To: | SUPERVALU LICENSING LLC (IPLegalTeam@unfi.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88483063 - FOODLAND CLOSE TO HOME - N/A |
Sent: | April 02, 2020 07:25:24 PM |
Sent As: | ecom125@uspto.gov |
Attachments: |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88483063
Mark: FOODLAND CLOSE TO HOME
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: SUPERVALU LICENSING LLC
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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FINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: April 02, 2020
This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on March 9, 2020.
In a previous Office action(s) dated September 13, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following: Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark.
The trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal. See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.
SECTION 2(d) FINAL REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Applicant has applied to register the mark FOODLAND CLOSE TO HOME for “Retail grocery store services.”
The registrant owns the marks FOODLAND for “coffee, evaporated milk, tomato catsup, canned fruits and vegetables,” FOODLAND for “canned foods-namely, fruits, vegetables, deciduous and citrus fruit juices, vegetable juices, baked beans with pork, sauerkraut, mushrooms, mixed vegetables, fruit preserves, jams, jellies; cane and maple syrup; cranberry sauce; apple sauce; honey; mayonnaise; peanut butter; pickles; sweet pickle relish; spaghetti sauce; prepared mustard; meat sauces; olives; salad dressing; tomato catsup; tomato sauce; moist cocoanut; pancake flour; egg noodles; tea; tea bags; vinegar; oleomargarine; evaporated milk; table salt; coffee; eggs; beef,” FOODLAND for “canned soups,” and FOODLAND for “processed foods; namely, mayonnaise, olive oil, chicken broth, instant soup and dip mixes, powdered instant mashed potatoes flakes, non-dairy coffee creamer, tomato paste, tomato puree, catsup, whole peeled tomatoes, sliced stewed tomatoes, canned and bottled banana mild peppers and banana hot peppers, packaged food combinations consisting of uncooked macaroni and cheese dinners in a box; salad dressing, hot sauce, soy sauce, tomato sauce, tamales, croutons, seasoned and unseasoned bread crumbs, processed microwave popcorn in a package.”
The registrant is SUPERVALU HOLDINGS, INC., a Missouri Corporation and applicant is SUPERVALU LICENSING LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company.
In its response, applicant asserted a unity of control argument which is unsupported by the facts of record. Specifically, the Secretary’s Certificate submitted in the response merely states the applicant and registrant are wholly owned subsidiaries of a common parent company. That is, the applicant and registrant are sister companies. If both the applicant and the registrant are wholly owned by a third common parent, the applicant has to provide detailed evidence to establish how one sister corporation controlled the trademark activities of the other to establish unity of control to support the contention that the sister corporations constitute a single source. See In re Pharmacia Inc., 2 USPQ2d 1883 (TTAB 1987); Greyhound Corp. v. Armour Life Ins. Co., 214 USPQ 473 (TTAB 1982) .
A legal relationship between the parties is insufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion unless the parties constitute a “single source.” That is, the legal relationship between the parties must exhibit a “unity of control” over the nature and quality of the goods and/or services in connection with which the trademarks and/or service marks are used, and a “unity of control” over the use of the trademarks and/or service marks. See In re Wella A.G., 5 USPQ2d 1359, 1361 (TTAB 1987); see also TMEP §1201.07.
Unity of control is presumed in instances where, absent contradictory evidence, one party owns (1) all of another entity, or (2) substantially all of another entity and asserts control over the activities of that other entity. See TMEP §1201.07(b)(i)-(ii). Such ownership is established, for example, when one party owns all or substantially all of the stock of another or when one party is a wholly owned subsidiary of another. See In re Wella A.G., 5 USPQ2d at 1361; TMEP §1201.07(b)(i)-(ii). It is additionally presumed when, absent contradictory evidence, applicant is shown in USPTO records as a joint owner of the cited registration, or the owner of the registration is listed as a joint owner of the application, and applicant submits a written statement asserting control over the use of the mark by virtue of joint ownership. TMEP §1201.07(b)(ii).
However, in most other situations, additional evidence is required to show unity of control. For example, if the parties are sister corporations or if the parties share certain stockholders, directors or officers in common, additional evidence must be provided to show how the parties constitute a single source. See In re Pharmacia, Inc., 2 USPQ2d 1883, 1884 (TTAB 1987); TMEP §1201.07(b)(iii).
Therefore, applicant must provide a written statement explaining the nature of the legal relationship between the parties. In addition, if neither party owns all or substantially all of the other party, and USPTO records do not show their joint ownership of the application or cited registration, applicant must provide a detailed written explanation and documentary evidence showing the parties’ “unity of control” over the nature and quality of the goods and/or services in connection with which the trademarks and/or service marks are used, and the parties’ “unity of control” over the use of the trademarks and/or service marks. See TMEP §1201.07(b)(i)-(iii). This statement and, if necessary, explanation must be verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20. TMEP §1201.07(b)(ii)-(iii); see 37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(1). However, if one party owns all of the other entity, and there is no contradictory evidence of record, the written statement need not be verified. TMEP §1201.07(b)(i).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Similarity of Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Here, the marks are similar because they share an identical dominant element, the wording FOODLAND.
As such, the marks are similar for purposes of likelihood of confusion.
Relatedness of Goods and Services
Here, registrants’ food goods are the type of goods that are commonly offered under a store brand of a provider of retail grocery store services. Thus, applicant’s retail store services are related to registrant’s food goods.The use of similar marks on or in connection with both products and retail-store services has been held likely to cause confusion where the evidence showed that the retail-store services featured the same type of products. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding the use of similar marks for various clothing items, including athletic uniforms, and for retail shops featuring sports team related clothing and apparel likely to cause confusion); In re House Beer, LLC, 114 USPQ2d 1073, 1078 (TTAB 2015) (holding the use of identical marks for beer and for retail store services featuring beer likely to cause confusion); In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d 1021, 1023 (TTAB 2006) (holding the use of similar marks for jewelry and for retail-jewelry and mineral-store services likely to cause confusion); TMEP §1207.01(a)(ii).
For these reasons, the applied-for mark is FINALLY refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
How to respond. Click to file a request for reconsideration of this final Office action that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals and/or click to file a timely appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) with the required filing fee(s).
/Brendan J. Ketchum/
Trademark Examining Attorney
United States Patent & Trademark Office
Law Office 125
571-272-5397
brendan.ketchum@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE