To: | Paige DuBois Erwin (paul@vxmlaw.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88481722 - BODYBARRE - ERWI0001 |
Sent: | October 07, 2019 02:41:14 PM |
Sent As: | ecom122@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 Attachment - 24 Attachment - 25 Attachment - 26 Attachment - 27 Attachment - 28 Attachment - 29 Attachment - 30 Attachment - 31 Attachment - 32 Attachment - 33 Attachment - 34 Attachment - 35 Attachment - 36 Attachment - 37 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88481722
Mark: BODYBARRE
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: Paige DuBois Erwin
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Reference/Docket No. ERWI0001
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: October 07, 2019
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark 88481722 (BODYBARRE) is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4449339 (THEBODYBAR(RE)). Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the enclosed registration.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the services, and similarity of the trade channels of the services. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Applicant’s mark is BODYBARRE in stylized form.
Registrant’s mark is THEBODYBAR(RE) in stylized form.
In the present case, the applicant’s mark is highly similar to the registered mark in sound, appearance, and overall commercial impression. Specifically, applicant’s mark and the registered mark contain the highly similar terms “BODYBARRE” and “BODYBAR(RE)”. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).
Finally, applicant’s omission of the term “THE” in the registered mark does not distinguish the marks. When comparing similar marks, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has found that inclusion of the term “the” at the beginning of one of the marks will generally not affect or otherwise diminish the overall similarity between the marks. See In re Thor Tech Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1635 (TTAB 2009) (finding WAVE and THE WAVE “virtually identical” marks; “[t]he addition of the word ‘The’ at the beginning of the registered mark does not have any trademark significance.”); In re Narwood Prods. Inc., 223 USPQ 1034, 1034 (TTAB 1984) (finding THE MUSIC MAKERS and MUSIC-MAKERS “virtually identical” marks; the inclusion of the definite article “the” is “insignificant in determining likelihood of confusion”).
Therefore, the applicant’s mark is highly similar to the registered mark in sound, appearance, and overall commercial impression. Accordingly, the marks are considered to be confusingly similar.
Comparison of the Services
The services of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
The respective services need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
Applicant’s identified services are: “Consulting services in the fields of fitness and exercise; Personal fitness training services; Personal fitness training services and consultancy; Physical fitness studio services, namely, providing group exercise instruction, equipment, and facilities; Physical fitness training of individuals and groups; Providing fitness and exercise studio services, namely, pilates instruction and training; Providing fitness instruction services in the field of ballet, yoga and pilates inspired exercises and fitness methods; Providing fitness training services in the field of ballet, yoga and pilates inspired exercises and fitness methods; Providing a web site featuring information on exercise and fitness; Providing an interactive website featuring information and links relating to fitness” in Class 41.
Registrant’s identified services are: “Physical fitness studio services, namely, providing exercise classes, body sculpting classes, and group fitness classes” in Class 41.
Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on evidence of actual use. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
In this case, the services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
Additionally, the registration uses broad wording to describe Physical fitness studio services, namely, providing exercise classes, body sculpting classes, and group fitness classes, which presumably encompasses all services of the type described, including applicant’s more narrow Physical fitness studio services, namely, providing group exercise instruction, equipment, and facilities; Physical fitness training of individuals and groups; Providing fitness and exercise studio services, namely, pilates instruction and training; Providing fitness instruction services in the field of ballet, yoga and pilates inspired exercises and fitness methods; Providing fitness training services in the field of ballet, yoga and pilates inspired exercises and fitness methods. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, the attached Internet evidence consisting of third party websites shows that entities that provide physical fitness studio services also provide applicant’s other services such as physical fitness consulting and providing a website with physical fitness information under the same mark. See attached evidence from www.bodybusiness.com, http://balance-pt.com, www.mychoicefitness.com, www.ignitefitnessstudio.com, www.dtlafitness.com/, and www.energyfitness.com.
The evidence establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant services and markets the services under the same mark, and that the relevant services are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
Because the marks are highly similar and the services are closely related, a likelihood of confusion exists and registration is refused.
SECTION 2(e)(1) REFUSAL – MERELY DESCRIPTIVE
Registration is refused because the applied-for mark merely describes a characteristic of applicant’s services. Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); see TMEP §§1209.01(b), 1209.03 et seq.
A mark is merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of an applicant’s services. TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re TriVita, Inc., 783 F.3d 872, 874, 114 USPQ2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920)).
“Whether consumers could guess what the product [or service] is from consideration of the mark alone is not the test.” In re Am. Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985).
The applied for mark is BODYBARRE for “Consulting services in the fields of fitness and exercise; Personal fitness training services; Personal fitness training services and consultancy; Physical fitness studio services, namely, providing group exercise instruction, equipment, and facilities; Physical fitness training of individuals and groups; Providing fitness and exercise studio services, namely, pilates instruction and training; Providing fitness instruction services in the field of ballet, yoga and pilates inspired exercises and fitness methods; Providing fitness training services in the field of ballet, yoga and pilates inspired exercises and fitness methods; Providing a web site featuring information on exercise and fitness; Providing an interactive website featuring information and links relating to fitness” in Class 41. In this context, “BODY” refers to the physical aspect of a person, whereas “BARRE” refers to a handrail used for certain exercises. See attached dictionary evidence.
Only where the combination of descriptive terms creates a unitary mark with a unique, incongruous, or otherwise nondescriptive meaning in relation to the goods and/or services is the combined mark registrable. See In re Colonial Stores, Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 551, 157 USPQ 382, 384 (C.C.P.A. 1968); In re Positec Grp. Ltd., 108 USPQ2d 1161, 1162-63 (TTAB 2013).
In this case, both the individual components and the composite result are descriptive of applicant’s services and do not create a unique, incongruous, or nondescriptive meaning in relation to the services. Specifically, applicant the mark immediately conveys characteristics of applicant’s services, namely, physical fitness classes for one’s body using exercises incorporating the use of a barre.
In addition, the words “BODY” and “BARRE” are both frequently used by third parties to describe similar services. See attached evidence.
Because the mark merely describes characteristic of applicant’s services, registration is refused under section 2(e)(1).
RESPONSE GUIDELINES
For this application to proceed toward registration, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement raised in this Office action. If the action includes a refusal, applicant may provide arguments and/or evidence as to why the refusal should be withdrawn and the mark should register. Applicant may also have other options for responding to a refusal and should consider such options carefully. To respond to requirements and certain refusal response options, applicant should set forth in writing the required changes or statements.
If applicant does not respond to this Office action within six months of the issue/mailing date, or responds by expressly abandoning the application, the application process will end, the trademark will fail to register, and the application fee will not be refunded. See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.65(a), 2.68(a), 2.209(a); TMEP §§405.04, 718.01, 718.02. Where the application has been abandoned for failure to respond to an Office action, applicant’s only option would be to file a timely petition to revive the application, which, if granted, would allow the application to return to active status. See 37 C.F.R. §2.66; TMEP §1714. There is a $100 fee for such petitions. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6, 2.66(b)(1).
If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney. All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response. See 37 C.F.R. §2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action
/C. Scott Strickland/
C. Scott Strickland
Examining Attorney
Law Office 122
571-272-3277
scott.strickland@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE