| To: | BLUEPRINT STUDIOS INC. (rnix@houkhornburg.com) |
| Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88474495 - BLUEPRINT - 19-068 |
| Sent: | September 07, 2019 03:06:08 PM |
| Sent As: | ecom122@uspto.gov |
| Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 Attachment - 24 Attachment - 25 Attachment - 26 Attachment - 27 Attachment - 28 Attachment - 29 Attachment - 30 Attachment - 31 Attachment - 32 Attachment - 33 Attachment - 34 Attachment - 35 Attachment - 36 Attachment - 37 Attachment - 38 Attachment - 39 Attachment - 40 Attachment - 41 Attachment - 42 Attachment - 43 Attachment - 44 Attachment - 45 Attachment - 46 Attachment - 47 Attachment - 48 Attachment - 49 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
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U.S. Application Serial No. 88474495
Mark: BLUEPRINT
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: BLUEPRINT STUDIOS INC.
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Reference/Docket No. 19-068
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: September 07, 2019
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 5704243, 4914385, 3584344. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registrations.
In the instant case, applicant seeks to register the mark BLUEPRINT in stylized font for “Boxing instruction; Physical fitness conditioning classes; Physical fitness instruction; Physical fitness studio services, namely, providing exercise classes, body sculpting classes, and group fitness classes; Physical fitness studio services, namely, providing group exercise instruction, equipment, and facilities; Physical fitness training of individuals and groups; Physical fitness training services” in Class 41.
The mark in Registration No. 5704243, owned by Casey Venters, is THE BLUEPRINT EXPERIENCE in standard characters for “Health club services, namely, providing instruction and equipment in the field of physical exercise; Personal trainer services; Physical fitness studio services, namely, providing group exercise instruction, equipment, and facilities” in Class 41, among other services.
The mark in Registration No. 4914385, owned by Quest Diagnostics Investments LLC, is BLUEPRINT FOR ATHLETES in standard characters for “Consulting services in the field of physical fitness” in Class 41, among other services.
The mark in Registration No. 3584344, owned by Blueprint Training, is BLUEPRINT TRAINING with a design for “Personal training services, namely, sports specific training” in Class 41.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the [services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
REGISTRATION No. 5704243 (THE BLUEPRINT EXPERIENCE)
Similarity of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Here, applicant’s mark is BLUEPRINT in stylized font and registrant’s mark is THE BLUEPRINT EXPERIENCE in standard characters. The term BLUEPRINT in applicant’s mark is identical in sound and appearance to the term BLUEPRINT in registrant’s mark. Moreover, this shared wording conveys the same meaning of a detailed plan of action. See http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=blueprint.
The addition of the wording THE and EXPERIENCE in the registered mark does not obviate the similarities between the marks. Although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark. See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)). Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion. See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.
Because the entirety of applicant’s mark is identical in sound, appearance, and meaning to a significant portion of the registrant’s mark, consumers are likely to believe the marks identify the same source of services.
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
Relatedness of the Services
Here, applicant’s fitness instruction services are related to registrant’s fitness instruction services.
In this case, the identification of “Physical fitness studio services, namely, providing group exercise instruction, equipment, and facilities” in the application and registration are identical. Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and class of purchasers are the same for these services. See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 27 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are related.
Moreover, the registration uses the broad wording “Physical fitness studio services, namely, providing group exercise instruction, equipment, and facilities” and “Health club services, namely, providing instruction and equipment in the field of physical exercise” to describe its fitness services, which presumably encompasses all services of the type described, including applicant’s more narrow identifications of “Physical fitness conditioning classes,” “Physical fitness instruction,” “Physical fitness studio services, namely, providing exercise classes, body sculpting classes, and group fitness classes,” “Physical fitness training of individuals and groups,” and “Physical fitness training services.” See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Finally, the attached Internet evidence, consisting of a number of third party websites, establishes that the same entity commonly provides and markets the relevant services, including boxing instruction, under the same mark. See
Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
Accordingly, when consumers encounter fitness services offered under highly similar marks, they are likely to be confused as to the source of the services.
In summary, the marks are confusingly similar and the services are related. Therefore, consumers are likely to be confused as to the source of the services. Thus, registration is refused pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
REGISTRATION No. 4914385 (BLUEPRINT FOR ATHLETES)
Similarity of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Here, applicant’s mark is BLUEPRINT in stylized font and registrant’s mark is BLUEPRINT FOR ATHLETES in standard characters. The term BLUEPRINT in applicant’s mark is identical in sound and appearance to the term BLUEPRINT in registrant’s mark. Moreover, this shared wording conveys the same meaning of a detailed plan of action. See http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=blueprint.
The addition of the wording FOR ATHLETES in the registered mark does not obviate the similarities between the marks. Although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark. See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)). Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion. See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.
Because the entirety of applicant’s mark is identical in sound, appearance, and meaning to a significant portion of the registrant’s mark, consumers are likely to believe the marks identify the same source of services.
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
Relatedness of the Services
The compared services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
Here, applicant’s fitness instruction services are related to registrant’s fitness consultation services.
The attached Internet evidence, consisting of a number of third party websites, establishes that the same entity commonly provides and markets the relevant services under the same mark. See
Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
Accordingly, when consumers encounter fitness services offered under highly similar marks, they are likely to be confused as to the source of the services.
In summary, the marks are confusingly similar and the services are related. Therefore, consumers are likely to be confused as to the source of the services. Thus, registration is refused pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
REGISTRATION No. 3584344 (BLUEPRINT TRAINING)
Similarity of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Here, applicant’s mark is BLUEPRINT in stylized font and registrant’s mark is BLUEPRINT TRAINING with a design. The term BLUEPRINT in applicant’s mark is identical in sound and appearance to the term BLUEPRINT in registrant’s mark. Moreover, this shared wording conveys the same meaning of a detailed plan of action. See http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=blueprint.
Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar. See In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1058, 224 USPQ at 751.
The addition of a design element in the registered mark does not obviate the similarities between the marks. When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the services. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Here, consumers will call for registrant’s services using the literal element, BLUEPRINT TRAINING, thus rendering this wording the more dominant element of the mark.
Moreover, the addition of the wording TRAINING in the registered mark does not obviate the similarities between the marks. Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Here, registrant has disclaimed the wording TRAINING, thus rendering the wording BLUEPRINT the dominant element of the mark.
Because the entirety of applicant’s mark is identical in sound, appearance, and meaning to the dominant portion of the registrant’s mark, consumers are likely to believe the marks identify the same source of services.
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
Relatedness of the Services
The compared services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
Here, applicant’s fitness training services are related to registrant’s fitness training services.
In this case, the application uses the broad wording “Physical fitness conditioning classes,” “Physical fitness instruction,” “Physical fitness studio services, namely, providing exercise classes, body sculpting classes, and group fitness classes,” “Physical fitness studio services, namely, providing group exercise instruction, equipment, and facilities,” “Physical fitness training of individuals and groups,” and “Physical fitness training services” to describe its services, which presumably encompasses all services of the type described, including registrant’s more narrow identification of “Personal training services, namely, sports specific training.” See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).
Similarly, registrant uses the broad wording “Personal training services, namely, sports specific training” to describe its services, which presumably encompass applicant’s more narrow identification of “Boxing instruction.” Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, the services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are related.
Accordingly, when consumers encounter fitness services offered under highly similar marks, they are likely to be confused as to the source of the services.
In summary, the marks are confusingly similar and the services are related. Therefore, consumers are likely to be confused as to the source of the services. Thus, registration is refused pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
PRIOR-FILED APPLICATION ADVISORY
The filing date of pending U.S. Application Serial No. 87799495 (BLUEPRINTFIT) precedes applicant’s filing date. See attached referenced application. If the mark in the referenced application registers, applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion between the two marks. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq. Therefore, upon receipt of applicant’s response to this Office action, action on this application may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed referenced application.
In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the mark in the referenced application. Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues. Please note that applicant must respond to the Section 2(d) Refusal above and the Requirements below within six months to avoid abandonment.
MARK DESCRIPTION AND COLOR CLAIM REQUIREMENT
The following description and color claim are suggested, if accurate:
The color(s) blue, white, and black is/are claimed as a feature of the mark.
The mark consists of the stylized term “BLUEPRINT” wherein the wording “BLUE” is in blue font and the word “PRINT” is in white font, all of the foregoing on a black background.
Applicant should note the following additional requirement.
SPECIMEN REQUIREMENT
Applicant has provided a specimen of a website, however, registration is refused because the specimen does not show the mark in the drawing in use in commerce in International Class 41, which is required in the application. Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a), 1301.04(g)(i). The mark appearing on the specimen and in the drawing must match; that is, the mark in the drawing “must be a substantially exact representation of the mark” on the specimen. See 37 C.F.R. §2.51(a)-(b); TMEP §807.12(a).
In this case, the drawing displays the mark as being blue and white font on a black background. However, the specimen displays the mark as being blue and gray font on a white background. Thus, the mark on the specimen does not match the mark in the drawing because the colors differ between the drawing and specimen. Applicant has thus failed to provide the required evidence of use of the mark in commerce. See TMEP §807.12(a).
Applicant may respond to this refusal by satisfying one of the following:
(1) Submit a new drawing of the mark that shows the mark on the specimen and, if appropriate, an amendment of the description and/or color claim that agrees with the new drawing. See 37 C.F.R. §2.72(a)-(b). The following amended description and color claim is suggested, if accurate: The color(s) blue and gray is/are claimed as a feature of the mark. The mark consists of the stylized wording “BLUEPRINT” where the wording “BLUE” is in blue font and the wording “PRINT” is in gray font.” Applicant may amend the mark in the drawing to match the mark on the specimen but may not make any other changes or amendments that would materially alter the drawing of the mark. See 37 C.F.R. §2.72(a)-(b); TMEP §807.14.
(2) Submit a different specimen (a verified “substitute” specimen) for each applicable international class that (a) shows the mark in the drawing in actual use in commerce for the services in the application, and (b) was in actual use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application.
Examples of specimens for services include advertising and marketing materials, brochures, photographs of business signage and billboards, and webpages that show the mark used in the actual sale, rendering, or advertising of the services. See TMEP §1301.04(a), (h)(iv)(C).
For more information about drawings and instructions on how to satisfy these response options online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, see the Drawing webpage.
RESPONSE GUIDELINES
For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action
/Lisa A. Papale/
Trademark Examining Attorney
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
Law Office 122
(571) 272-7751
lisa.papale@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE
