Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  October 23, 2019

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

I.         SEARCH OF THE OFFICE RECORDS

 

Application Refused--Section 2(d) Refusal—Likelihood of Confusion

The examining attorney refuses registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d) because the applicant’s applied-for mark when used on or in connection with the identified goods and/or services so resembles the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4378791 as to be likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or deceive. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  Please see the enclosed registration.

 

Case Law Determinations Governing Likelihood of Confusion Analysis

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant(s).  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Determining likelihood of confusion is made on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  However, “[n]ot all of the [du Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1366, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601. F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir 2010)).  Furthermore, the relevant du Pont factors are not necessarily “of equal weight in a given case, and any one of the factors may control a particular case.” Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F3d 1344, 1355, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

 

The USPTO may focus its analysis “on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods [and/or services].”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see TMEP §1207.01.  In this case, the examining attorney finds the following du Pont factors are most relevant: the similarity of the marks, the similarity and nature of the goods and/or services, and the similarity of the trade channels for these goods and/or services.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

The applicant’s proposed mark is THE D; the registered mark is THE D SHOP.

 

Comparison of the Respective Marks

When making a similarity comparison for purposes of Section 2(d) analysis, the marks must be viewed in their entireties.  See TMEP §1207.01(b).  Nevertheless, marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where there are similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appearing in both applicant’s and registrant’s mark.  See e.g., Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689 (TTAB 1986), aff’d 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (21 CLUB and “21” CLUB (stylized)); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS); In re Collegian Sportswear Inc., 224 USPQ 174 (TTAB 1984) (COLLEGIAN OF CALIFORNIA and COLLEGIENNE); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983) (MILTRON and MILLTRONICS); In re BASF A.G., 189 USPQ 424 (TTAB 1975) (LUTEXAL and LUTEX); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, the similar portion of both the applicant’s proposed mark and the registered mark is the identical term “THE D.”

 

The examining attorney refuses registration of the mark THE D on the grounds that it will cause a likelihood of confusion with the registered mark THE D SHOP because the applicant’s proposed mark has an identical sound, appearance, and meaning as that of a significant portion of the mark in the cited registration.  Similarity in sound alone has been found sufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.  RE/MAX of Am., Inc., v. Realty Mart, Inc. 207 USPQ 960, 964 (TTAB 1980); Molenaar, Inc. v. Happy Toys Inc., 188 USPQ 469 (TTAB 1975); In re Cresco Mfg. Co., 138 USPQ 401 (TTAB 1963). TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv). 

 

The additional descriptive and disclaimed term SHOP in the cited registration does not alter this determination.  Although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, the applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.  The similarity between the respective marks caused by the term THE D appearing in both marks outweighs the difference between these marks caused by additional descriptive and disclaimed term SHOP appearing in the cited registration.  In sum, the examining attorney finds that the applicant’s proposed mark so resembles the registered mark that confusion as to source is likely.

 

Comparison of the Respective Goods and Services

The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).  It is well settled that the compared products and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

If the marks of the respective parties are identical or highly similar, the relationship between the goods and/or services of the respective parties need not be as close to support a finding of likelihood of confusion as might apply where differences exist between the marks. In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001); Amcor, Inc. v. Amcor Industries, Inc., 210 USPQ 70, 78 (TTAB 1981); TMEP §1207.01(a).  In addition, the Office must also consider any goods or services in the registrant’s normal fields of expansion in order to determine whether the registrant’s goods or services are related to the applicant’s identified goods or services for purposes of analysis under Section 2(d).  In re General Motors Corp., 196 USPQ 574 (TTAB 1977).  The test is whether purchasers would believe the product or service is within the registrant’s logical zone of expansion.  CPG Prods. Corp. v. Perceptual Play, Inc., 221 USPQ 88 (TTAB 1983); TMEP §1207.01(a)(v).

 

The examining attorney refuses registration of the mark THE D because the channels of trade in which the applicant’s goods travel are similar to those used by the registrant.  The applicant’s goods are identified as “douce bags” and “douching preparations for medical purposes”.  The services named in the registration comprise “Retail store services featuring apparel, jewelry, hair accessories, music, books, perfumes, fragrances, business accessories, gift items, personal hygiene products, sundry items, health care products, food items, travel accessories and other general merchandise”. 

 

When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods and services for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods and services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

Absent restrictions in an application or registration, the identified goods and services are presumed “travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  In this case, the identifications set forth in the application and registration have no restrictions as to their nature, type, channel of trade or class of purchasers.  Therefore, it is presumed that these goods and services travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.

 

In addition, it is noted that unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods and/or services of the type described.  See In re Jump Designs, LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006) (citing In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981)).  In this case, the registrant uses broad wording (personal hygiene products, health care products) in its identification of services.  Therefore, the case law requires that the Office presume this broad wording encompasses all kinds of personal hygiene products and health care products—including the douches and douche bags specifically identified in the applicant’s more narrow identification. See, e.g., Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015); In re N.A.D., Inc., 57 USPQ2d 1872, 1874 (TTAB 2000). 

 

Because of this presumption, the examining attorney must conclude that the registrant’s retail store services feature the very personal hygiene or health care products listed in this application.  It is well settled that the use of similar marks on or in connection with both products and retail-store services has been held likely to cause confusion where the evidence showed that the retail-store services featured the same type of products.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding the use of similar marks for various clothing items, including athletic uniforms, and for retail shops featuring sports team related clothing and apparel likely to cause confusion); In re House Beer, LLC, 114 USPQ2d 1073, 1078 (TTAB 2015) (holding the use of identical marks for beer and for retail store services featuring beer likely to cause confusion); In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d 1021, 1023 (TTAB 2006) (holding the use of similar marks for jewelry and for retail-jewelry and mineral-store services likely to cause confusion); TMEP §1207.01(a)(ii).

 

As evidence that consumers are accustomed to a single source identifier in relation to particular products as well as retail store services featuring such goods, the examining attorney encloses five (5) separate trademark registrations in which the same mark is used in relation to particular products as well as retail store services featuring such goods.  These printouts have probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the identified products and services are of a kind that may emanate from a single source.  In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Dallas, 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1218 (TTAB 2001), citing In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); and In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 at n.6 (TTAB 1988).  As additional evidence establishing that feminine hygiene products and retail store service featuring such products are found in the same channels of trade, marketed to the same consumers, and commonly produced by the same entity under the same mark, the examining attorney refers to the attached webpages of WALGREENS[1] and CVS[2] showing such use.  Evidence obtained from the Internet may be used to support a determination under Section 2(d) that goods and services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009); In re G.B.I. Tile & Stone, Inc., 92 USPQ2d 1366, 1371 (TTAB 2009). 

 

In light of this evidence and the required presumptions under the relevant case law, the examining attorney must find that the respective goods and services are related in that they are consistently found in the same channels of trade and marketed to, or encountered by, the same consumers under a single mark—a situation that would necessarily give rise to a mistaken belief by consumers that these goods and services come from a common source, when in fact, they do not.  As such, the respective goods and services are considered related for purposes of likelihood of confusion analysis.

 

In sum, given the similarity between the respective marks when viewed in light of the relatedness between the respective goods and services as well as the similarity between the channels of trade for such goods and services, it is likely that consumers will be confused as to the ultimate source of these products and services and associate the registered mark with the applicant’s proposed mark.  Accordingly, the examining attorney refuses registration of the applicant’s proposed mark pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

Although the examining attorney has refused registration, the applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

II.        INFORMALITIES

 

If the applicant chooses to respond to the refusal to register, the applicant must also respond to the following issue(s):

 

Application Refused—Applicant’s Appointed U.S.-Based Attorney Must Provide Certain Information

The application record indicates that the applicant is represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney.  Unfortunately, certain required information concerning the U.S.-licensed attorney is not part of the record.  Specifically, the applicant’s appointed U.S.-licensed attorney has not provided:  (1) his or her bar membership number, if the bar provides one; (2) the name of the U.S. state, commonwealth, or territory of his or her bar membership; and (3) the year of his or her admission to the bar.  37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(3).  This information is required for all U.S.-licensed attorneys who are representing trademark applicants at the USPTO.  Id.  If the attorney’s bar does not issue bar membership numbers, applicant must state this for the record.  See id.

 

In addition, the applicant’s appointed U.S.-licensed attorney must also provide the following statement:  “I am an attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of a U.S. state (including the District of Columbia and any U.S. Commonwealth or territory).”  See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(3).  This information and attestation is required for all U.S.-licensed attorneys who are representing trademark applicants at the USPTO. Id.  Because the applicant has already retained an attorney, the attorney can respond to this Office action by using the appropriate TEAS response form and provide his or her attorney information in the form and sign it as applicant’s attorney.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(1)(ii).

 

Please Note:  Failure to comply with this requirement is grounds for refusing registration.  In re Harley, 119 USPQ2d 1755, 1757-58 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §814.  Merely stating that the attorney’s bar information is available on a state bar’s website is an insufficient response and will not make the relevant information of record.  See In re Planalytics, Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1453, 1457-58 (TTAB 2004).

 

Applicant’s Response

There is no required format or form for responding to an Office action.  For this application to proceed further, the applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement raised in this Office action.  If the action includes a refusal, the applicant may provide arguments and/or evidence as to why the refusal should be withdrawn and the mark should register.  The applicant may also have other options specified in this Office action for responding to a refusal and should consider those options carefully.  To respond to requirements and certain refusal response options, the applicant should set forth in writing the required changes or statements.  For more information and general tips on responding to USPTO Office actions, response options, and how to file a response online, Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” on the USPTO’s website.

 

If the applicant does not respond to this Office action within six months of the issue/mailing date, or responds by expressly abandoning the application, the application process will end and the trademark will fail to register.  See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.65(a), 2.68(a); TMEP §§718.01, 718.02.  Additionally, the USPTO will not refund the application filing fee, which is a required processing fee.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(i)-(iv), 2.209(a); TMEP §405.04.

 

When an application has abandoned for failure to respond to an Office action, an applicant may timely file a petition to revive the application, which, if granted, would allow the application to return to active status.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.66; TMEP §1714.  The petition must be filed within two months of the date of issuance of the notice of abandonment and may be filed online via the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) with a $100 fee.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(15)(ii), 2.66(a)(1), (b)(1)

 

Responses to Office actions must be properly signed.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(b), 2.193(e)(2); TMEP §§712, 712.01.  If an applicant is not represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant (e.g., a corporate officer or general partner).  See 37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(2)(ii); TMEP §§611.03(b), 611.06(b)-(h), 712.01.  In the case of joint applicants, all must sign.  37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(2)(ii); TMEP §611.06(a). 

 

If an applicant is represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney authorized to practice before the USPTO, the attorney must sign the response.  37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(2)(i); TMEP §§611.03(b), 712.01.  The only attorneys who may sign responses are (1) attorneys in good standing with a bar of the highest court of any U.S. state or territory, or (2) Canadian trademark attorneys or agents reciprocally recognized by the USPTO’s Office of Enrollment and Discipline (OED) who are appointed in connection with a U.S.-licensed attorney.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(a), 11.14(a), (c), (e).  Foreign attorneys, other than recognized Canadian trademark attorneys or agents, do not have authority to sign responses.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(e), 11.14(c)(1), (e).  If an applicant is initially represented by an attorney, and then later retains another U.S.-licensed attorney from a different firm, the newly retained attorney may not sign responses until the applicant files a new power and/or revocation of attorney.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.18(a)(7); TMEP §604.03.

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  If the applicant has technical questions about the TEAS response to Office action form, applicant can review the electronic filing tips available online at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eFilingTips.htm and email technical questions to TEAS@uspto.gov.

 

If the applicant or its appointed attorney has any questions or needs assistance in responding to this Office action, please telephone the assigned examining attorney.

 

/Michael Tanner/

Michael Tanner

Trademark Attorney

Law Office 119

Telephone: 571-272-9706

Email: Michael.Tanner@uspto.gov

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action  

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.