United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
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U.S. Application Serial No. 88492266
Mark: CHLOE
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Correspondence Address: |
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Applicant: DREAM WORLD, INC.
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Reference/Docket No. T09093US00
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: September 19, 2019
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
Refusal - Likelihood of Confusion
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4468931. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the enclosed registration.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and services of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods and services, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods and services. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
A. Comparison of Marks
In this case, the applied-for mark CHLOE is identical to the registered mark CHLOE in sound, appearance and commercial impression.
B. Comparison of Goods and Services
Applicant’s “hair accessories, namely, hair bands, hair barrettes, hair clips, hair ribbons, and ponytail holders” are closely related to the registrant’s “retail store services in the field of . . . personal ornaments . . . provided via the Internet and other computer and electronic communications networks” because they are personal hair accessories and retail store services featuring the same likely to travel through the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers. For example, the goods and services are likely to be advertised together in beauty and fashion supply catalogs, directories and trade publications.
Furthermore, with respect to applicant’s and registrant’s goods and services, the question of likelihood of confusion is determined based on the description of the goods and services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See, e.g., Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-70, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods and services are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Additionally, unrestricted and broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods and services of the type described. See In re Jump Designs, LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006) (citing In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981)); In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992).
In this case, the identifications set forth in the application and registration have no restrictions as to channels of trade or classes of purchasers. Therefore, it is presumed that these goods and services travel in all normal channels of trade and are available to the same class of purchasers.
Further, the application uses broad wording to describe the goods and this wording is presumed to encompass all goods of the type described including hair accessories, namely, hair bands, hair barrettes, hair clips, hair ribbons and ponytail holders sold by and through on-line retail stores, which are undeniably commercially-related to the registrant’s services.
Similarly, the registration uses broad wording to describe the services and this wording is presumed to encompass all goods of the type described including retail store services in the field of personal ornaments, namely, hair bands, hair barrettes, hair clips, hair ribbons and ponytail holders, provided via the Internet and other computer and electronic communications networks, which are related to the applicant’s goods.
In this regard, applicant’s attention is respectfully directed to the attached dictionary definitions showing the word “Ornament” means “something that lends grace, beauty, or festivity”, “a small, fancy object that is put on something else to make it more attractive” and/or “something that adds beauty”. In addition, the word “Barrette” means “a decorative clip or bar that is used to hold a girl's or woman's hair in place”. [Emphasis added].
For purposes of evaluating a trademark, material obtained from the Internet is generally accepted as competent evidence. See In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 488 F.3d 960, 966, 82 USPQ2d 1828, 1833 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Reed Elsevier Props., Inc., 482 F.3d 1376, 1380, 82 USPQ2d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007); TBMP §1208.03; TMEP §710.01(b).
In further support of the relationship between the goods and services of the parties, the trademark examining attorney has attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of twenty third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar goods and services as those of both applicant and registrant in this case. This evidence shows that the goods and services listed therein, namely, hair bands, hair barrettes, hair clips, hair ribbons, ponytail holders and retail store services featuring the same, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark. See In re Anderson, 101 USPQ2d 1912, 1919 (TTAB 2012); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).
The use of similar marks on or in connection with both products and retail-store services is likely to cause confusion. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding the use of similar marks for various clothing items, including athletic uniforms, and for retail shops featuring sports team related clothing and apparel likely to cause confusion); In re House Beer, LLC, 114 USPQ2d 1073, 1078 (TTAB 2015) (holding the use of identical marks for beer and for retail store services featuring beer likely to cause confusion); In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d 1021, 1023 (TTAB 2006) (holding the use of similar marks for jewelry and for retail-jewelry and mineral-store services likely to cause confusion); TMEP §1207.01(a)(ii).
What’s more, where the marks of the respective parties are identical, the relationship between the relevant goods and services need not be as close to support a finding of likelihood of confusion. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202 (TTAB 2009); In re Thor Tech, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1636 (TTAB 2009); TMEP §1207.01(a).
Finally, the overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Based on the foregoing remarks, because confusion as to source is likely, registration is refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d) based on a likelihood of confusion.
Applicant should also note the following potential refusal.
Prior Pending Applications
The filing dates of pending Application Serial Nos. 88428781 and 88432681 precede applicant’s filing date. See attached referenced applications. If one or more of the marks in the referenced applications register, applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion with the registered mark(s). See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq. Therefore, upon receipt of applicant’s response to this Office action, action on this application may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed referenced applications.
In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the marks in the referenced applications. Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal and potential refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
Miscellaneous
If applicant’s counsel has questions about this application or needs assistance in responding to this Office action, please telephone the assigned trademark examining attorney directly at the number below.
Advisory Regarding E-mail Communications
If applicant’s counsel has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney. All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response. See 37 C.F.R. §2.191; TMEP §§709.04-.05. Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action
/David Yontef/
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 118
(571) 272-8274
david.yontef@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE
