Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  September 18, 2019

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

• Prior-Pending Application
• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
• Failure to Function Refusal – Name of Performing Artist
• Applicant’s Domicile Address Required
• Attorney Bar Information and Attestation Required

 

PRIOR-PENDING APPLICATION

 

The filing date of pending U.S. Application Serial No. 88380339 precedes applicant’s filing date.  See attached referenced application.  If the mark in the referenced application registers, applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion between the two marks.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq.  Therefore, upon receipt of applicant’s response to this Office action, action on this application may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed referenced application.

 

In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the mark in the referenced application.  Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.

 

Applicant must address the following issues:

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration Nos. 3704052 and 5231123.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

COMPARISON OF THE MARKS

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In this case, the registered marks are NIAYH (Reg. No. 3704052) in standard character form and NIA KAY (Reg. No. 5231123) in standard character form.

 

The applied-for mark is NIIA, also in standard character form.

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In this case, the applied-for and registered marks share the highly similar wording NIIA, NIA, and NIAYH.  Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

 

Here, the wording NIIA in the applied-for mark is indistinguishable in sound from the registered marks’ NIA and NIAYH.  While the term comprising the respective marks are spelled differently, this does not obviate a likelihood of confusion.  Despite the differences in spelling, the applied-for mark is nonetheless the phonetic equivalent of the registered marks and is thus virtually indistinguishable from them.  Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar, and even slight differences in the sound of similar marks will not avoid a likelihood of confusion.  In re Energy Telecomm. & Elec. Ass’n, 222 USPQ 350, 351 (TTAB 1983); see In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1367, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1912 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).

 

Further, although the registered mark NIA KAY (Reg. No. 5231123) includes the additional wording “KAY”, this does not obviate the similarity between the marks.  The applied-for and registered marks share the highly similar wording NIA and NIIA, which comprises the entirety of the applied-for mark and the first word in the registered mark.  Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).

 

In addition, although the applied-for mark omits the additional wording “KAY” in the registered mark NIA KAY (Reg. No. 5231123), and applicant’s mark thus does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  As such, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains the highly similar wording NIA or NIIA and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark. 

 

Thus, the applied-for mark NIIA is highly similar in sound, appearance, and overall commercial impression to the registered marks NIAYH (Reg. No. 3704052) and NIA KAY (Reg. No. 5231123).  As such, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

COMPARISON OF THE GOODS AND SERVICES

 

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Here, the applicant’s goods are identified as “Audio and video recordings featuring music and artistic performances; downloadable audio and video recordings featuring music and artistic performances” in International Class 009.

 

I.                Comparison of the Goods with NIAYH (Reg. No. 3704052)

 

Registrant’s goods for the registered mark NIAYH (Reg. No. 3704052) are identified as “Audio and video recordings featuring music” in International Class 009.

 

When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

In this case, the applicant and registrant have identified identical goods, with both identifying their goods as “Audio and video recordings featuring music and artistic performances”.  Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and classes of purchasers are the same for these goods.  See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 27 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 

 

In addition, the registration uses broad wording to describe its goods as “Audio and video recordings featuring music and artistic performances”, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including the applicant’s narrower identification for “downloadable audio and video recordings featuring music and artistic performances”.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  The registrant’s broad identification for audio and video recordings featuring music and artistic performances encompasses the applicant’s narrower identification a particular type of audio and video recordings featuring music and artistic performances, specifically, downloadable recordings. 

 

Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.

 

II.              Comparison of the Goods and Services with NIA KAY (Reg. No. 5231123)

 

Registrant’s services for the registered mark NIA KAY (Reg. No. 5231123) are identified as “Entertainment services in the nature of live musical performances”.

 

Consumers are likely to be confused by the use of similar marks on or in connection with goods and with services featuring or related to those goods.  TMEP §1207.01(a)(ii); see In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding retail shops featuring sports team related clothing and apparel related to various clothing items, including athletic uniforms); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding retail grocery and general merchandise store services related to furniture); In re United Serv. Distribs., Inc., 229 USPQ 237 (TTAB 1986) (finding distributorship services in the field of health and beauty aids related to skin cream); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (finding various items of men’s, boys’, girls’ and women’s clothing related to restaurant services and towels); Steelcase Inc. v. Steelcare Inc., 219 USPQ 433 (TTAB 1983) (finding refinishing of furniture, office furniture, and machinery related to office furniture and accessories); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Huskie Freightways, Inc., 177 USPQ 32 (TTAB 1972) (finding trucking services related to motor trucks and buses).

 

The attached Internet evidence from Taylor Swift, Jonas Brothers, and Backstreet Boys establishes that entities that provide entertainment services in the nature of live musical performances, like the registrant, also provide audio and video recordings and downloadable audio and video recordings featuring music.  This evidence shows that applicant’s goods and registrant’s services are commonly available from a single source.  Moreover, this evidence demonstrates that the relevant consumers are likely accustomed to encountering live musical performances and audio and video recordings and downloadable audio and video recordings featuring music emanating from the same source and offered under the same mark.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and services are sufficiently related such that the ordinary consumer would arrive at the mistaken belief that the respective goods and services emanate from the same source.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

In summary, applicant’s and registrant’s marks create the same commercial impression, and the goods the applicant’s mark identifies are sufficiently related to the registrants’ goods and services such that consumers are likely to be confused as to the source of these goods and services.  Accordingly, registration must be refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  However, if applicant responds to the refusal applicant must also respond to the refusal and requirements set forth below.

 

Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.

 

FAILURE TO FUNCTION REFUSAL – NAME OF PERFORMING ARTIST

 

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark, as used on the specimen of record, merely identifies the name of a featured performer on a sound recording; it does not function as a trademark to indicate the source of applicant’s goods and to identify and distinguish them from others.  Trademark Act Sections 1, 2 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1052, 1127; see In re Polar Music Int’l AB, 714 F.2d 1567, 1572, 221 USPQ 315, 318 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Arnold, 105 USPQ2d 1953, 1957 (TTAB 2013).  Sound recordings include musical and other performances presented in recorded or electronic form.  See TMEP §1202.09(a).

 

In this case, applicant has submitted evidence appearing to show the mark used on a series of sound recordings, as required by the first (a) prong of the evidence requirements listed below.  Therefore, applicant must only fulfill the second (b) prong of the evidence listed in either response option (1) or (2) below.

 

Applicant may respond to this refusal by satisfying one of the following:

 

(1)   Submitting evidence that (a) the name is used on a series of sound recordings, and (b) the performer controls the quality of the recordings and controls the use of the name, such that the name has come to represent an assurance of quality to the public.  See In re Polar Music Int’l AB, 714 F.2d at 1572, 221 USPQ at 318; In re Arnold, 105 USPQ2d at 1958; TMEP §1202.09(a)-(a)(ii), (a)(ii)(B).  Evidence of a series includes copies or photographs of at least two different CD covers or similar packaging for recorded works that show the name sought to be registered.  TMEP §1202.09(a)(i); see In re Polar Music Int’l AB, 714 F.2d at 1572, 221 USPQ at 318.  Evidence of control over the quality of the recordings and use of the name includes licensing contracts or similar documentation.  TMEP §1202.09(a)(ii)(B); see In re Polar Music Int’l AB, 714 F.2d at 1568-72, 221 USPQ at 316-18.  However, if the sound recordings are recorded directly under applicant’s control, applicant may submit solely as evidence of control the following statement, verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20:  “The applicant produces the goods and controls their quality.”  TMEP §1202.09(a)(ii)(B); see 37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(1).

 

(2)   Submitting evidence that (a) the name is used on a series of sound recordings, and (b) the name is promoted and recognized by others as the source of the series of sound recordings.  See In re Arnold, 105 USPQ2d at 1958; TMEP §1202.09(a)-(a)(ii)(A).  Evidence of a series includes copies or photographs of at least two different CD covers or similar packaging for recorded works that show the name sought to be registered.  TMEP §1202.09(a)(i); see In re Polar Music Int’l AB, 714 F.2d at 1572, 221 USPQ at 318.  Evidence that the name is promoted and recognized by others as a source of the series includes advertising that promotes the name as the source of the series, third-party reviews showing use of the name by others to refer to the series, and/or declarations from the sound recording industry, retailers, and purchasers showing recognition of the name as an indicator of the source of a series of recordings.  TMEP §1202.09(a)(ii)(A); cf. In re First Draft, Inc., 76 USPQ2d 1183, 1191 (TTAB 2005); In re Scholastic, Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1774, 1777-78 (TTAB 1992).

 

            (3) Amending the application to seek registration on the Supplemental Register.  Trademark Act Section 23, 15 U.S.C. §1091; see 37 C.F.R. §§2.47, 2.75(a); TMEP §§816, 1202.09(a).

 

If applicant cannot satisfy one of the above requirements, applicant may amend the application from a use in commerce basis under Trademark Act Section 1(a) to an intent to use basis under Section 1(b), and the refusal will be withdrawn.  See TMEP §806.03(c).  However, if applicant amends the basis to Section 1(b), registration will not be granted until applicant later amends the application back to use in commerce by filing an acceptable allegation of use along with satisfying one of the above requirements.  See 15 U.S.C. §1051(c), (d); 37 C.F.R. §§2.76, 2.88; TMEP §1103.  If the same specimen is submitted with an allegation of use, and applicant does not either provide the additional evidence described above or amend to the Supplemental Register, the same refusal will issue.

 

To amend to Section 1(b), applicant must submit the following statement, verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20:  “Applicant has a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce and had a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce as of the filing date of the application.”  37 C.F.R. §2.34(a)(2); TMEP §806.01(b); see 15 U.S.C. §1051(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.35(b)(1), 2.193(e)(1).

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusals by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  However, if applicant responds to the refusals, applicant must also respond to the requirements set forth below.

 

APPLICANT’S DOMICILE ADDRESS REQUIRED

 

Applicant must provide applicant’s domicile address.  All applications must include the applicant’s domicile address, and domicile dictates whether an applicant is required to have an attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a U.S. state or territory represent the applicant at the USPTO.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.2(o)-(p), 2.11(a), 2.189; Requirement of U.S.-Licensed Attorney for Foreign-Domiciled Trademark Applicants & Registrants, Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A. (Rev. Sept. 2019). 

 

An individual applicant’s domicile is the place a person resides and intends to be the person’s principal home.  37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.  A juristic entity’s domicile is the principal place of business, i.e. headquarters, where a juristic entity applicant’s senior executives or officers ordinarily direct and control the entity’s activities.  37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.  An applicant whose domicile is located outside of the United States or its territories is foreign-domiciled and must be represented at the USPTO by a U.S.-licensed attorney qualified to practice before the USPTO under 37 C.F.R. §11.14.  37 C.F.R. §2.11(a).

 

The application record lists applicant as an individual and specifies applicant’s domicile as “c/o” or in “care of” another party’s address.  In most cases, an address that is listed as “c/o” or in “care of” another party’s address is not acceptable as a domicile address because it does not identify the location of the place applicant resides and intends to be applicant’s principal home.  See37 C.F.R. §§2.2(o)-(p), 2.189; Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.3.  Thus, applicant must provide its domicile street address.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.189.  Alternatively, an applicant may demonstrate that the listed address is, in fact, the applicant’s domicile.  Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.3.

 

ATTORNEY BAR INFORMATION AND ATTESTATION REQUIRED

 

Attorney bar information required.  Applicant’s attorney must provide the following bar information:  (1) his or her bar membership number, if the bar provides one; (2) the name of the U.S. state, commonwealth, or territory of his or her bar membership; and (3) the year of his or her admission to the bar.  37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(3).  This information is required for all U.S.-licensed attorneys who are representing trademark applicants at the USPTO.  Id.  If the attorney’s bar does not issue bar membership numbers, applicant must state this for the record.  See id.

 

To provide bar information.  Applicant’s attorney should respond to this Office action by using the appropriate TEAS response form and provide his or her bar information in the “Attorney Information” page of the form, within the bar information section.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(1)(ii).  Bar information provided in any other area of the form will be viewable by the public in USPTO records.

 

Attorney statement required.  Applicant’s attorney must provide the following statement:  “I am an attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of a U.S. state (including the District of Columbia and any U.S. Commonwealth or territory).”  See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(3).  This is required for all U.S.-licensed attorneys who are representing trademark applicants at the USPTO.  Id. 

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusals and/or requirements in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action  

 

 

/Laura Taraban/

Laura Taraban

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 127

(571) 272-3352

laura.taraban@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on September 18, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88492578

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Laura Taraban/

Laura Taraban

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 127

(571) 272-3352

laura.taraban@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from September 18, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond.

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”