Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  July 31, 2019

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

 

• Section 2(d) Likelihood of Confusion Refusal
• Section 2(e)(4) Surname Refusal
• Supplemental Register (Advisory)
• Disclaimer of Generic Matter When Filing an Amendment to Allege Use (AAU) and Amendment to the Supplemental Register (Advisory)
• Pro Se Applicant May Wish to Seek Trademark Counsel (Advisory)

 

Section 2(d) Likelihood of Confusion Refusal

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 1548714, 3014707 and 4725461.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In this case, applicant’s mark is GOODE DRIVE-THRU (standard character) for services listed as “Self-service restaurant services; Take-out restaurant services” in International Class 43.

Registrant, Good-Cook Inc., owns registrations for the following marks:

 

·       GOODE COMPANY (typed drawing) (U.S. Reg. No. 1548714) for services listed as “Restaurant services” in International Class 42; and

 

·       GOODE CO. RESTAURANTS (stylized) (U.S. Reg. No. 3014707) for services listed as “Restaurant services” in International Class 43; and

 

·       GOODE CO. (stylized) (U.S. Reg. No. 4725461) for services listed as “Restaurant and catering services” in International Class 43.

 

Analysis

 

Here, applicant’s mark and registrant’s marks share an identical dominant portion consisting of the first term “GOODE”. As such, the marks are confusingly similar in sound, appearance, connotation and commercial impression. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34).

 

Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).

 

Furthermore, the examining attorney points out that disclaimed matter, such as the wording “CO.”,“COMPANY” and “RESTAURANTS” in registrant’s marks, as well as descriptive matter that is subject to a disclaimer requirement, such as the term “DRIVE-THRU” in applicant’s mark, is properly accorded less weight in a Trademark Act Section 2(d) likelihood of confusion analysis than the dominant portion of a mark. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). [See requirement entitled “Disclaimer of Descriptive Wording” below].

 

Moreover, the examining attorney points out that a mark in typed or standard characters, such as the applied-for mark, may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii).  Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element, such as registrant’s marks in the instant case (U.S. Reg. Nos. 3014707 and 4725461) generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display.  See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).

 

Accordingly, applicant’s mark and registrant’s marks are sufficiently similar, such that consumer confusion in the marketplace is likely.

 

Comparison of the Services

 

The compared services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

In this case, registrant’s services listed as “Restaurant services” (U.S. Reg. Nos. 1548714, 3014707) and “Restaurant and catering services” (U.S. Reg. No. 4725461) encompass applicant’s services listed as “Self-service restaurant services; Take-out restaurant services” in International Class 43.

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

 

In this case, the registrations use broad wording to describe the services, which presumably encompasses all services of the type described, including applicant’s more narrow services.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Additionally, the services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are related.

 

Therefore, confusion is likely, as consumers would believe that both applicant’s services and registrant’s services emanate from a single source. Accordingly, registration is refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d).

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

Applicant should note the additional ground for refusal:

 

Section 2(e)(4) Surname Refusal

 

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark is primarily merely a surname.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(4), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(4); see TMEP §1211. 

 

An applicant’s mark is primarily merely a surname if the surname, when viewed in connection with the applicant’s recited services, “‘is the primary significance of the mark as a whole to the purchasing public.’”  Earnhardt v. Kerry Earnhardt, Inc., 864 F.3d 1374, 1377, 123 USPQ2d 1411, 1413 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Hutchinson Tech. Inc., 852 F.2d 552, 554, 7 USPQ2d 1490, 1492 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); TMEP §1211.01.

 

The following five inquiries are often used to determine the public’s perception of a term’s primary significance:

 

(1)       Whether the surname is rare;

 

(2)       Whether anyone connected with applicant uses the term as a surname;

 

(3)       Whether the term has any recognized meaning other than as a surname;

 

(4)       Whether the term has the structure and pronunciation of a surname; and

 

(5)       Whether the term is sufficiently stylized to remove its primary significance from that of a surname.

 

In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1276, 1278 & n.2, 1282-83 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Benthin Mgmt. GmbH, 37 USPQ2d 1332, 1333-34 (TTAB 1995) for the Benthin inquiries/factors); TMEP §1211.01; see also In re Etablissements Darty et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 16-18, 225 USPQ 652, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 

 

These inquiries are not exclusive, and any of these circumstances – singly or in combination – and any other relevant circumstances may be considered when making this determination.  In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d at 1277-78; TMEP §1211.01.  For example, when the applied-for mark is not stylized, it is unnecessary to consider the fifth inquiry.  In re Yeley, 85 USPQ2d 1150, 1151 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1211.01.

