United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88488061
Mark: JADEN
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: Jaden Brand LLC
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: September 17, 2019
Summary of Issues:
· Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
· Prior-Filed Pending Applications
· Minor Font Stylization in Drawing & No Standard Character Claim – Inquiry
Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 4283279, 4546249, and 4952516. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registrations.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Applicant has applied for the mark JADEN (stylized text) for “blazers; dresses; jackets; shoes; business wear, namely, suits, jackets, trousers, blazers, blouses, shirts, skirts, dresses and footwear; denim jackets; down jackets; evening dresses; formalwear, namely, dresses, gowns, tuxedos, dinner jackets, trousers and footwear; knit dresses; knit jackets; leather jackets; rainproof jackets; suede jackets; women's shoes; woven dresses” in International Class 025.
The cited registrations are as follows:
JAYDIN DEVINE (plus design) (Reg. No. 4283279) for “athletic apparel, namely, shirts, pants, jackets, footwear, hats and caps, athletic uniforms; children's and infant's apparel, namely, jumpers, overall sleepwear, pajamas, rompers and one-piece garments; crew neck sweaters; jeans; mock turtle-neck sweaters; scientific and technological apparel, namely, shirts, pants, jackets, footwear, hats and caps, uniforms; sweaters; turtleneck sweaters; v-neck sweaters” in International Class 025;
JADEN'S LAW (standard characters) (Reg. No. 4546249) for “T-shirts for babies, adults, children, women, men” in International Class 025;
JAEDEN (stylized text) (Reg. No. 4952516) for “clothing, namely, tops, bottoms, dresses, gowns, suits, shoes, gloves, hosiery, undergarments, veils” in International Class 025.
Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In this case, applicant’s mark JADEN is highly similar to the registrants’ marks where the marks share the term “JADEN” or a phonetic equivalent thereof (i.e., JAEDEN and JAYDIN). Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).
Additionally, although spelled differently, each mark has a highly similar structure and likely pronunciation when compared to applicant’s applied-for mark. There is no correct pronunciation of a mark because it is impossible to predict how the public will pronounce a particular mark. See Embarcadero Techs., Inc. v. RStudio, Inc., 105 USPQ2d 1825, 1835 (TTAB 2013) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1367, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1912 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re The Belgrade Shoe Co., 411 F.2d 1352, 1353, 162 USPQ 227, 227 (C.C.P.A. 1969)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv). The marks in question could clearly be pronounced the same; such similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).
Moreover, with respect to the marks, the stylization of applicant’s applied-for mark is not obviated with respect to Reg. No. 4546249 where registrant’s mark is in standard characters. A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display. See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).
Similarly, the design element in Reg. No. 4283279 does not obviate the similarity between the marks. When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
Where the goods of an applicant and registrant are identical or virtually identical, the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding that confusion is likely declines. See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
As the marks look and sound similar and create the same commercial impression, the marks are considered similar for likelihood of confusion purposes.
Comparison of the Goods
The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).
In this case, the registrations use broad wording to describe “tops, bottoms, dresses, gowns, suits [and] shoes”, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including applicant’s identical “dresses [and] shoes” and applicant’s more narrow “business wear, namely, suits, trousers, blouses, shirts, dresses and footwear; evening dresses; formalwear, namely, dresses, gowns, tuxedos, trousers and footwear; knit dresses; women's shoes [and] woven dresses”. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Similarly, the application use broad wording to describe “shirts” and “jackets and shoes”, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including Reg. No’s. 4546249 more narrow “t-shirts for babies, adults, children, women, men” and Reg. No’s. 4283279 more narrow “athletic apparel, namely, shirts … jackets [and] footwear”. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Further, the compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
In the present case, applicant’s goods directly overlap with and/or are closely related to registrants’ goods. Specifically, an entity that provides jackets, like the applicant, also routinely provides hats, dresses and t-shirts, among others, like the registrants’, under the same mark. The attached Internet evidence from brooksbrothers.com, and hm.com establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures/produces/provides the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark and that the relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
Conclusion
In conclusion, the parties utilize highly similar marks featuring the same phonetically equivalent dominant term and conveying a highly similar overall sound and impression in connection with related goods marketed to the same consumers through similar channels of trade. Therefore, registration of the applied-for mark is refused.
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. However, if applicant responds to the refusal, applicant must also respond to the requirement set forth below. Applicant should note the prior pending application below, which does not require a response at this time.
Prior-Filed Pending Applications
The filing dates of pending U.S. Application Serial Nos. 88039161 and 88039176 precede applicant’s filing date. See attached referenced applications. If one or more of the marks in the referenced applications register, applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion with the registered mark(s). See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq. Therefore, upon receipt of applicant’s response to this Office action, action on this application may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed referenced applications.
In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the marks in the referenced applications. Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.
Although applicant is not required to respond to the above advisory at this time, applicant must timely respond to the below requirement to avoid abandonment of the application.
Minor Font Stylization in Drawing & No Standard Character Claim – Inquiry
In this case, because the wording in the mark creates a distinct commercial impression apart from the stylized lettering, applicant may elect to have a standard character drawing of the mark. See In re wTe Corp., 87 USPQ2d 1536, 1539-40 (TTAB 2008); TMEP §807.04. A mark registered in standard characters provides the broadest protection of a textual mark in any lettering style, size, and color, whereas a special form drawing provides protection only for a specific depiction. See 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a)-(b); TMEP §§807.03(a), 807.04(a).
To clarify that the mark is in standard characters, applicant must submit the following statement: “The mark consists of standard characters without claim to any particular font style, size, or color.” 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §807.03(a).
To clarify that the mark is in special form drawing format, applicant must provide (1) a statement to that effect and (2) an accurate description of the literal elements of the mark, if not already in the record. 37 C.F.R. §2.37; see TMEP §§808.01, 808.02.
For more information about standard character and special form drawings and how to satisfy the above requirements using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) online form, see the Drawing webpage.
Trademark Counsel Representation Advisory
Because of the legal technicalities and strict deadlines of the trademark application process, applicant may wish to hire a private attorney who specializes in trademark matters to assist in the process. The assigned trademark examining attorney can provide only limited assistance explaining the content of an Office action and the application process. USPTO staff cannot provide legal advice or statements about an applicant’s legal rights. TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.
Response guidelines. For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action
Christopher Hoffman
/Christopher Hoffman/
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 128
(571)272-3351
christopher.hoffman@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE