Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  October 11, 2019

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

I.         SEARCH OF THE OFFICE RECORDS

 

Application Refused--Section 2(d) Refusal—Likelihood of Confusion

The examining attorney refuses registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d) because the applicant’s applied-for mark when used on or in connection with the identified goods and/or services so resembles the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5812061 as to be likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or deceive. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  Please see the enclosed registration.

 

Case Law Determinations Governing Likelihood of Confusion Analysis

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant(s).  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Determining likelihood of confusion is made on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  However, “[n]ot all of the [du Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1366, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601. F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir 2010)).  Furthermore, the relevant du Pont factors are not necessarily “of equal weight in a given case, and any one of the factors may control a particular case.” Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F3d 1344, 1355, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

 

The USPTO may focus its analysis “on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods [and/or services].”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see TMEP §1207.01.  In this case, the examining attorney finds the following du Pont factors are most relevant: the similarity of the marks, the similarity and nature of the goods and/or services, and the similarity of the trade channels for these goods and/or services.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

The applicant’s proposed mark is YIGATI; the registered mark is YAGATA.

 

Comparison of the Respective Marks

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the examining attorney must compare the marks for similarities in sound, appearance, meaning or connotation.  In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b).  Similarity in any one of these elements is sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB (1988); In re Mack, 197 USPQ 755 (TTAB 1977); see TMEP §§1207.01(b).

 

The test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison.  The issue is whether the marks create the same overall impression. See Racot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.2d 1322, 1329-30, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1899 (Fed Cir. 2000); Visual Information Institute, Inc. v. Vicon Industries Inc., 209 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1980).  The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The examining attorney refuses registration of the proposed mark YIGATI on the grounds that it will cause a likelihood of confusion with the registered mark YAGATA.  In this case, the applicant’s proposed mark so resembles the registered mark so as to render confusion as to source likely.  The respective marks are essentially phonetic equivalents—the only difference is the difference between sound of the vowel “I” compared to the vowel “A” that appears in the first and last vowel in each mark.  Not only have the courts consistently and repeatedly found that similarity in sound alone is sufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion, but also, that slight differences in the sound of similar marks will not avoid a finding of likelihood of confusion. See e.g., RE/MAX of Am., Inc., v. Realty Mart, Inc. 207 USPQ 960, 964 (TTAB 1980); Molenaar, Inc. v. Happy Toys Inc., 188 USPQ 469 (TTAB 1975); In re Cresco Mfg. Co., 138 USPQ 401 (TTAB 1963); In re Energy Telecommunications & Electrical Association, 222 USPQ 350 (TTAB 1983). TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv). 

 

This is especially true considering, (as more fully explained below) that the respective goods are deemed to be highly related, if not identical, found in the same channels of trade, and marketed to the same consumers.  The courts have consistently and repeatedly found that where the goods of an applicant and registrant are “similar in kind and/or closely related,” the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as in the case of diverse goods.  See, In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987); Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1242, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TMEP §1207.01(b).  In sum, the examining attorney finds that applicant’s proposed mark so resembles the registered mark in relation to sound, appearance, and meaning that confusion as to source is likely.

 

Comparison of the Respective Goods

The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).  It is well settled that the compared products and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

If the marks of the respective parties are identical or highly similar, the relationship between the goods of the respective parties need not be as close to support a finding of likelihood of confusion as might apply where differences exist between the marks. In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001); Amcor, Inc. v. Amcor Industries, Inc., 210 USPQ 70, 78 (TTAB 1981); TMEP §1207.01(a).  In addition, the Office must also consider any goods or services in the registrant’s normal fields of expansion in order to determine whether the registrant’s goods are related to the applicant’s identified goods for purposes of analysis under Section 2(d).  In re General Motors Corp., 196 USPQ 574 (TTAB 1977).  The test is whether purchasers would believe the product is within the registrant’s logical zone of expansion.  CPG Prods. Corp. v. Perceptual Play, Inc., 221 USPQ 88 (TTAB 1983); TMEP §1207.01(a)(v).

 

The examining attorney refuses registration of the mark YIGATI because the channels of trade in which the applicant’s goods travel are similar to those used by the registrant.  The applicant’s goods are identified as:

Dress pants; Dress shields; Dress shirts; Dress straps; Dress suits; Dresses; Jeans; Pants; Shirts; A-shirts; Blue jeans; Body shirts; Bridesmaid dresses; Camouflage shirts; Dance pants; Evening dresses; Fishing shirts; Gym pants; Hunting pants; Nurse dresses; Over shirts; Polo shirts; Sleep pants; Sport shirts; Sports pants; Sports shirts; Stretch pants; Sweat shirts; T-shirts; Wedding dresses; Wind pants; Yoga pants; Yoga shirts.

 

The goods named in the registration comprise:

Brassieres; Clothing, namely, folk costumes; Dresses for babies, children, women; Maternity sleepwear; Outerwear, namely, coats, hats, gloves; Pajamas; Pockets for clothing; Shirts; Shoes; Skirts; Socks; Sports jackets; Sports jerseys; Suits; Sweaters; Swimsuits; Trousers; Underwear. 

 

When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

Absent restrictions in an application or registration, the identified goods are presumed “travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  In this case, the identifications set forth in the application and registration have no restrictions as to their nature, type, channel of trade or class of purchasers.  Therefore, it is presumed that these goods travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.

 

As an initial matter, the wording “shirts” in the applicant’s proposed mark is identical to the “shirts” wording in the cited registration(s) and neither identification has any restriction as to the nature, type, channel of trade, or class of purchaser for these clothing articles.  Therefore, it is presumed that these shirts travel in all normal channels of trade, and are available to the same class of purchasers.  See Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d 1046, 1053, 103 USPQ2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  Accordingly, the shirts of the applicant and the registrant, are, by definition, related for purposes of the likelihood of confusion analysis.

 

In addition, it is noted that unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods and/or services of the type described.  See In re Jump Designs, LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006) (citing In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981)).  In this case, the registrant uses broad wording (dresses for babies, children, women; suits; shirts, trousers) in its identification of goods.  Therefore, the case law requires that the Office presume this broad wording encompasses all kinds of shirts, all kinds of suits, all kinds of trousers or pants[1] as well as all kinds of dresses for babies, children and women—including the dress pants, dress shirts, dress suits, dresses, jeans, pants, shirts, a-shirts, blue jeans, body shirts, bridesmaid dresses, camouflage shirts, dance pants, evening dresses, fishing shirts, gym pants, hunting pants, nurse dresses, over shirts, polo shirts, sleep pants, sport shirts, sports pants, sports shirts, stretch pants, sweat shirts, t-shirts, wedding dresses, wind pants, yoga pants, and yoga shirts specifically identified in the applicant’s more narrow identification. See, e.g., Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015); In re N.A.D., Inc., 57 USPQ2d 1872, 1874 (TTAB 2000).  Accordingly, the examining attorney must find the respective clothing goods are highly related, if not identical, found in the same channels of trade and marketed to the same consumers.  As such, they are considered related for purposes of likelihood of confusion analysis.

 

In sum, given the similarity between the respective marks when viewed in light of the relatedness between the respective clothing goods as well as the similarity between the channels of trade for such goods, it is likely that consumers will be confused as to the ultimate source of these products and associate the registered mark with the applicant’s proposed mark.  Accordingly, the examining attorney refuses registration of the applicant’s proposed mark pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

Although the examining attorney has refused registration, the applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

II.        INFORMALITIES

 

If the applicant chooses to respond to the refusal to register, the applicant must also respond to the following issue(s):

 

Application Refused—Applicant Failed to Identify the Name of the Person Who Signed the Application

The name of the person signing the application has not been identified.  In the initial application, the applicant’s name is Xiamen Youjing E-commerce Co., Ltd., and the application was electronically signed as /Xiamen Youjing E-commerce Co., Ltd./.  In the “signatory’s name” section of the application, the applicant indicated that the name of the person who signed the application was Xiamen Youjing E-commerce Co., Ltd.  While the applicant can be a limited liability company named Xiamen Youjing E-commerce Co., Ltd., an individual person cannot.  As such, the application cannot be deemed to have been properly signed. TMEP §804.04.

 

The name of the person who signs a document submitted in connection with an application must be set forth in printed or typed form immediately below or adjacent to the signature, or identified elsewhere in the filing (e.g., in a cover letter or other document that accompanies the filing). 37 C.F.R. §2.193(d).  Where the name of the person who signed the application is not set forth in the initial application, the applicant, in its response, must indicate for the record the name of the specific individual who signed this application. TMEP §804.04.

 

Application Refused—Applicant Must be Represented by a U.S. Licensed Attorney

The application record indicates that the applicant’s domicile is outside of the United States, specifically, it appears to be in China, but no attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a U.S. State or territory has been appointed to represent the applicant in this matter.

 

An applicant whose domicile is located outside of the United States or its territories is foreign-domiciled and must be represented at the USPTO by an attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a U.S. state or territory.  37 C.F.R. §§2.11(a), 11.14; Requirement of U.S.-Licensed Attorney for Foreign-Domiciled Trademark Applicants & Registrants, Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A. (Rev. Sept. 2019)  An individual applicant’s domicile is the place a person resides and intends to be the person’s principal home.  37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.  A juristic entity’s domicile is the principal place of business; i.e., headquarters, where a juristic entity applicant’s senior executives or officers ordinarily direct and control the entity’s activities.  37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.  Because the applicant is foreign-domiciled, the applicant must appoint such a U.S.-licensed attorney qualified to practice under 37 C.F.R. §11.14 as its representative before the application may proceed to registration.  37 C.F.R. §2.11(a).  Please Note:  This application will not proceed to registration without such representation by a U.S.-licensed attorney.  See id.  See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.

 

Any appointed U.S.-licensed attorney must provide the following bar information: (1) his or her bar membership number, if the bar provides one; (2) the name of the U.S. state, commonwealth, or territory of his or her bar membership; and (3) the year of his or her admission to the bar.  37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(3).  This information is required for all U.S.-licensed attorneys who are representing trademark applicants at the USPTO.  Id.  If the attorney’s bar does not issue bar membership numbers, applicant must state this for the record.  See id.

 

In addition, the applicant’s appointed attorney must provide the following statement:  “I am an attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of a U.S. state (including the District of Columbia and any U.S. Commonwealth or territory).”  See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(3).  This is required for all U.S.-licensed attorneys who are representing trademark applicants at the USPTO.  Id.

 

To appoint or designate a U.S.-licensed attorney.  To appoint an attorney, applicant should submit a completed Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Revocation, Appointment, and/or Change of Address of Attorney/Domestic Representative form.  The newly-appointed attorney must submit a TEAS Response to Examining Attorney Office Action form indicating that an appointment of attorney has been made and address all other refusals or requirements in this action, if any.  Alternatively, if applicant retains an attorney before filing the response, the attorney can respond to this Office action by using the appropriate TEAS response form and provide his or her attorney information in the form and sign it as applicant’s attorney.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(1)(ii).

 

Application Refused—Requirement Concerning the Meaning of the Wording in the Mark

The applicant must specify whether “YIGATI” in the mark has any meaning in a foreign language.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(9); TMEP §§809, 814.  An applicant must submit an English translation of all foreign wording in a mark.  37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(9); TMEP §809. 

 

Accordingly, if the wording has a meaning in a foreign language, the applicant should provide the following translation statement:

 

The English translation of the word “YIGATI” in the mark is _________ [applicant must provide English translation if applicable]. 

 

TMEP §809.03.

 

Alternatively, if the wording does not have a meaning in a foreign language, the applicant should provide the following statement: 

 

The wording “YIGATI” has no meaning in a foreign language. 

 

Id.

 

Please Note:  Failure to comply with a request for information is grounds for refusing registration.  In re Harley, 119 USPQ2d 1755, 1757-58 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §814.  Merely stating that information about the goods or services is available on applicant’s website is an insufficient response and will not make the relevant information of record.  See In re Planalytics, Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1453, 1457-58 (TTAB 2004).

 

Applicant’s Response

There is no required format or form for responding to an Office action.  For this application to proceed further, the applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement raised in this Office action.  If the action includes a refusal, the applicant may provide arguments and/or evidence as to why the refusal should be withdrawn and the mark should register.  The applicant may also have other options specified in this Office action for responding to a refusal and should consider those options carefully.  To respond to requirements and certain refusal response options, the applicant should set forth in writing the required changes or statements.  For more information and general tips on responding to USPTO Office actions, response options, and how to file a response online, Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” on the USPTO’s website.

 

If the applicant does not respond to this Office action within six months of the issue/mailing date, or responds by expressly abandoning the application, the application process will end and the trademark will fail to register.  See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.65(a), 2.68(a); TMEP §§718.01, 718.02.  Additionally, the USPTO will not refund the application filing fee, which is a required processing fee.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(i)-(iv), 2.209(a); TMEP §405.04.

 

When an application has abandoned for failure to respond to an Office action, an applicant may timely file a petition to revive the application, which, if granted, would allow the application to return to active status.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.66; TMEP §1714.  The petition must be filed within two months of the date of issuance of the notice of abandonment and may be filed online via the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) with a $100 fee.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(15)(ii), 2.66(a)(1), (b)(1)

 

Responses to Office actions must be properly signed.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(b), 2.193(e)(2); TMEP §§712, 712.01.  If an applicant is not represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant (e.g., a corporate officer or general partner).  See 37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(2)(ii); TMEP §§611.03(b), 611.06(b)-(h), 712.01.  In the case of joint applicants, all must sign.  37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(2)(ii); TMEP §611.06(a). 

 

If an applicant is represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney authorized to practice before the USPTO, the attorney must sign the response.  37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(2)(i); TMEP §§611.03(b), 712.01.  The only attorneys who may sign responses are (1) attorneys in good standing with a bar of the highest court of any U.S. state or territory, or (2) Canadian trademark attorneys or agents reciprocally recognized by the USPTO’s Office of Enrollment and Discipline (OED) who are appointed in connection with a U.S.-licensed attorney.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(a), 11.14(a), (c), (e).  Foreign attorneys, other than recognized Canadian trademark attorneys or agents, do not have authority to sign responses.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(e), 11.14(c)(1), (e).  If an applicant is initially represented by an attorney, and then later retains another U.S.-licensed attorney from a different firm, the newly retained attorney may not sign responses until the applicant files a new power and/or revocation of attorney.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.18(a)(7); TMEP §604.03.

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  If the applicant has technical questions about the TEAS response to Office action form, applicant can review the electronic filing tips available online at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/eFilingTips.htm and email technical questions to TEAS@uspto.gov.

 

If the applicant or its appointed attorney has any questions or needs assistance in responding to this Office action, please telephone the assigned examining attorney.

 

/Michael Tanner/

Michael Tanner

Trademark Attorney

Law Office 119

Telephone: 571-272-9706

Email: Michael.Tanner@uspto.gov

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action  

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.