Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  October 02, 2019

 

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

• Refusal – Section 2(d) Likelihood of Confusion
• Refusal – Section 2(e)(4) Primarily Merely a Surname
• Refusal – Specimen of Use
• Requirement – Clarification of Entity and Citizenship
• Requirement – Consent of Living Individual
• Requirement – Disclaimer
• Requirement – Identification of Services; Classification
• Advisory – Multi-Class Application Requirements

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 1077817 (HIRSCH and Design).  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In this instance, applicant’s mark HIRSCH GIFT creates the same commercial impression as registrant’s mark HIRSCH and Design.  Both marks contain the identical distinctive element HIRSCH.  The additional elements in each mark do not obviate the overall similarity of sound, meaning, and commercial impression.  As set forth in more detail below, the word “GIFT” in applicant’s mark is generic in the context of applicant’s services.  The design element in the registered mark does not transform the overall commercial impression of the mark; the word portion HIRSCH is the dominant element in registrant’s mark.  The identical and dominant term HIRSCH appearing in both marks creates a likelihood of confusion.

 

Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant in relation to other wording in a mark.  See Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1816, 1824-25 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1342-43, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).

 

In the present case, the attached evidence from the American Heritage Dictionary and applicant’s website shows that the wording GIFT in the applied-for mark is generic for applicant’s services.  Thus, this wording is less significant in terms of affecting the mark’s commercial impression, and renders the wording HIRSCH the more dominant element of the mark.

 

When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).  In this case, HIRSCH is the dominant element of the registered mark.

 

Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  Here, the identical term HIRSCH appears in both marks, making confusion likely.

 

Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar, and consumers encountering the marks in the same commercial channels are likely to confuse the marks or at least mistake the underlying sources of closely-related goods and/or services provided under the marks. 

 

Relatedness of the Goods and Services

 

The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

Applicant seeks to register the mark HIRSCH GIFT in standard characters for “On-line wholesale and retail store services featuring promotional products and imprinting services” in Class 35.

 

Registration No. 1077817 is for the mark HIRSCH and Design for “wrist watch straps” in Class 14.

 

Wrist watch straps are complementary to and related to wholesale, retail, and imprinting services.  Wrist watch straps, and watches themselves, are goods that are custom printed and sold as promotional items, and are sold online at wholesale and retail.

 

The use of similar marks on or in connection with both products and retail-store services has been held likely to cause confusion where the evidence showed that the retail-store services featured the same type of products.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding the use of similar marks for various clothing items, including athletic uniforms, and for retail shops featuring sports team related clothing and apparel likely to cause confusion); In re House Beer, LLC, 114 USPQ2d 1073, 1078 (TTAB 2015) (holding the use of identical marks for beer and for retail store services featuring beer likely to cause confusion); In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d 1021, 1023 (TTAB 2006) (holding the use of similar marks for jewelry and for retail-jewelry and mineral-store services likely to cause confusion); TMEP §1207.01(a)(ii).

 

The attached Internet evidence, consisting of screenshots from applicant’s website, as well as third party retailers 4imprint USA, AnyPromo, and SMI Awards who provide online retail store services in connection with promotional items, as well as custom printing of promotional items, establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant goods and/or services and markets the goods and/or services under the same mark, the relevant goods and/or services are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use, and the goods and/or services are similar or complementary in terms of purpose or function.  Specifically, the same entities commonly provide both retail and wholesale services in connection with promotional items, custom printing of promotional items, which includes watches and watch bands.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Therefore, upon encountering HIRSCH GIFT used in connection with on-line wholesale and retail store services featuring promotional products and imprinting services, and HIRSCH and Design used in connection with wrist watch straps, consumers are likely to be confused and mistakenly believe that the respective goods and/or services emanate from a common source.

 

Thus, the mark is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  However, if applicant responds to the refusal(s), applicant must also respond to the requirement(s) set forth below.

 

Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.

 

SECTION 2(e)(4) REFUSAL – PRIMARILY MERELY A SURNAME

 

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark is primarily merely a surname.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(4), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(4); see TMEP §1211. 

 

An applicant’s mark is primarily merely a surname if the surname, when viewed in connection with the applicant’s recited goods and/or services, “‘is the primary significance of the mark as a whole to the purchasing public.’”  Earnhardt v. Kerry Earnhardt, Inc., 864 F.3d 1374, 1377, 123 USPQ2d 1411, 1413 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Hutchinson Tech. Inc., 852 F.2d 552, 554, 7 USPQ2d 1490, 1492 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); TMEP §1211.01.

 

The following five inquiries are often used to determine the public’s perception of a term’s primary significance:

 

(1)       Whether the surname is rare;

 

(2)       Whether anyone connected with applicant uses the term as a surname;

 

(3)       Whether the term has any recognized meaning other than as a surname;

 

(4)       Whether the term has the structure and pronunciation of a surname; and

 

(5)       Whether the term is sufficiently stylized to remove its primary significance from that of a surname.

 

In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1276, 1278 & n.2, 1282-83 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Benthin Mgmt. GmbH, 37 USPQ2d 1332, 1333-34 (TTAB 1995) for the Benthin inquiries/factors); TMEP §1211.01; see also In re Etablissements Darty et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 16-18, 225 USPQ 652, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 

 

These inquiries are not exclusive, and any of these circumstances – singly or in combination – and any other relevant circumstances may be considered when making this determination.  In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d at 1277-78; TMEP §1211.01.  For example, when the applied-for mark is not stylized, it is unnecessary to consider the fifth inquiry.  In re Yeley, 85 USPQ2d 1150, 1151 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1211.01.

 

Combining a surname with a term that is merely descriptive, primarily geographically descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive, or generic of an applicant’s goods and/or services typically does not “detract from the primary surname significance” of the mark.  Azeka Bldg. Corp. v. Azeka, 122 USPQ2d 1477, 1481-82, 1481 n.9 (TTAB 2017) (construing In re Hutchinson Tech. Inc., 852 F.2d 552, 554, 7 USPQ2d 1490, 1492-93 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see TMEP §1211.01(b)(vi). 

 

Specifically, the term GIFT in the applied-for mark HIRSCH GIFT is generic, and when combined with the surname does not create a separate, distinct commercial impression.  As shown in the attached dictionary entry from the American Heritage Dictionary the term GIFT is defined as “something that is bestowed voluntarily” or “to present something as a gift to: gifted his niece with a watch.”  As shown in the attached screenshot from applicant’s website, “gifts” are the subject of applicant’s services.  A term that is generic for a type of goods is generic for the service of selling primarily those goods.  TMEP §1209.03(r).

 

Please see the attached evidence from the LEXINEXIS® surname database, 411.com, and HowManyOfMe, establishing the surname significance of HIRSCH.  This evidence shows the HIRSCH appearing 33,484 times as a surname in the LEXISNEXIS® surname database, appearing 45,214 times in 411.com, and appearing 20,644 as a surname on the website HowManyOfMe.com. 

 

Further, HIRSCH is the surname of either the applicant (if an individual) or the president of applicant (if a corporation), Peter Hirsch, as evidenced by the owner name in the application record, as well as by the attached news story from the website of Advertising Specialty Institute entitled “Bess Cohn Humanitarian Of The Year Award 2018: Peter Hirsch, Hirsch Gift.”

 

Additionally, HIRSCH does not have a recognized meaning or significance other than as a surname.  Evidence that a term has no recognized meaning or significance other than as a surname is relevant to determining whether the term would be perceived as primarily merely a surname.  See In re Weiss Watch Co., 123 USPQ2d 1200, 1203 (TTAB 2017); In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1276, 1280 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §1211.02(b)(vi).  The attached evidence from the Merriam-Webster Dictionary shows that HIRSCH does not appear in the dictionary.  Thus, this term appears to have no recognized meaning or significance other than as a surname. 

 

Finally, the applied-for mark HIRSCH GIFT has no stylization to remove its primary significance from that of a surname.

 

“There is no rule as to the kind or amount of evidence necessary to show that [a] mark would be perceived as primarily merely a surname.”  In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1276, 1278 (TTAB 2016); see TMEP §1211.01.  Each case is decided on its own facts, based on the evidence of record.  TMEP §1211.01; see In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d at 1278 (citing In re Etablissements Darty et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 17, 225 USPQ 652, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 

 

The following are examples of evidence that is generally considered to be relevant to such a determination:  telephone directory listings, excerpted listings and articles from computerized research databases, applicant’s website, evidence in the application record showing the term used as a surname, the manner of use on specimens, dictionary definitions of the term and evidence from dictionaries showing no definition of the term.  See TMEP §1211.02(b)(i)-(b)(iii), (b)(v)-(b)(vi).

 

Here, the evidence of surname significance of HIRSCH, the evidence that HIRSCH is the surname of an individual connected to applicant, the absence of a recognized meaning or significance in English associated with the term HIRSCH, and the lack of any distinctive matter in the applied-for mark to change the significance of HIRSCH GIFT from that of merely a surname, in total and on balance, favors the determination that HIRSCH GIFT would be perceived as primarily merely a surname.

 

Therefore, because HIRSCH GIFT is primarily merely a surname, registration is refused pursuant to §2(e)(4) of the Trademark Act.

 

Response Options – Section 2(e)(4) Surname Refusal

 

A mark deemed primarily merely a surname may be registered on the Principal Register under Trademark Act Section 2(f) based on a claim of acquired distinctiveness.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(f); 37 C.F.R. §2.41(a); TMEP §§1211, 1212.  Applicant may respond by asserting a claim of acquired distinctiveness based on one or more of the following:

 

(1)       Prior Registrations:  Applicant may claim ownership of one or more active prior registrations on the Principal Register of the same mark for goods and/or services that are sufficiently similar to those named in the pending application.  37 C.F.R. §2.41(a)(1); TMEP §§1212, 1212.04.  Applicant may do so by submitting the following statement, if accurate:  “The mark has become distinctive of the goods and/or services as evidenced by the ownership of active U.S. Registration No(s).                 on the Principal Register for the same mark for sufficiently similar goods and/or services.”  TMEP §1212.04(e).

 

(2)       Five Years’ Use:  Applicant may submit the following statement, verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20:  “The mark has become distinctive of the goods and/or services through the applicant’s substantially exclusive and continuous use of the mark in commerce that the U.S. Congress may lawfully regulate for at least the five years immediately before the date of this statement.”  37 C.F.R. §2.41(a)(2); TMEP §1212.05(d); see 37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(1).

 

(3)       Other Evidence:  Applicant may submit other evidence of acquired distinctiveness, with the following statement, if accurate:  “The evidence shows that the mark has become distinctive of the goods and/or services.”  37 C.F.R. §2.41(a)(3); TMEP §1212.06.  Such additional evidence may include “advertising expenditures, sales success, length and exclusivity of use, unsolicited media coverage, and consumer studies (linking the name to a source).”  In re Change Wind Corp., 123 USPQ2d 1453, 1467 (TTAB 2017) (quoting In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1300, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 

 

If applicant cannot satisfy one of the above, applicant may respond by amending the application to seek registration on the Supplemental Register.  See 15 U.S.C. §1091; 37 C.F.R. §§2.47, 2.75(a).

 

Applicant is advised that these response options will not obviate the refusal based on Section 2(d) set forth in the section above.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  However, if applicant responds to the refusal(s), applicant must also respond to the requirement(s) set forth below.

 

Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.

 

SPECIMEN OF USE

 

Registration is refused because the specimen does not show the applied-for mark in use in commerce in connection with any of the services specified in International Class 35 in the application or amendment to allege use.  Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); In re Keep A Breast Found., 123 USPQ2d 1869, 1876-79 (TTAB 2017); In re Graystone Consulting Assocs., Inc., 115 USPQ2d 2035, 2037-38 (TTAB 2015); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a), 1301.04(d), (g)(i).  Specifically, applicant’s specimen is the cover of a printed catalog from 2002.  This material does not reference or show a connection to the applied-for services of online wholesale or online retail services, or to imprinting services.

 

An application based on Trademark Act Section 1(a) must include a specimen showing the applied-for mark in use in commerce for each international class of goods and/or services identified in the application or amendment to allege use.  15 U.S.C. §1051(a)(1); 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a). 

 

Examples of specimens for services include advertising and marketing materials, brochures, photographs of business signage and billboards, and webpages that show the mark used in the actual sale, rendering, or advertising of the services.  See TMEP §1301.04(a), (h)(iv)(C).  Specimens comprising advertising and promotional materials must show a direct association between the mark and the services.  TMEP §1301.04(f)(ii).

 

Applicant may respond to this refusal by satisfying one of the following for each applicable international class:

 

(1)       Submit a different specimen (a verified “substitute” specimen) that (a) was in actual use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of an amendment to allege use and (b) shows the mark in actual use in commerce for the goods and/or services identified in the application or amendment to allege use.  A “verified substitute specimen” is a specimen that is accompanied by the following statement made in a signed affidavit or supported by a declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20:  “The substitute (or new, or originally submitted, if appropriate) specimen(s) was/were in use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of the amendment to allege use.”  The substitute specimen cannot be accepted without this statement.

