumpsuits, and shorts, all sold through retail channels other than direct mail-order marketing, and not in conjunction with the promotion of any services.”
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F. 3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In this case, the marks all consist of the word “PAPILLON.” The applied-for mark appears in standard characters, and the marks in Reg. Nos. 1879685 and 2403039 both appear in typed form. Standard character and typed forms are equivalent. See TMEP §§807.03 et seq. Thus, the referenced marks are identical. Id.
The mark in Reg. No. 4520462 appears in a stylized font not shown in the applied-for mark. However, the applicant’s standard character claim encompasses virtually all stylized renderings, including forms similar or identical to that of the drawing in the registration. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, the stylization in the registered mark does not avoid a likelihood of confusion in this case. See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).
In sum, there is a likelihood of confusion as to the marks because they share the same appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.
The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
The respective goods and/or services need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
In this case, the application uses broad wording to describe its various clothing articles, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including the registrants’ more narrowly-identified goods. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Furthermore, the applicant’s goods have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
Specifically, the application covers “hats” and “scarfs” which are presumably identical to the “hats” and “scarves” identified in Reg. No. 4520462.
Similarly, applicant’s “outer jackets,” “pants,” “capris,” “shirts,” “shorts,” “skirts,” “sweatsuits” are the same as, or legally identical to, the “jackets,” “pants,” “shirts,” “shorts,” “skirts,” “sweatpants [AND] sweatshirts” identified in Reg. No. 1879685. Likewise, applicant’s “dresses,” “skirts,” “shirts,” “pants,” “capris,” and “shorts,” are the same as, or legally identical to, the “dresses,” “skirts,” “blouses,” “pants,” and “shorts,” identified in Reg. No. 2403039.
The remaining goods in the application – bodysuits, brassieres, coats, suits, gloves, hosiery, and various articles of underwear and swimwear – are all closely related to the parties’ numerous shared clothing products, because such goods are commonly sold through the same commercial channels and emanate from the same commercial sources. The foregoing goods, along with several of the parties’ shared goods, are all referenced in the following third-party registrations, copies of which are attached herein: U.S. Reg. No. 5893227, 5786215, 5703425, 5257838, 5267143, 5267142, and 5158245. This evidence shows that the goods and/or services listed therein are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark. See In re Anderson, 101 USPQ2d 1912, 1919 (TTAB 2012); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).
For the reasons discussed above, registration must be refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d). Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
· LEGAL COUNSEL REQUIRED
Applicant must be represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney. The application record indicates that applicant’s domicile is outside of the United States in China, but no attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a U.S. State or territory has been appointed to represent the applicant in this matter. All applicants whose permanent legal residence or principal place of business is not within the United States or its territories must be represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney at the USPTO. 37 C.F.R. §§2.2(o), 2.11(a). Thus, applicant is required to be represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney and must appoint one. 37 C.F.R. §2.11(a). This application will not proceed to registration without such appointment and representation. See id. See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.
To appoint or designate a U.S.-licensed attorney. To appoint an attorney, applicant should (1) submit a completed Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Revocation, Appointment, and/or Change of Address of Attorney/Domestic Representative form and (2) promptly notify the trademark examining attorney that this TEAS form was submitted. Alternatively, if applicant has already retained an attorney, the attorney can respond to this Office action by using the appropriate TEAS response form and provide his or her attorney information in the form and sign it as applicant’s attorney. See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(1)(ii).
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action
/Lief Martin/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 112
571-272-3434
lief.martin@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE