To: | Aya Healthcare, Inc. (docketing@procopio.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88501714 - SHIFTS - 12275704US01 |
Sent: | September 25, 2019 11:23:06 AM |
Sent As: | ecom115@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88501714
Mark: SHIFTS
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Correspondence Address: PROCOPIO, CORY, HARGREAVES & SAVITCH LLP
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Applicant: Aya Healthcare, Inc.
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Reference/Docket No. 12275704US01
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: September 25, 2019
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
INTRODUCTION
PRIOR PENDING APPLICATION NOTED
In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the mark in the referenced application. Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.
LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION REFUSAL
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 5397349 and 5859159. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the enclosed registrations.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods and/or services, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods and/or services. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Applicant seeks to register the mark SHIFTS for “Downloadable computer software for per diem and temporary staffing in the field of healthcare; downloadable computer software for arrangement of booking of housing and travel” and “Employment agency services, namely, providing per diem and temporary healthcare staffing services” and “Non-downloadable computer software for per diem and temporary staffing in the field of healthcare; providing temporary use of online non-downloadable software for searching open job postings for per diem and temporary staffing in the field of healthcare.”
The first registrant has registered the mark SHYFT for “Computer application software for mobile phones, namely, software for facilitating the exchange and management of work days and work shifts.”
The second registrant has registered the mark SHIFT.ORG for “Cloud computing featuring software for use of a pipeline to hire military veterans.”
Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Although not identical, the marks at issue are highly similar.
Applicant’s mark is SHIFTS and the first registrants’ mark is SHYFT. Applicant’s mark is essentially the plural form and correct spelling of the registered mark. Further, the marks are essentially phonetic equivalents and thus sound similar. Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).
Applicant’s mark SHIFTS is also highly similar to the second registrant’s mark SHIFT.ORG. Applicant has essentially adopted the plural form of the second registrant’s mark and merely deleted the generic top level domain.
Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar. See In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1058, 224 USPQ at 751.
Comparison of the Goods and/or Services
The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
The respective goods and/or services need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); Gen. Mills Inc. v. Fage Dairy Processing Indus. SA, 100 USPQ2d 1584, 1597 (TTAB 2011); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
Here, the goods and services are closely related. Here, both applicant and registrants identify employee staffing software.
The examining attorney also relies on the identification of goods and/or services in the present application to show relatedness of registrants’ goods and/or services to applicant’s goods and services. Applicant itself identifies employment staffing software goods and services together with employment agency services. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Board erred in finding that there was insufficient evidence of relatedness, “because the Board did not consider the important evidence already before it, namely the ITU application and [opposer’s multiple] registrations”). See TMEP §1207.01(a)(vi).
Conclusion
Because the marks are highly similar and the goods and services are closely related, consumers are likely to be confused as to the source of applicant’s goods and services. Accordingly, registration must be refused under Section 2(d).
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.
DESCRIPTIVENESS REFUSAL
Registration is refused because the applied-for mark merely describes a feature of applicant’s goods and services. Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); see TMEP §§1209.01(b), 1209.03 et seq.
A mark is merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of an applicant’s goods and/or services. TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1251, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1755 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920)).
“A mark may be merely descriptive even if it does not describe the ‘full scope and extent’ of the applicant’s goods or services.” In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1346, 57 USPQ2d 1807, 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); TMEP §1209.01(b). It is enough if a mark describes only one significant function, attribute, or property. In re The Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §1209.01(b); see In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d at 1173, 71 USPQ2d at 1371.
A mark does not need to be merely descriptive of all the goods or services specified in an application. In re The Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Franklin Cnty. Historical Soc'y, 104 USPQ2d 1085, 1089 (TTAB 2012). “A descriptiveness refusal is proper ‘if the mark is descriptive of any of the [goods or] services for which registration is sought.’” In re The Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d at 1300, 102 USPQ2d at 1219 (quoting In re Stereotaxis Inc., 429 F.3d 1039, 1040, 77 USPQ2d 1087, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
Applicant seeks to register the mark SHIFTS for “Downloadable computer software for per diem and temporary staffing in the field of healthcare; downloadable computer software for arrangement of booking of housing and travel,” and “Employment agency services, namely, providing per diem and temporary healthcare staffing services,” and “Non-downloadable computer software for per diem and temporary staffing in the field of healthcare; providing temporary use of online non-downloadable software for searching open job postings for per diem and temporary staffing in the field of healthcare.”
The wording “shift” is defined as “2. a. A group of workers that relieve another on a regular schedule. b. The working period of such a group: worked the night shift.” Please see attached dictionary definition from The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fifth Edition copyright ©2019.
In this case, the mark is descriptive of applicant’s goods and services and does not create a unique, incongruous, or nondescriptive meaning in relation to the goods and services. Specifically, the wording SHIFTS immediately informs consumers that the identified employment goods and services feature work shifts. The examining attorney relies on the above-referenced dictionary definition together with the specimens of use that state in relevant part, “…swipe left or right to accept the shifts that work for you!” and “We have immediate per diem (PRN) shifts available…You’ll make $250.00 per shift and you can pick up shifts as frequently as you’d like.”
For the foregoing reasons, the mark is merely descriptive of the identified goods and services. Accordingly, registration must be refused on the Principal Register under Section 2(e)(1). Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
Response Option: Supplemental Register
(1) Use of the registration symbol ® with the registered mark in connection with the designated goods and/or services, which provides public notice of the registration and potentially deters third parties from using confusingly similar marks.
(2) Inclusion of the registered mark in the USPTO’s database of registered and pending marks, which will (a) make it easier for third parties to find it in trademark search reports, (b) provide public notice of the registration, and thus (c) potentially deter third parties from using confusingly similar marks.
(3) Use of the registration by a USPTO trademark examining attorney as a bar to registering confusingly similar marks in applications filed by third parties.
(4) Use of the registration as a basis to bring suit for trademark infringement in federal court, which, although more costly than state court, means judges with more trademark experience, often faster adjudications, and the opportunity to seek an injunction, actual damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs.
(5) Use of the registration as a filing basis for a trademark application for registration in certain foreign countries, in accordance with international treaties.
See 15 U.S.C. §§1052(d), 1091, 1094; J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair Competition §§19:33, 19:37 (rev. 4th ed. Supp. 2017).
IDENTIFICATION OF THE SERVICES – CLASS 42
Applicant must clarify some of the wording in the identification of services in International Class 42 because it is indefinite and too broad. See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §§1402.01, 1402.03. This wording is indefinite because it does not make clear the exact nature of the services.
Wording in applicant’s proposed identification of services that should be deleted appears below in strikethrough. Additional suggested wording appears
in bolded italics. Please note that these forms of stylization are being used to
provide guidance in forming an acceptable amended identification; they should not be made part of any amendments offered by applicant in its response.
Applicant may adopt the following identification, if accurate:
“Providing temporary use of online non-downloadable computer software for per diem and temporary staffing in the field of healthcare; providing temporary use of online non-downloadable software for searching open job postings for per diem and temporary staffing in the field of healthcare;” in CLASS 42
For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual. See TMEP §1402.04.
For information on how to identify the goods and services in an application, applicant is encouraged to view the USPTO’s Trademark Information Network Video number 6, “Goods and services.”
CLOSING
For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
Do not respond via e-mail; e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. How to respond: Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action
Please telephone the undersigned with questions about this Office action.
/Tracy Fletcher/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 115
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
Direct Dial: 571-272-9471
tracy.fletcher@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE