Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 no persons are required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control number. PTO Form 1957 (Rev 10/2011) |
OMB No. 0651-0050 (Exp 09/20/2020) |
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SERIAL NUMBER | 88479494 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
LAW OFFICE ASSIGNED | LAW OFFICE 120 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
MARK SECTION | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
MARK FILE NAME | http://uspto.report/TM/88479494/mark.png | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
LITERAL ELEMENT | SCOUT | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
STANDARD CHARACTERS | NO | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
USPTO-GENERATED IMAGE | NO | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
OWNER SECTION (current) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
NAME | Scout Exchange LLC | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
STREET | 501 Boylston Street | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
CITY | Boston | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
STATE | Massachusetts | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
ZIP/POSTAL CODE | 02116 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
COUNTRY/REGION/JURISDICTION/U.S. TERRITORY | United States | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
OWNER SECTION (proposed) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
NAME | Scout Exchange LLC | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
STREET | 501 Boylston Street | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
CITY | Boston | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
STATE | Massachusetts | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
ZIP/POSTAL CODE | 02116 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
COUNTRY/REGION/JURISDICTION/U.S. TERRITORY | United States | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
notices@goscoutgo.com | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
ARGUMENT(S) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
In the United States Patent and Trademark Office
I. INTRODUCTIONThis response is submitted by Applicant, Scout Exchange LLC (“Applicant”), through its undersigned counsel, in response to the Office Action dated September 11, 2019 (“the Office Action”) for the above-referenced U.S. Trademark Application for the mark SCOUT (stylized and/or design) in International class 042 (“Applicant’s Mark”). II. “MERELY DESCRIPTIVE” REJECTIONThe Office Action preliminarily refuses registration on the Principal Register of Applicant’s Mark under Section 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), alleging that Applicant’s Mark is merely descriptive of Applicant’s services. Applicant disagrees and submits that Applicant’s Mark is at most a suggestive concept used to communicate information indirectly about Applicant’s services. Accordingly, Applicant respectfully requests withdrawal of the § 2(e)(1) rejection and registration of Applicant’s Mark on the Principal Register. A. Legal Framework A mark is merely descriptive of goods or services within the meaning of Section 2(e)(1) if it immediately conveys knowledge of a quality, feature, function, or characteristic of the goods or services with which it is used. In re Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1987). If the mental leap between the word and the product attributes is not almost instantaneous, this strongly indicates suggestiveness, not direct descriptiveness. In re Driven Innovations, 674 F. App’x 996, 999-1000 (Fed. Cir. 2017). In determining whether a mark is merely descriptive, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“the Board”) and courts have historically reviewed considerations such as the degree of imagination required to determine the nature of the goods or services from the mark, or the degree to which competitors need to use the mark to describe their services. Even though the legal standard has evolved over time into the above standard, such considerations can still be relevant to the 2(e)(1) analysis. In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1511 (T.T.A.B. 2016). Finally, if after the 2(e)(1) analysis is conducted doubt remains as to mere descriptiveness, the Board resolves doubts in favor of Applicant. See In re Conductive Sys., Inc., 220 U.S.P.Q. 84, 86 (T.T.A.B. 1983). As set forth below, Applicant’s Mark is not merely descriptive under applicable law. B. The SCOUT Mark Requires Consumer Imagination to Determine the Nature of Goods and Services to Which the Mark is Applied The degree of imagination required to determine the nature of the goods or services is part and parcel of the concept of suggestiveness, as contrasted with descriptiveness: if a mark is suggestive, by definition it is not merely descriptive. In paticular: A suggestive mark requires imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the goods [or services], while a merely descriptive mark forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods [or services]. StonCor Grp., Inc. v. Specialty Coatings, Inc., 759 F.3d 1327, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (italics added); see also Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs. Inc., 160 U.S.P.Q. 777, 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding the word “contact” suggestive when applied to self-adhesive plastic). Under this standard, where a consumer must exercise “mature thought or follow a multi-stage reasoning process” to determine the nature of the goods or services, then the mark is suggestive and not descriptive. In re Tennis In The Round, Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 496, 498 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (finding the marks TENNIS IN THE ROUND INC. and TENNIS IN THE ROUND not merely descriptive of tennis courts arranged in a circular configuration and overturning the Examiner’s decision refusing registration). If the mental leap between the word and the product’s attributes is not virtually automatic and instantaneous, suggestiveness is strongly indicated. McCarthy § 11.21[1]. Here, nothing about the SCOUT mark immediately conveys the ingredients, qualities or characteristics, feature, function, purpose or use of the services offered thereunder. Initially, although the Office Action alleges that “scout” means “to make a search” or “to find by making a search”, the word “scout” carries multiple other definitions, any of which could equally well be called to the consumer’s mind, creating completely different associations or impressions. For example, “scout” can mean:
See, e.g., Exhibit A (a printout from the online dictionary Cambridge Dictionaries Online, U.S. English version, available at www.dictionary.cambridge.org). Indeed, the word “scout” has so many different meanings that it is not immediately clear, based on inspection of Applicant’s Mark alone, which if any of these specific aspects of the broad notion of “scout” Applicant’s Mark may be relevant. Moreover, where an otherwise descriptive term is so broad as to encompass a universe of potential goods and services, as is the case here, such a mark is suggestive and not descriptive of the particular goods and services offered by an applicant. In re The House Store, Ltd., 221 U.S.P.Q. 92, 93 (T.T.A.B. 1983) (finding the mark THE HOUSE STORE suggestive when used in connection with furniture and housewares and overturning the Examiner’s decision refusing registration). Applicant’s services are “Providing online, non-downloadable software in the field of employee recruitment to enable candidates to find job openings and to enable employers to find suitable candidates for employment.” Initially, nothing in the word “scout” describes anything about online, non-downloadable software. Moreover, to the extent that “scout” means “to make a search” or “to find by making a search” as the Office Action alleges, that definition suggests nothing about what is found by the search. To the extent that the term “SCOUT” is alleged to subsume Applicant’s services because it describes “making a search,” it also subsumes so many other goods or services that employee recruiting constitutes a trivial fraction of them. This is exactly the kind of situation in which In re The House Store, Ltd. forbids a finding of mere descriptiveness. Indeed, it is not immediately clear how any of the definitions of “scout” could be adapted to identify Applicant’s particular services. Instead, a multi-stage reasoning process is required, and a finding of mere descriptiveness is inappropriate. The registrability of Applicant’s Mark is further demonstrated by the existence on the Principal Register of many other marks including the word “scout”, several of which also relating to “finding” (or “searching for” or related actions) various targets. A search of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office electronic records conducted on January 3, 2020, revealed that “SCOUT” has been registered 137 times on the Principal Register. Selected registration certificates are attached as Exhibit B and summarized here, with the relevant goods or services emphasized in bold:
For example, Reg. No. 5,579,717 shows a “SCOUT” (and design) mark owned by Applicant registered in connection with identical services. In addition, Reg. No. 5,603,187 for SCOUT relates to “[p]roviding communication technology, namely, providing search platforms and voice enabled search platforms…” Similarly, Reg. No. 4,504,571 relates to goods and services “providing temporary use of nondownloadable software for use in enabling users to search for and find news, point-of-interest information and events…”. In none of the cases shown above was the relationship between “scout” and search services enough to refuse registration of the mark on the basis of mere descriptiveness. Nor should the use of the word “scout” lead to a determination of mere descriptiveness in Applicant’s case. Because imagination is required to determine the precise nature of Applicant’s services, and because the consumer must follow a multi-stage reasoning process to determine the nature of Applicant’s services, Applicant’s Mark is at most suggestive, as opposed to merely descriptive. C. Competitors Do Not Need The Word SCOUT To Describe Competitive Services In determining whether a mark is suggestive or merely descriptive, McCarthy suggests asking whether the suggestion made by the mark is so “remote and subtle” that it is not likely to be needed by competitive sellers to describe their services. McCarthy § 11.21[2] at 11-109. In the case of the SCOUT mark the answer is “yes”—competitors simply have no need to use the wording SCOUT to describe competitive services. For example, searches of the U.S. Patent and Trademark records conducted on January 3, 2020 revealed the following marks that were registered in connection with services that are in some way related to job seeking (registration certificates are attached as Exhibit C):
Applicant’s Mark, no less than these marks, is not merely descriptive and therefore deserving of registration. Competitors simply do not need to use Applicant’s Mark to describe related or competitive services. The fact that the Examining Attorney’s search of the PTO records failed to identify any similar registered or pending marks further supports this conclusion. D. Precedent Mandates That Doubts As To Applicant’s Mark’s Descriptiveness Should Be Resolved In Favor Of ApplicantIt is well settled that where there is any doubt as to the descriptiveness of a mark, the doubt should be resolved in Applicant’s favor and the mark should be published for opposition. See In re Aid Labs. Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. 1215 (TTAB 1983); McCarthy at §11:51 (“Because the line between merely descriptive and only suggestive terms is so ‘nebulous,’ the Trademark Board takes the position that doubt is resolved in favor of the applicant on the assumption that competitors have the opportunity to oppose the registration once published and to present evidence that is usually not present in ex parte examination.”) (citing several decisions, including In re Gourmet Bakers, Inc., 173 U.S.P.Q. 565 (T.T.A.B. 1972) and In re Conductive Systems, Inc., 220 U.S.P.Q. 84 (T.T.A.B. 1983)). Thus, if the response above has raised any doubts in the Examining Attorney’s mind, the rejection should be withdrawn. III. NO CONFLICTING MARKS UNDER § 2(D)Applicant thanks the Examiner for the conclusion that there are no conflicting marks under Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), that would bar Applicant’s mark from registration. IV. SUPPLEMENTAL REGISTER ADVISORYBecause Applicant’s Mark is registrable on the Principal Register, as established above, no further response to this advisory is required at this time. V. CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing reasons, Applicant respectfully submits that all issues raised in the Office Action have been addressed and overcome. Accordingly, Applicant requests that the pending application proceed to registration. The Examiner is invited to contact the undersigned attorney to discuss the application, particularly if a discussion might help to facilitate prosecution of the application. |
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EVIDENCE SECTION | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
EVIDENCE FILE NAME(S) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
ORIGINAL PDF FILE | evi_207210163202-20200306175159514129_._Scout_Exhibits.pdf | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
CONVERTED PDF FILE(S) (45 pages) |
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DESCRIPTION OF EVIDENCE FILE | exhibits to response | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
ATTORNEY INFORMATION (current) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
NAME | Joseph A. Capraro Jr. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
ATTORNEY BAR MEMBERSHIP NUMBER | NOT SPECIFIED | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
YEAR OF ADMISSION | NOT SPECIFIED | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
U.S. STATE/ COMMONWEALTH/ TERRITORY | NOT SPECIFIED | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
FIRM NAME | PROSKAUER ROSE LLP | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
STREET | ONE INTERNATIONAL PLACE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
CITY | BOSTON | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
STATE | Massachusetts | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
POSTAL CODE | 02110 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
COUNTRY/REGION/JURISDICTION/U.S. TERRITORY | United States | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
PHONE | 617-526-9600 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
FAX | 617-526-9899 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
docketingpatentboston@proskauer.com | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
DOCKET/REFERENCE NUMBER | SCT-608 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
ATTORNEY INFORMATION (proposed) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
NAME | Joseph A. Capraro Jr. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
ATTORNEY BAR MEMBERSHIP NUMBER | XXX | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
YEAR OF ADMISSION | XXXX | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
U.S. STATE/ COMMONWEALTH/ TERRITORY | XX | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
FIRM NAME | PROSKAUER ROSE LLP | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
STREET | ONE INTERNATIONAL PLACE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
CITY | BOSTON | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
STATE | Massachusetts | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
POSTAL CODE | 02110 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
COUNTRY/REGION/JURISDICTION/U.S. TERRITORY | United States | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
PHONE | 617-526-9600 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
FAX | 617-526-9899 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
docketingpatentboston@proskauer.com | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
DOCKET/REFERENCE NUMBER | SCT-608 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
OTHER APPOINTED ATTORNEY | S. James Boumil III and other attorneys associated with customer number 42532 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
CORRESPONDENCE INFORMATION (current) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
NAME | JOSEPH A. CAPRARO JR. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
PRIMARY EMAIL ADDRESS FOR CORRESPONDENCE | docketingpatentboston@proskauer.com | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
SECONDARY EMAIL ADDRESS(ES) (COURTESY COPIES) | jboumil@proskauer.com | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
DOCKET/REFERENCE NUMBER | SCT-608 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
CORRESPONDENCE INFORMATION (proposed) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
NAME | Joseph A. Capraro Jr. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
PRIMARY EMAIL ADDRESS FOR CORRESPONDENCE | docketingpatentboston@proskauer.com | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
SECONDARY EMAIL ADDRESS(ES) (COURTESY COPIES) | jboumil@proskauer.com | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
DOCKET/REFERENCE NUMBER | SCT-608 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
SIGNATURE SECTION | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
RESPONSE SIGNATURE | /S. James Boumil III/ | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
SIGNATORY'S NAME | Boumil III, Sylvester J. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
SIGNATORY'S POSITION | Attorney of record, Massachusetts bar member | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
SIGNATORY'S PHONE NUMBER | 617-526-9600 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
DATE SIGNED | 03/06/2020 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY | YES | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
FILING INFORMATION SECTION | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
SUBMIT DATE | Fri Mar 06 18:16:52 ET 2020 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
TEAS STAMP | USPTO/ROA-XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX -20200306181652184080-884 79494-710c26cde4249a26cf6 335fff5fb4671cd795dcd1aba 212139f4ff254c868a04021-N /A-N/A-202003061751595141 29 |
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 no persons are required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control number. PTO Form 1957 (Rev 10/2011) |
OMB No. 0651-0050 (Exp 09/20/2020) |
In the United States Patent and Trademark Office
Serial No.: 88/479,494 Mark: SCOUT (stylized and/or design) Int’l Class: 042 Atty. Docket: SCT-608 |
This response is submitted by Applicant, Scout Exchange LLC (“Applicant”), through its undersigned counsel, in response to the Office Action dated September 11, 2019 (“the Office Action”) for the above-referenced U.S. Trademark Application for the mark SCOUT (stylized and/or design) in International class 042 (“Applicant’s Mark”).
The Office Action preliminarily refuses registration on the Principal Register of Applicant’s Mark under Section 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), alleging that Applicant’s Mark is merely descriptive of Applicant’s services. Applicant disagrees and submits that Applicant’s Mark is at most a suggestive concept used to communicate information indirectly about Applicant’s services. Accordingly, Applicant respectfully requests withdrawal of the § 2(e)(1) rejection and registration of Applicant’s Mark on the Principal Register.
A. Legal Framework
A mark is merely descriptive of goods or services within the meaning of Section 2(e)(1) if it immediately conveys knowledge of a quality, feature, function, or characteristic of the goods or services with which it is used. In re Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1987). If the mental leap between the word and the product attributes is not almost instantaneous, this strongly indicates suggestiveness, not direct descriptiveness. In re Driven Innovations, 674 F. App’x 996, 999-1000 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
In determining whether a mark is merely descriptive, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“the Board”) and courts have historically reviewed considerations such as the degree of imagination required to determine the nature of the goods or services from the mark, or the degree to which competitors need to use the mark to describe their services. Even though the legal standard has evolved over time into the above standard, such considerations can still be relevant to the 2(e)(1) analysis. In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1511 (T.T.A.B. 2016).
Finally, if after the 2(e)(1) analysis is conducted doubt remains as to mere descriptiveness, the Board resolves doubts in favor of Applicant. See In re Conductive Sys., Inc., 220 U.S.P.Q. 84, 86 (T.T.A.B. 1983).
As set forth below, Applicant’s Mark is not merely descriptive under applicable law.
B. The SCOUT Mark Requires Consumer Imagination to Determine the Nature of Goods and Services to Which the Mark is Applied
The degree of imagination required to determine the nature of the goods or services is part and parcel of the concept of suggestiveness, as contrasted with descriptiveness: if a mark is suggestive, by definition it is not merely descriptive. In paticular:
A suggestive mark requires imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the goods [or services], while a merely descriptive mark forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods [or services].
StonCor Grp., Inc. v. Specialty Coatings, Inc., 759 F.3d 1327, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (italics added); see also Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs. Inc., 160 U.S.P.Q. 777, 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding the word “contact” suggestive when applied to self-adhesive plastic). Under this standard, where a consumer must exercise “mature thought or follow a multi-stage reasoning process” to determine the nature of the goods or services, then the mark is suggestive and not descriptive. In re Tennis In The Round, Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 496, 498 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (finding the marks TENNIS IN THE ROUND INC. and TENNIS IN THE ROUND not merely descriptive of tennis courts arranged in a circular configuration and overturning the Examiner’s decision refusing registration). If the mental leap between the word and the product’s attributes is not virtually automatic and instantaneous, suggestiveness is strongly indicated. McCarthy § 11.21[1].
Here, nothing about the SCOUT mark immediately conveys the ingredients, qualities or characteristics, feature, function, purpose or use of the services offered thereunder. Initially, although the Office Action alleges that “scout” means “to make a search” or “to find by making a search”, the word “scout” carries multiple other definitions, any of which could equally well be called to the consumer’s mind, creating completely different associations or impressions. For example, “scout” can mean:
A member of the Girl Scouts or Boy Scouts;
A person, especially a soldier, sent out to get information about the enemy;
A quick look around a place or area, especially in order to find something; and
To go to look in various places for something you want or to check for possible danger.
See, e.g., Exhibit A (a printout from the online dictionary Cambridge Dictionaries Online, U.S. English version, available at www.dictionary.cambridge.org). Indeed, the word “scout” has so many different meanings that it is not immediately clear, based on inspection of Applicant’s Mark alone, which if any of these specific aspects of the broad notion of “scout” Applicant’s Mark may be relevant.
Moreover, where an otherwise descriptive term is so broad as to encompass a universe of potential goods and services, as is the case here, such a mark is suggestive and not descriptive of the particular goods and services offered by an applicant. In re The House Store, Ltd., 221 U.S.P.Q. 92, 93 (T.T.A.B. 1983) (finding the mark THE HOUSE STORE suggestive when used in connection with furniture and housewares and overturning the Examiner’s decision refusing registration). Applicant’s services are “Providing online, non-downloadable software in the field of employee recruitment to enable candidates to find job openings and to enable employers to find suitable candidates for employment.” Initially, nothing in the word “scout” describes anything about online, non-downloadable software. Moreover, to the extent that “scout” means “to make a search” or “to find by making a search” as the Office Action alleges, that definition suggests nothing about what is found by the search. To the extent that the term “SCOUT” is alleged to subsume Applicant’s services because it describes “making a search,” it also subsumes so many other goods or services that employee recruiting constitutes a trivial fraction of them. This is exactly the kind of situation in which In re The House Store, Ltd. forbids a finding of mere descriptiveness. Indeed, it is not immediately clear how any of the definitions of “scout” could be adapted to identify Applicant’s particular services. Instead, a multi-stage reasoning process is required, and a finding of mere descriptiveness is inappropriate.