 

“There is no rule as to the kind or amount of evidence necessary to show that [a] mark would be perceived as primarily merely a surname.”  In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1276, 1278 (TTAB 2016); see TMEP §1211.01.  Each case is decided on its own facts, based on the evidence of record.  TMEP §1211.01; see In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d at 1278 (citing In re Etablissements Darty et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 17, 225 USPQ 652, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 

 

The following are examples of evidence that is generally considered to be relevant to such a determination:  telephone directory listings, excerpted listings and articles from computerized research databases, applicant’s website, evidence in the application record showing the term used as a surname, the manner of use on specimens, dictionary definitions of the term and evidence from dictionaries showing no definition of the term.  See TMEP §1211.02(b)(i)-(b)(iii), (b)(v)-(b)(vi).

 

Please see the attached evidence from the LEXISNEXIS® surname database, establishing the surname significance of “GOODE”.  This evidence shows the applied-for mark appearing 43,472 times as a surname in the LEXISNEXIS® surname database, which is a weekly updated directory of cell phone and other phone numbers (such as voice over IP) from various data providers.  As such, the surname GOODE is not considered rare.

 

In addition, the attached dictionary evidence from the online version of the Macmillan Dictionary, shows that the term “GOODE” does not appear to have any other meaning apart from its surname significance. Please see attached dictionary evidence.

 

Furthermore, the term “GOODE” is not sufficiently stylized to remove its primary significance from that of a surname, as the applied-for mark appears in standard characters.

 

Finally, the examining attorney points out that the combination of the surname “GOODE” with the merely generic terminology “DRIVE-THRU,” which is defined by Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary as “business (such as a bank or restaurant) that is designed so that customers can be served while remaining in their cars,” which merely denotes the type of restaurant applicant operates, is not sufficient to obviate a finding that the applied-for mark is primarily merely a surname, as said wording does not create a separate, distinct commercial impression apart from the surname significance imparted by “GOODE”. Please see attached dictionary evidence.

 

Combining a surname with a term that is merely descriptive, primarily geographically descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive, or generic of an applicant’s services typically does not “detract from the primary surname significance” of the mark.  Azeka Bldg. Corp. v. Azeka, 122 USPQ2d 1477, 1481-82, 1481 n.9 (TTAB 2017) (construing In re Hutchinson Tech. Inc., 852 F.2d 552, 554, 7 USPQ2d 1490, 1492-93 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see TMEP §1211.01(b)(vi). 

 

Accordingly, registration is refused on the Principal Register under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(4).

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Supplemental Register (Advisory)

 

Note: Applicant should note that although an amendment of the application to seek registration on the Supplemental Register may be sufficient to obviate a Trademark Act Section 2(e)(4) Surname refusal, such an amendment is not acceptable to obviate a Trademark Act Section 2(d) Likelihood of Confusion refusal.

 

A mark in an application under Trademark Act Section 1(b) is not eligible for registration on the Supplemental Register until an acceptable amendment to allege use under 37 C.F.R. §2.76 has been filed.  37 C.F.R. §§2.47(d), 2.75(b); TMEP §§815.02, 1102.03.  When a Section 1(b) application is successfully amended to the Supplemental Register, the application effective filing date will be the date applicant met the minimum filing requirements under 37 C.F.R. §2.76(c) for the amendment to allege use.  TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03; see 37 C.F.R. §2.75(b).

 

To amend an intent-to-use application under Trademark Act Section 1(b) to use in commerce, an applicant must file, prior to approval of the mark for publication, an acceptable amendment to allege use.  See 15 U.S.C. §1051(c); 37 C.F.R. §2.76; TMEP §§806.01(b), 1103.  An amendment to allege use must satisfy the following requirements:

 

(1)       STATEMENTS:  The following statements:  “The applicant is the owner of the mark sought to be registered.” and “The applicant is using the mark in commerce on or in connection with all the goods/services in the application or notice of allowance, or as subsequently modified.”

 

(2)       DATES OF FIRST USE:  The date of first use of the mark anywhereon or in connection with the goods and/or services, and the date of first use of the mark in commerceas a trademark or service mark.  See more information about dates of use.

 

(3)       GOODS AND/OR SERVICES:  The goods and/or services specified in the application.

 

(4)       SPECIMEN:  A specimen showing how applicant uses the mark in commerce for each class of goods and/or services for which use is being asserted.  If a single specimen supports multiple classes, applicant should indicate which classes the specimen supports rather than providing multiple copies of the same specimen.  See more information about specimens.

 

(5)       FEE(S):  A filing fee for each international class of goods and/or services for which use is being asserted (find current fee information).

 

(6)       VERIFICATION:  Verification of (1) through (4) above in an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20.  See more information about verification.

 

See 37 C.F.R. §2.76(b); TMEP §1104.08.

 

An amendment to allege use may be filed online via the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  Filing an amendment to allege use is not considered a response to an Office action.  37 C.F.R. §2.76(h); TMEP §1104.  An applicant must file a separate response to any outstanding Office action.  TMEP §1104; see 37 C.F.R. §2.76(h). 

Disclaimer of Generic Matter When Filing an Amendment to Allege Use (AAU) and Amendment to the Supplemental Register (Advisory)

 

Applicant is advised that, if an acceptable allegation of use and an amendment to the Supplemental Register are filed, applicant will be required to disclaim “DRIVE-THRU” because such wording appears to be generic in the context of applicant’s services. Please see attached dictionary evidence obtained from Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary.  See 15 U.S.C. §1056(a); In re Wella Corp., 565 F.2d 143, 144, 196 USPQ 7, 8 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Creative Goldsmiths of Wash., Inc., 229 USPQ 766, 768 (TTAB 1986); TMEP §1213.03(b).

 

Applicant may submit a disclaimer in the following format:

 

No claim is made to the exclusive right to use “DRIVE-THRU” apart from the mark as shown.

 

TMEP §1213.08(a)(i).

 

For an overview of disclaimers and instructions on how to satisfy this issue using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), see the Disclaimer webpage.

 

A “disclaimer” is a statement in the application record that an applicant does not claim exclusive rights to an unregistrable component of the mark.  See Schwarzkopf v. John H. Breck, Inc., 340 F.2d 978, 979-80, 144 USPQ 433, 433 (C.C.P.A. 1965); TMEP §1213.  A disclaimer does not physically remove the disclaimed matter from the mark or otherwise affect the appearance of the mark.  See Schwarzkopf v. John H. Breck, Inc., 340 F.2d at 979, 144 USPQ2d at 433; TMEP §1213.

 

If applicant does not provide the required disclaimer, the USPTO may refuse to register the entire mark.  See In re Stereotaxis Inc., 429 F.3d 1039, 1041, 77 USPQ2d 1087, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2005); TMEP §1213.01(b).

 

Pro Se Applicant May Wish to Seek Trademark Counsel (Advisory)

 

Because of the legal technicalities and strict deadlines involved in the USPTO application process, applicant may wish to hire a private attorney specializing in trademark matters to represent applicant in this process and provide legal advice.  Although the undersigned trademark examining attorney is permitted to help an applicant understand the contents of an Office action as well as the application process in general, no USPTO attorney or staff is permitted to give an applicant legal advice or statements about an applicant’s legal rights.  TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. 

 

For attorney referral information, applicant may consult the American Bar Association’s Consumers’ Guide to Legal Help; an online directory of legal professionals, such as FindLaw®; or a local telephone directory.  The USPTO, however, may not assist an applicant in the selection of a private attorney.  37 C.F.R. §2.11.

 

Response Guidelines

 

For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action.  For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above.  For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements.  Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.

 

Furthermore, if applicant has an amendment that does not require the payment of a fee, submission of a specimen, response to a statutory refusal or declaration signature, applicant is encouraged to telephone the examining attorney to expedite the processing of the application.

 

 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action  

 

 

 /Brian P. Callaghan/

Trademark Examining Attorney

U.S. Patent & Trademark Office

Law Office 108

Ph: (571) 272-4906

brian.callaghan@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on July 31, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88496131

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

 /Brian P. Callaghan/

Trademark Examining Attorney

U.S. Patent & Trademark Office

Law Office 108

Ph: (571) 272-4906

brian.callaghan@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from July 31, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond.

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”