Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  October 16, 2019

 

The referenced application from Xixian Li (“Applicant”) has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

 

• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
• Specimen Refusal
• U.S.-Licensed Attorney Required

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark, GIRO (“The Applied for Mark”) is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration Nos. 3722128, 3756412, and 5691857 (“Registrations 1, 2, and 3” or “GIRO” owned by Registrant 1), 5796955 (“Registration 4” or “GYRO KING” owned by Registrant 2), 4319970 (“Registration 5” or “GYRO FORCE” owned by Registrant 3), 4397150 (“Registration 6” or “GYRO ZEE” owned by Registrant 4), 1828955 (“Registration 7” or “GYRO SPIN” owned by Registrant 5), and 1502342 (“Registration 8” or “GYRO” owned by Registrant 6) (jointly referred to as “The Registered Marks” owned separately by The Registrants).  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations owned by The Registrants.

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).

 

In the present case, Applicant’s mark is GIRO and Registrant 1’s marks are GIRO.  These marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015).  Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with Applicant’s and Registrant 3’s respective goods.  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d at 1411.

 

Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

The Applied for Mark is GIRO, Registration 4 is “GYRO KING”, Registration 5 is GYRO FORCE, Registration 6 is GYRO ZEE, Registration 7 is GYRO SPIN, and Registration 8 is GYRO. The marks are similar in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

There is no correct pronunciation of a mark because it is impossible to predict how the public will pronounce a particular mark.  See Embarcadero Techs., Inc. v. RStudio, Inc., 105 USPQ2d 1825, 1835 (TTAB 2013) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1367, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1912 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re The Belgrade Shoe Co., 411 F.2d 1352, 1353, 162 USPQ 227, 227 (C.C.P.A. 1969)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).  The Applied for Mark is GIRO, Registration 8 is GYRO, and the first term in Registrations 4 – 7 is GYRO, and these could clearly be pronounced the same; such similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv). This also weighs heavily in favor of finding The Applied for Mark confusingly similar to The Registered Marks.

 

Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”). The Applied for Mark is GIRO and the first term in Registrations 4 – 7 is GYRO, therefore the more prominent feature of Registrations 4 – 7 look similar to and sound identical to The Applied for Mark. This weighs heavily in favor of finding The Applied for Mark confusingly similar to Registrations 4 – 7.

 

Although The Applied for Mark does not contain the entirety of Registrations 4 – 7, The Applied for Mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of Registrations 4 – 7.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, The Applied for Mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from The Registered Marks because it sounds like it contains some of the wording in The Registered Marks and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from those marks. This, too, weighs heavily in favor of finding The Applied for Mark confusingly similar to The Registered Marks.

 

For the foregoing reasons, The Applied for Mark is confusingly similar to The Registered Marks.

 

Similarity and Nature of the Goods and of the Trade Channels

 

Applicant’s goods are “Athletic supporters; Body-building apparatus; Carnival masks; Dolls; Dumbbells; Elbow guards for athletic use; Elbow pads for athletic use; Fishing harnesses; Hangers for Christmas tree ornaments; Infant toys; Knee pads for athletic use; Leg guards for athletic use; Pet toys; Plush toys; Sport balls; Swimming belts; Toy cars; Toy models; Toy robots; Wrist guards for athletic use” in Class 28.

 

Registrant 1’s goods associated with Registrations 1 – 3 are “Protective helmets; Protective helmets for sports” and “Bicycle helmets; Goggles for sports; Protective helmets; Protective helmets for sports; Ski goggles; Snow goggles; ski helmets” in Class 9 and “Footwear” in Class 25.

 

Registrant 2’s goods include “Board Games; Arcade video game machines; Game apparatus for playing action type target games sold as a combined unit; Game apparatus, namely, bases, bats, and balls for playing indoor and outdoor games; Amusement apparatus adapted for use with an external display screen or monitor; Player-operated electronic controllers for electronic video game machines; Hand-held, non-electronic skill games; Nets for ball games; Video game machines; Toys namely, soft dolls, puzzles, balloons, return top toys, toy figures attachable to pencils, rubber balls, children's multiple activity toys, basketballs, bath toys, baseballs, beach balls, collectible toy figures, doll accessories, doll playsets, electric action toys, equipment sold as a unit for playing card games, footballs, mechanical toys, toy mobiles, toy vehicles, toy watches, and toy weapons; Toys for domestic pets; Dolls; Playing cards; Card games; Skis; Snowboards; Athletic sporting goods, namely, athletic wrist, ankle and joint supports; Shoulder pads for athletic use; Elbow guards for athletic use; Shin guards for athletic use; Knee guards for athletic use; Baseball gloves; Goalkeepers gloves; Fencing gloves; Skateboarding gloves; Hockey gloves; Boxing gloves; Ascenders made of metal for use as mountaineering equipment; Climbers' harness; Golf bags with or without wheels; Golf balls; Golf gloves; Golf equipment namely, balls, clubs, gloves, club covers; Toy bicycles other than for transport; Toy scooters; Athletic protective wrist pads for skating; Athletic protective elbow pads for skating; Athletic protective knee pads for skateboarding; Athletic protective arm pads for skating; Toy roller skates; Christmas tree ornaments and decorations, except confectionery and electric Christmas tree lights; Butterfly nets; Fishing tackle; Twirling batons; Ride-on toys; Chess games” in Class 28.

 

Registrant 3’s goods are “toys, games and playthings, namely, toy vehicles, radio controlled toy cars, airplanes, flying toy vehicles, cars, boats and robots” in Class 28.

 

Registrant 4’s goods are “Toys, namely, toy watercrafts, vehicles, figures, aircrafts, helicopters and accessories therefor, action skill games, cases for toy vehicles and figurines, electronically-operated toy vehicles, aircrafts, helicopters and spacecrafts, children's multiple activity toys, toy vehicle track sets and roadways and accessories therefor, and motorized, remote and radio-controlled toy vehicles, aircrafts and helicopters” in Class 28.

 

Registrant 5’s goods are “fishing reels, fishing rods” in Class 28.

 

Registrant 6’s goods are “BOWLING BALLS AND BOWLING GLOVES” in Class 28.

 

The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). 

 

The respective goods and/or services need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). Unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods and/or services of the type described.  See In re Jump Designs, LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006) (citing In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981)); In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992).

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). Applicant’s goods and The Registrants’ goods both include dolls, elbow guards, elbow pads, wrist protection, Christmas tree ornaments, knee pads, toy cars, and toy robots. This weighs heavily in favor of finding Applicant’s goods related to Registrant 2’s goods for likelihood of confusion purposes.

 

Applicant’s goods include guards and pads for athletic use and Registrant 1’s goods include bicycle helmets, which are guards for wearing on your head while riding a bicycle which is an athletic use. Therefore the goods are related because both can be used by cyclists to keep themselves safe while riding their bicycles. Similarly, Applicant’s goods include fishing harnesses and The Registrants’ goods include fishing tackle, fishing rods, and fishing reels. Therefore Applicant’s and The Registrant’s goods are related because they are both used when fishing. This weighs in favor of finding Applicant’s goods related to Registrant 1’s goods for likelihood of confusion purposes.

 

In addition the application uses broad wording to describe Applicant’s sports balls, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including The Registrant’s more narrow balls for playing indoor and outdoor games, rubber balls, basketballs, baseballs, beach balls, footballs, golf balls, and bowling balls.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, with respect to those goods, Applicant’s and The Registrants’ goods are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)). This also weighs heavily in favor of finding Applicant’s goods related to The Registrants’ goods for likelihood of confusion purposes.

 

Furthermore, the attached Internet evidence establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures/produces/provides the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark.  This, too, weighs heavily in favor of finding Applicant’s goods related to The Registrants’ goods for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

For the foregoing reasons, Applicant’s goods The Registrants’ goods are related for likelihood of confusion purposes.

 

With respect to trade channels, absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods and/or services are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 

 

The identifications set forth in the application and registrations have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers.  Therefore, for purpose of a likelihood of confusion analysis, it is presumed that Applicant’s goods and The Registrants’ goods travel in all normal channels of trade, and are available to the same class of purchasers.

 

Section 2(d) Analysis Conclusion

 

In total, The Applied for Mark, GIRO, is confusingly similar to The Registered Marks, GIRO, GYRO KING, GYRO FORCE, GYRO ZEE, GYRO SPIN, GYRO; Applicant’s goods are identical and related to The Registrants’ goods; and Applicant’s goods travel in the same trade channels as The Registrants’ goods. Consequently, consumers are likely to be confused by the marks and mistakenly believe that the goods that these marks identify originate from a common source. Therefore, registration of The Applied for Mark must be refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion with The Registered Marks.

 

Although Applicant’s mark has been refused registration, Applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  However, if Applicant responds to the refusal, Applicant must also respond to the refusal and requirement set forth below.

 

SPECIMEN REFUSAL

 

Registration is refused because the specimen in International Class 21 appears to consist of a digitally altered image or a mock-up of the mark on the goods or their packaging and does not show the applied-for mark in actual use in commerce.  Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a). 

 

An application based on Trademark Act Section 1(a) must include a specimen showing the applied-for mark in use in commerce for each international class of goods identified in the application or amendment to allege use.  15 U.S.C. §1051(a)(1); 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a).  “Use in commerce” means (1) a bona fide use of the applied-for mark in the ordinary course of trade (and not merely to reserve a right in the mark), (2) the mark is placed in any manner on the goods, packaging, tags or labels affixed to the goods, or displays that directly associate the mark with the goods and have a point-of-sale nature, and (3) the goods are actually sold or transported in commerce.  See 15 U.S.C. §1127.

 

An image of a product or packaging that has been digitally created or otherwise altered to include the mark does not show actual use of the mark in commerce.  See 15 U.S.C. §1127; TMEP §§904.04(a), 904.07(a); cf. In re Chica, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1845, 1848 (TTAB 2007) (holding that “a mere drawing of the goods with an illustration of how the mark may be displayed” was not an acceptable specimen because it did not show actual use in commerce); In re The Signal Cos., 228 USPQ 956, 957-58 n.4 (TTAB 1986) (noting that a printer’s proof of an advertisement would not be an acceptable specimen because it does not show actual use in commerce).

 

In this case, the specimen shows the provider of the goods is SN0002. It does not show Applicant is the provider of the goods.  Therefore, the submitted specimen cannot be accepted.

 

In addition, registration is refused because the specimen does not show the applied-for mark in use in commerce in connection with any of the goods and/or services specified in International Class 28 in the application or amendment to allege use.  Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); In re Keep A Breast Found., 123 USPQ2d 1869, 1876-79 (TTAB 2017); In re Graystone Consulting Assocs., Inc., 115 USPQ2d 2035, 2037-38 (TTAB 2015); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a), 1301.04(d), (g)(i).  Specifically, the specimen shows The Applied for Mark used with a compression sleeve for athletic use, which is in International Class 10; however, Applicant’s goods are elbow guards and pads for athletic use in International Class 28.

 

An application based on Trademark Act Section 1(a) must include a specimen showing the applied-for mark in use in commerce for each international class of goods and/or services identified in the application or amendment to allege use.  15 U.S.C. §1051(a)(1); 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a). 

 

Examples of specimens for goods include tags, labels, instruction manuals, containers, photographs that show the mark on the actual goods or packaging, and displays associated with the actual goods at their point of sale.  See TMEP §§904.03 et seq.  Webpages may also be specimens for goods when they include a picture or textual description of the goods associated with the mark and the means to order the goods.  TMEP §904.03(i).  Examples of specimens for services include advertising and marketing materials, brochures, photographs of business signage and billboards, and webpages that show the mark used in the actual sale, rendering, or advertising of the services.  See TMEP §1301.04(a), (h)(iv)(C).  Specimens comprising advertising and promotional materials must show a direct association between the mark and the services.  TMEP §1301.04(f)(ii).

 

Applicant may respond to this refusal by satisfying one of the following for each applicable international class:

 

(1)        Submit a different specimen (a verified “substitute” specimen) that (a) was in actual use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application and (b) shows the mark in actual use in commerce for the goods identified in the application or amendment to allege use.  A “verified substitute specimen” is a specimen that is accompanied by the following statement made in a signed affidavit or supported by a declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20:  “The substitute (or new, or originally submitted, if appropriate) specimen(s) was/were in use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of the amendment to allege use.”  The substitute specimen cannot be accepted without this statement.

 

(2)        Amend the filing basis to intent to use under Section 1(b), for which no specimen is required.  This option will later necessitate additional fee(s) and filing requirements such as providing a specimen.

 

For an overview of both response options referenced above and instructions on how to satisfy either option online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, please go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/law/specimen.jsp.

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

U.S.-LICENSED ATTORNEY REQUIRED

 

Applicant must be represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney.  An applicant whose domicile is located outside of the United States or its territories is foreign-domiciled and must be represented at the USPTO by an attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a U.S. state or territory.  37 C.F.R. §§2.11(a), 11.14; Requirement of U.S.-Licensed Attorney for Foreign-Domiciled Trademark Applicants & Registrants, Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A. (Rev. Sept. 2019)  An individual applicant’s domicile is the place a person resides and intends to be the person’s principal home.  37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.  A juristic entity’s domicile is the principal place of business; i.e., headquarters, where a juristic entity applicant’s senior executives or officers ordinarily direct and control the entity’s activities.  37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.  Because applicant is foreign-domiciled, applicant must appoint such a U.S.-licensed attorney qualified to practice under 37 C.F.R. §11.14 as its representative before the application may proceed to registration.  37 C.F.R. §2.11(a).  See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information. 

 

To appoint a U.S.-licensed attorney.  To appoint an attorney, applicant should submit a completed Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Revocation, Appointment, and/or Change of Address of Attorney/Domestic Representative form.  The newly-appointed attorney must submit a TEAS Response to Examining Attorney Office Action form indicating that an appointment of attorney has been made and address all other refusals or requirements in this action, if any.  Alternatively, if applicant retains an attorney before filing the response, the attorney can respond to this Office action by using the appropriate TEAS response form and provide his or her attorney information in the form and sign it as applicant’s attorney.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(1)(ii).

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action  

 

 

 

/Louis Kolodner/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 122

(571) 272-7562

Louis.Kolodner@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on October 16, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88559257

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

 

/Louis Kolodner/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 122

(571) 272-7562

Louis.Kolodner@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from October 16, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond.

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”