 

(2)       Amend the filing basis to intent to use under Section 1(b), for which no specimen is required.  This option will later necessitate additional fee(s) and filing requirements such as providing a specimen.

 

For an overview of both response options referenced above and instructions on how to satisfy either option online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, please go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/law/specimen.jsp.

 

ENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP

 

The name of an individual person appears in the section of the application intended for the trademark owner’s name; however, the legal entity is set forth as a corporation.  Applicant must clarify this inconsistency.  TMEP §803.02(a); see 37 C.F.R. §§2.32(a)(2), (a)(3)(i)-(ii), 2.61(b).

 

If applicant is an individual, applicant must request that the legal entity be amended to “individual” and must indicate his or her country of citizenship.  See TMEP §803.03(a).  Alternatively, if applicant is a corporation, applicant must provide the legal name of the corporation and U.S. state or foreign country of incorporation or organization.  See TMEP §803.03(c).

 

If, in response to the above request, applicant provides information indicating that it is not the owner of the mark, registration will be refused because the application was void as filed.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(d); TMEP §§803.06, 1201.02(b).  An application must be filed by the party who owns or is entitled to use the mark as of the application filing date.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(d); TMEP §1201.02(b).

 

CONSENT OF LIVING INDIVIDUAL

 

The applied-for mark includes the name of the following individual applicant:  “Peter Hirsch.”  However, this individual did not sign the application and the application does not include a written consent personally signed by this individual.  To register a mark that consists of or comprises the name of a particular living individual, including a first name, pseudonym, stage name, or nickname, an applicant must provide a written consent personally signed by the named individual.  15 U.S.C. §1052(c); TMEP §§813, 1206.04(a).  Consent to registration is presumed only when the particular individual identified in the mark is also the person who signed the application.  Alford Mfg. Co. v. Alfred Elecs., 137 USPQ 250, 250 (TTAB 1963), aff’d, 333 F.3d 912, 142 USPQ 168 (C.C.P.A. 1964); TMEP §1206.04(b). 

 

Because the individual named in the mark did not sign the application and the application did not include a proper written consent, applicant must provide a statement that the name in the mark identifies a particular living individual and a written consent to register the name.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(c); TMEP §§813.01(a)-(b), 1206.04(a), 1206.05. 

 

Accordingly, applicant must submit both of the following: 

 

(1)       The following statement:  “The name shown in the mark identifies a living individual whose consent to register is made of record.” 

 

(2)       A written consent, personally signed by the named individual, as follows:  “I, Peter Hirsch, consent to the use and registration of my name, Hirsch, as a trademark and/or service mark with the USPTO.”

 

For an overview of the requirements pertaining to names appearing in marks, and instructions on how to satisfy this requirement online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) response form, please go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/law/consent.jsp.

 

DISCLAIMER REQUIRED

 

Applicant must provide a disclaimer of the unregistrable part(s) of the applied-for mark even though the mark as a whole appears to be registrable.  See 15 U.S.C. §1056(a); TMEP §§1213, 1213.03(a).  A disclaimer of an unregistrable part of a mark will not affect the mark’s appearance.  See Schwarzkopf v. John H. Breck, Inc., 340 F.2d 978, 979-80, 144 USPQ 433, 433 (C.C.P.A. 1965).

 

In this case, applicant must disclaim the wording “GIFT” because it is not inherently distinctive.  These unregistrable term(s) at best are merely descriptive of an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of applicant’s goods and/or services.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1251, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1755 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §§1213, 1213.03(a). 

 

The attached evidence from the American Heritage Dictionary shows this wording is defined as “something that is bestowed voluntarily” or “to present something as a gift to: gifted his niece with a watch.”  Thus, the wording merely describes applicant’s services because “gifts” are the subject of applicant’s retail, wholesale, and imprinting services.  See the attached screenshot from applicant’s website.

 

A term that is generic for a type of goods has been held generic for the service of selling primarily those goods.  See In re Tires, Tires, Tires, Inc., 94 USPQ2d 1153, (TTAB 2009) (holding TIRES TIRES TIRES generic for retail tire store services); In re A La Vieille Russie, Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1895 (TTAB 2001) (holding RUSSIANART generic for art dealership services in the field of Russian art); In re Log Cabin Homes Ltd., 52 USPQ2d 1206 (TTAB 1999) (holding LOG CABIN HOMES generic for architectural design of buildings and retail outlets featuring kits for constructing buildings, especially houses); In re Bonni Keller Collections Ltd., 6 USPQ2d 1224 (TTAB 1987) (holding LA LINGERIE generic for retail store services featuring clothing); In re Wickerware, Inc., 227 USPQ 970 (TTAB 1985) (holding WICKERWARE generic for mail order and distributorship services featuring products made of wicker); In re Half Price Books, Records, Magazines, Inc., 225 USPQ 219 (TTAB 1984) (holding HALF PRICE BOOKS RECORDS MAGAZINES generic for retail book and record store services); TMEP §1209.03(r).

 

Applicant may respond to this issue by submitting a disclaimer in the following format: 

 

No claim is made to the exclusive right to use “GIFT” apart from the mark as shown. 

 

For an overview of disclaimers and instructions on how to satisfy this issue using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), see the Disclaimer webpage. 

 

IDENTIFICATION OF SERVICES; CLASSIFICATION

 

The identification for “On-line wholesale and retail store services featuring promotional products” in International Class 35 is indefinite and must be clarified to further specify “promotional products.”  “Promotional products” is indefinite and overly broad and must be amended to identify these goods with more specificity, such as “clothing, beverageware, pens.” 

 

The identification for “imprinting services” is indefinite and overly broad, and does not clearly identify the nature of these services.  Applicant may amend this wording to “printing services” and/or “Imprinting services, namely, customized printing of company names and logos for promotional and advertising purposes on the goods of others,” if accurate.  Additionally, applicant has classified these services in International Class 35; however, the proper classification is International Class 40. 

 

Applicant may adopt the following wording and classification, if accurate:

 

Class 35:         On-line wholesale and retail store services featuring promotional products, namely {identify promotional products, e.g., clothing, beverageware, pens, etc.}

 

Class 40:        Printing services; Imprinting services, namely, customized printing of company names and logos for promotional and advertising purposes on the goods of others

 

If applicant adds one or more international classes to the application, applicant must comply with the multiple-class requirements specified in this Office action.

 

Applicant may amend the identification to clarify or limit the goods and/or services, but not to broaden or expand the goods and/or services beyond those in the original application or as acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Generally, any deleted goods and/or services may not later be reinserted.  See TMEP §1402.07(e).

 

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual.  See TMEP §1402.04.

 

MULTIPLE-CLASS APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS

 

The application references goods and/or services based on use in commerce in more than one international class; therefore, applicant must satisfy all the requirements below for each international class:

 

(1)       List the goods and/or services by their international class number in consecutive numerical order, starting with the lowest numbered class (for example, International Class 3: perfume; International Class 18: cosmetic bags sold empty).

 

(2)       Submit a filing fee for each international class not covered by the fee(s) already paid (view the USPTO’s current fee schedule).  Specifically, the application identifies goods and/or services based on use in commerce that are classified in at least two classes; however, applicant submitted a fee(s) sufficient for only one class(es).  Applicant must either (a) submit the filing fees for the classes not covered by the submitted fees or (b) restrict the application to the number of classes covered by the fees already paid.

 

(3)       Submit verified dates of first use of the mark anywhere and in commerce for each international class.  See more information about verified dates of use.

 

(4)       Submit a specimen for each international class.  The current specimen is not acceptable for any international class.  See more information about specimens.

 

            Examples of specimens for services include advertising and marketing materials, brochures, photographs of business signage and billboards, and website printouts that show the mark used in the actual sale, rendering, or advertising of the services.  

 

(5)       Submit a verified statement that “The specimen was in use in commerce on or in connection with the goods and/or services listed in the application at least as early as the filing date of the application.”  See more information about verification.

 

See 15 U.S.C. §§1051(a), 1112; 37 C.F.R. §§2.32(a)(6)-(7), 2.34(a)(1), 2.86(a); TMEP §§904, 1403.01, 1403.02(c).

 

See an overview of the requirements for a Section 1(a) multiple-class application and how to satisfy the requirements online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form.

 

The fee for adding classes to a TEAS Reduced Fee (RF) application is $275 per class.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(iii), 2.23(a).  See more information regarding the requirements for maintaining the lower TEAS RF fee and, if these requirements are not satisfied, for adding classes at a higher fee using regular TEAS.

 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action  

 

 

/Alina Morris/

Examining Attorney, Law Office 117

United States Patent and Trademark Office

571-272-2256

alina.morris@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on October 02, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88507480

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Alina Morris/

Examining Attorney, Law Office 117

United States Patent and Trademark Office

571-272-2256

alina.morris@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from October 02, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond.

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”