The registrability of Applicant’s Mark is further demonstrated by the existence on the Principal Register of many other marks including the word “scout”, several of which also relating to “finding” (or “searching for” or related actions) various targets. A search of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office electronic records conducted on January 3, 2020, revealed that “SCOUT” has been registered 137 times on the Principal Register. Selected registration certificates are attached as Exhibit B and summarized here, with the relevant goods or services emphasized in bold:
Reg. No. |
Mark |
Software services (International Classes 042 or 009) |
5,579,717 |
SCOUT (and design) |
Providing online, non-downloadable software in the field of employee recruitment to enable candidates to find job openings and to enable employers to find suitable candidates for employment. (Owned by Applicant) |
5,603,187 |
SCOUT |
Providing communication technology, namely, providing search platforms and voice enabled search platforms that enable users to request and obtain information in the medical, health, hospital, dental, prescription drug, pharmaceutical, wellness, fitness, exercise, diet, nutrition, health insurance, health care plan and health saving account areas; Providing a website featuring technology that enables users to access, manage and process health, medical, hospital, pharmaceutical and prescription drug insurance applications, records, claims, benefits, accounts. |
4,504,571 |
SCOUT |
Providing temporary use of nondownloadable software for activating and managing voice recognition and voice controls; providing temporary use of nondownloadable software for use in the control of voice-controlled information; providing temporary use of nondownloadable software for use in enabling users to search for and find news, point-of-interest information and events by name, date/time, category, schedule, price, ratings, reviews and recommendations. |
3,262,256 |
SCOUT |
Electronic devices for locating underground or hidden pipes and lines. |
3,299,371 |
SCOUT |
Mapping. |
For example, Reg. No. 5,579,717 shows a “SCOUT” (and design) mark owned by Applicant registered in connection with identical services. In addition, Reg. No. 5,603,187 for SCOUT relates to “[p]roviding communication technology, namely, providing search platforms and voice enabled search platforms…” Similarly, Reg. No. 4,504,571 relates to goods and services “providing temporary use of nondownloadable software for use in enabling users to search for and find news, point-of-interest information and events…”. In none of the cases shown above was the relationship between “scout” and search services enough to refuse registration of the mark on the basis of mere descriptiveness. Nor should the use of the word “scout” lead to a determination of mere descriptiveness in Applicant’s case.
Because imagination is required to determine the precise nature of Applicant’s services, and because the consumer must follow a multi-stage reasoning process to determine the nature of Applicant’s services, Applicant’s Mark is at most suggestive, as opposed to merely descriptive.
C. Competitors Do Not Need The Word SCOUT To Describe Competitive Services
In determining whether a mark is suggestive or merely descriptive, McCarthy suggests asking whether the suggestion made by the mark is so “remote and subtle” that it is not likely to be needed by competitive sellers to describe their services. McCarthy § 11.21[2] at 11-109. In the case of the SCOUT mark the answer is “yes”—competitors simply have no need to use the wording SCOUT to describe competitive services. For example, searches of the U.S. Patent and Trademark records conducted on January 3, 2020 revealed the following marks that were registered in connection with services that are in some way related to job seeking (registration certificates are attached as Exhibit C):
Registration No. |
Mark |
Services |
4,259,232 |
RECRUITABLE |
“[C]omputer application software for mobile phones, namely, software for helping recruiters find qualified candidates for jobs by searching candidate information” in International Class 009. |
5,842,657 |
IDEAL HIRES |
“Providing software as a service (SaaS) that enables users to post and search jobs and employment opportunities, to receive notices about applications and opportunities, to post and search resumes, and to apply for jobs, that enables employers to search for candidates who best meet their job vacancy criteria by searching and filtering resumes and applications, and that locates and posts job and employment opportunities from other web resources; …” in International Class 042. |
4,909,632 |
RIGHTJOBNOW |
“Computer software development in the field of mobile applications; Developing customized software in the field of allowing prospective job candidates to find and apply for jobs, and for use in connection with job candidate sourcing, recruiting, hiring, placement, and related staffing services for others…” in International Class 042. |
5,919,018 |
SEEKOUT |
“Software as a service (SAAS) services, namely, hosting software for use by others for use as a product for maintaining a searchable database of job candidates to provide employers a competitive edge in enabling them to recruit hard to find and diverse talent needed to achieve their goals” in International Class 042. |
5,271,696 |
I AM RECRUIT (and design) |
“Providing temporary use of on-line non-downloadable software for accessing an online multi-media platform to assist job seekers in their search for jobs by allowing job seekers to create and manage their profiles, to search for and apply for jobs, to record and upload media to an online multi-media platform, and to assist employers to receive applications for employment by searching candidate profiles and facilitating the transmission of job applications from interested candidates” in International Class 042. |
5,237,481 |
UPWORK |
“Employment recruiting, placement, staffing, and career networking services; providing an online searchable database featuring job postings, employment opportunities and resumes; providing online employment information; consulting services in the field of human resources and management of freelance and remote workers…” in International Class 042. |
5,407,887 |
STAFF POND (and design) |
“Providing a website featuring technology that enables users to recruit employees, find jobs, test for job fit, track job applications, list classified ads, create online resumes and CVs” in International Class 042. |
5,925,073 |
ATTRACT ENGINE |
“Computer services, namely, providing a search engine that utilizes machine learning to automate and optimize employment searches; providing technology, namely, a website featuring a search engine for obtaining job listings, resume postings, and other job search information to locate jobseekers for companies to attract and fill open roles by crowd sourcing” in International Class 042. |
5,253,770 |
FIND YOUR CALLING |
“Providing a website featuring resources, namely, non-downloadable software for use by students, graduates, and families in planning and preparing for future career and post-secondary education by using labor market information and proprietary analytical methods to help users determine careers of interest and related educational requirements and programs…” in International Class 042. |
5,125,429 |
HIREWIRE |
“Downloadable software for matching job-seekers with employers; mobile application software for matching job-seekers with employers; downloadable software for enabling job-seekers and employers to find each other, communicate, and perform pre-screening functions; mobile application software for enabling job-seekers and employers to find each other, communicate, and perform pre-screening functions…” in International Class 009. |
Applicant’s Mark, no less than these marks, is not merely descriptive and therefore deserving of registration. Competitors simply do not need to use Applicant’s Mark to describe related or competitive services. The fact that the Examining Attorney’s search of the PTO records failed to identify any similar registered or pending marks further supports this conclusion.
It is well settled that where there is any doubt as to the descriptiveness of a mark, the doubt should be resolved in Applicant’s favor and the mark should be published for opposition. See In re Aid Labs. Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. 1215 (TTAB 1983); McCarthy at §11:51 (“Because the line between merely descriptive and only suggestive terms is so ‘nebulous,’ the Trademark Board takes the position that doubt is resolved in favor of the applicant on the assumption that competitors have the opportunity to oppose the registration once published and to present evidence that is usually not present in ex parte examination.”) (citing several decisions, including In re Gourmet Bakers, Inc., 173 U.S.P.Q. 565 (T.T.A.B. 1972) and In re Conductive Systems, Inc., 220 U.S.P.Q. 84 (T.T.A.B. 1983)). Thus, if the response above has raised any doubts in the Examining Attorney’s mind, the rejection should be withdrawn.
Applicant thanks the Examiner for the conclusion that there are no conflicting marks under Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), that would bar Applicant’s mark from registration.
Because Applicant’s Mark is registrable on the Principal Register, as established above, no further response to this advisory is required at this time.
For the foregoing reasons, Applicant respectfully submits that all issues raised in the Office Action have been addressed and overcome. Accordingly, Applicant requests that the pending application proceed to registration. The Examiner is invited to contact the undersigned attorney to discuss the application, particularly if a discussion might help to facilitate prosecution of the application.