Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

Issue date:  September 16, 2019

INTRODUCTION

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

·        Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

·        Amendment of Identification of Services Required

·        Disclaimer Required

·        U.S. Attorney Bar Information and Attestation Required

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3386231 (PROXIMITY).  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

The Applicant’s mark is PROXIMITY BURGER for “Mobile food kiosk services; Online ordering services in the field of food, restaurants, restaurant take-out, or restaurant delivery; Providing consumer information in the field of food, restaurants, restaurant take-out, or restaurant delivery”, “Delivery of food prepared by restaurants; Delivery of food prepared in dark kitchen facilities; Food ordering and delivery services”, and “Providing temporary kitchen facilities; Providing dark kitchen facilities; Providing specialized facilities for food preparation; Leasing and rental of kitchen facilities; Food preparation services”.

The Registrant’s mark is PROXIMITY for “Restaurant services”.

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by-case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the services, and similarity of the trade channels of the services.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

COMPARISON OF THE MARKS

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

Applicant's mark is PROXIMITY BURGER.

Registrant's mark is PROXIMITY.

In this case, both marks feature the wording “PROXIMITY”.  Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

As the first or only term in each mark, the common wording “PROXIMITY” is the dominant feature in each mark.  Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).

The fact that the applied-for mark includes additional wording will not avoid a likelihood of confusion here.  Adding a term to a registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER and design confusingly similar); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1269 (TTAB 2009) (finding TITAN and VANTAGE TITAN confusingly similar); In re El Torito Rests., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002, 2004 (TTAB 1988) (finding MACHO and MACHO COMBOS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part.

Moreover, the added wording “BURGER” is merely descriptive of the services and must be disclaimed (See disclaimer requirement below).  Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Therefore, the common wording “MEDLEY” remains the dominant term in the applied-for mark.

Furthermore, where the services of an applicant and registrant are “similar in kind and/or closely related,” the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as in the case of diverse services.  In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987); see Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1242, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TMEP §1207.01(b).

COMPARISON OF THE SERVICES

The services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).  The compared services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

The attached Internet evidence shows a number of entities that provide restaurant services, as well as food ordering, food delivery, mobile kiosk, consumer information, and/or rental of kitchen facility services, all under the same mark (See attached evidence from Chipotle®, Five Guys®, Kitchen United®, Local Taqueria, McDonald’s®, Panda Express®, Panera®, Roll Play®, and Sudhouse).  This evidence establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant services and markets the services under the same mark.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

The trademark examining attorney has attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of a number of third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar services as those of both applicant and registrant in this case.  This evidence shows that the services listed therein, namely, restaurant services, and ordering, mobile food kiosk, delivery, consumer information, and providing kitchen facility services, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark.  See In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1737 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

In light of the similarities between the marks and the relatedness of the services, it is likely that consumers who encounter the parties' services will falsely conclude that they originate from the same source.

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  If applicant responds to the refusal, applicant must also respond to the requirements set forth below.

AMENDMENT OF IDENTIFICATION OF SERVICES REQUIRED

The identification of services is unacceptable because it contains indefinite wording and must be clarified.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01.  For example, Applicant must clarify the nature of its dark kitchen facilities, and its leasing and rental of kitchen facilities services.  Applicant should also note that food ordering services are properly classified in International Class 035, rather than in International Class 039.

Applicant may adopt the following identification, if accurate: 

International Class 035:  "Mobile food kiosk services; Online ordering services in the field of food, restaurants, restaurant take-out, or restaurant delivery; Providing consumer information in the field of food, restaurants, restaurant take-out, or restaurant delivery" [no change required]

International Class 039:  "Delivery of food prepared by restaurants; Delivery of food prepared in dark kitchen facilities in the nature of kitchens for use by delivery-only restaurants; Food ordering and delivery services"

International Class 043:  "Providing temporary kitchen facilities; Providing dark kitchen facilities in the nature of kitchens for use by delivery-only restaurants; Providing specialized facilities for food preparation; Leasing and rental of kitchen facilities in the nature of kitchen space for commercial food preparation; Food preparation services"

Applicant may amend the identification to clarify or limit the services, but not to broaden or expand the services beyond those in the original application or as acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Generally, any deleted services may not later be reinserted.  See TMEP §1402.07(e).

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual.  See TMEP §1402.04.

DISCLAIMER REQUIRED

Applicant must provide a disclaimer of the unregistrable part of the applied-for mark even though the mark as a whole appears to be registrable.  See 15 U.S.C. §1056(a); TMEP §§1213, 1213.03(a).  A disclaimer of an unregistrable part of a mark will not affect the mark’s appearance.  See Schwarzkopf v. John H. Breck, Inc., 340 F.2d 978, 979-80, 144 USPQ 433, 433 (C.C.P.A. 1965).

In this case, applicant must disclaim the wording “BURGER” because it is not inherently distinctive.  The unregistrable term at best is merely descriptive of an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of applicant’s services.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1251, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1755 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §§1213, 1213.03(a). 

The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “BURGER” as “hamburger” or “a sandwich similar to a hamburger” (See attached evidence from merriam-webster.com).  Thus, the wording merely describes a feature of applicant’s services, namely, that the kiosk, order, delivery, and other services feature hamburgers.

Applicant may respond to this issue by submitting a disclaimer in the following format: 

No claim is made to the exclusive right to use “BURGER” apart from the mark as shown. 

For an overview of disclaimers and instructions on how to satisfy this issue using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), see the Disclaimer webpage. 

U.S. ATTORNEY BAR INFORMATION AND ATTESTATION REQUIRED

Attorney bar information required.  Applicant’s attorney must provide the following bar information:  (1) his or her bar membership number, if the bar provides one; (2) the name of the U.S. state, commonwealth, or territory of his or her bar membership; and (3) the year of his or her admission to the bar.  37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(3).  This information is required for all U.S.-licensed attorneys who are representing trademark applicants at the USPTO.  Id.  If the attorney’s bar does not issue bar membership numbers, applicant must state this for the record.  See id.

To provide bar information.  Applicant’s attorney should respond to this Office action by using the appropriate TEAS response form and provide his or her bar information in the “Attorney Information” page of the form, within the bar information section.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(1)(ii).  Bar information provided in any other area of the form will be viewable by the public in USPTO records.

Attorney statement required.  Applicant’s attorney must provide the following statement:  “I am an attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of a U.S. state (including the District of Columbia and any U.S. Commonwealth or territory).”  See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(3).  This is required for all U.S.-licensed attorneys who are representing trademark applicants at the USPTO.  Id. 

If the applicant has any questions or requires assistance in responding to this Office Action, please contact the examining attorney at the contact information provided below.  Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

Yi, Crystal

/Crystal H. Yi/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 123

571.270.0763

crystal.yi@uspto.gov

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action  

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on September 16, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88554131

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

(1)  Read the official letter.

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

Yi, Crystal

/Crystal H. Yi/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 123

571.270.0763

crystal.yi@uspto.gov

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from September 16, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond.

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”