Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  October 24, 2019

 

INTRODUCTION

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on October 1, 2019.

 

In a previous Office action dated September 7, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:  Trademark Act Section 2(d) and Trademark Act Section 2(e)1.

 

Applicant’s arguments and amendment with respect to the refusal(s) have been considered and found unpersuasive for the reasons set forth below. The trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusals in the summary of issues below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:

• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
• Section 2(e)1 Refusal – Merely Descriptive

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4889990, THERE’S A PARTY IN EVERY POUCH (standard characters), for “Food for animals” in International Class 031.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the previously attached registration.

 

The applied-for mark, POUCH (standard characters), is for “Pet food” in International Class 031.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

In this case, both key considerations (i.e., similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods) support refusal of the applicant’s mark for registration.

 

Similarity of the Marks

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Where the goods of an applicant and registrant are legally identical, as in this case, the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding that confusion is likely declines.  See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In applicant’s response of October 1, 2019, applicant argues that “the marks are significantly different in their entirety, appearance when printed, speech, and commercial impression”. However, both the applied-for mark and registered mark share the identical wording “POUCH”.  Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

 

Marks must be compared in their entireties and should not be dissected; however, a trademark examining attorney may weigh the individual components of a mark to determine its overall commercial impression.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[Regarding the issue of confusion,] there is nothing improper in stating that . . . more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties.” (quoting In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). In this case, the identical “POUCH” wording is emphasized in the registrant’s mark due to its being the subject matter of the slogan as it the “POUCH” is the location of every party. As such, a consumer would be likely to understand the “POUCH” wording from the registrant’s slogan to be used in reference to applicant’s “POUCH” mark. 

 

Applicant also argues that the marks are different in length, meaning, and connotation.  The examining attorney is not persuaded by this argument.  The marks in question share the identical wording “POUCH”, which retains the same meaning and connotation in both marks. Although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  In particular, a prospective purchaser may perceive the registered mark as a slogan for the applied-for mark.  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.

 

In addition, the applicant “agrees these products are similar”. It is settled that where the goods of an applicant and registrant are “similar in kind and/or closely related,” as in this case, the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as in the case of diverse goods.  In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987); see Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1242, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Finally, the applicant argues that the likelihood of impulse buying does not apply because the length of the marks differ.  The trademark examining attorney is not persuaded by this argument.  Pet food is a low-priced, every-day consumer item.  The attached evidence from Petsmart.com, Chewy.com, Petco.com, and Amazon.com shows pet food priced at $0.46, $1.52, $1.99, and $4.32, respectively.  Notably, the pet food shown on Petco.com is sold in pouch form at $1.52.  For products that are relatively low-priced and subject to impulse buying, the risk of likelihood of confusion increases because purchasers of these products are held to a lesser standard of purchasing care.  In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d 1958, 1960 (TTAB 2016) (quoting Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1899 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  Casual purchasers of low-cost, every-day consumer items are generally more likely to be confused as to the source of the goods.  In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1818 (TTAB 2014) (citing Specialty Brands, Inc. v. Coffee Bean Distribs., Inc., 748 F.2d 669, 672, 223 USPQ 1281, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).  Accordingly, the risk of likelihood of confusion is not dispelled by the differing lengths of the marks in question.

 

In summary, the marks are identical in part and consumers may perceive the applied-for mark as a shortened form of the registered mark. In addition, the cost of the goods in the application and registration are relatively low and subject to impulse buying.  As such, the marks are likely to cause confusion when used on or in connection with highly similar or closely related goods. The high likelihood of confusion supports refusal of the applicant’s mark for registration.

 

Relatedness of the Goods

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). 

 

In this case, the registration uses broad wording to describe “Food for animals”, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including applicant’s more narrowly identified “Pet food”.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.

 

The similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods supports the refusal of the application.

 

Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.

 

SECTION 2(e)(1) REFUSAL - MERELY DESCRIPTIVE

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark merely describes a feature of applicant’s goods.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); see TMEP §§1209.01(b), 1209.03 et seq.

 

A mark is merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of an applicant’s goods.  TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re TriVita, Inc., 783 F.3d 872, 874, 114 USPQ2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920)). 

 

The previously attached evidence from The American Heritage dictionary shows that the wording “POUCH” means “[a] sealed plastic or foil container used for packaging food or drink”. In addition, the previously attached evidence from Chewy.com, LoyalCompanian.com, and PetCo.com shows that the wording “POUCH” is commonly used in the industry to describe a feature of pet food – namely, the packaging in which the product is sold. Accordingly, the wording “POUCH” in the mark is descriptive of applicant’s identified goods, “Pet food”. Additional evidence is attached to this office action from Amazon.com, PetCo.com and StandUpPouches.Net showing that the word “POUCH” is used to describe an entire type of pet food packaging which preserves and protects. “Whether consumers could guess what the product [or service] is from consideration of the mark alone is not the test.”  In re Am. Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985).  The pertinent question is “whether someone who knows what the goods and[/or] services are will understand the mark to convey information about them.”  DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1254, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1757 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Tower Tech, Inc., 64 USPQ2d 1314, 1316-17 (TTAB 2002)); In re Mueller Sports. Med., Inc., 126 USPQ2d 1584, 1587 (TTAB 2018). As such consumers would be used to seeing the applied-for mark being used descriptively in association with the identified goods.

 

In its response of October 1, 2019, applicant argues that the wording “POUCH” in the mark is not descriptive of its identified goods, “Pet food”, because the wording describes packaging and not pet food.  The trademark examining attorney does not find this argument persuasive. A mark is merely descriptive if it describes a feature of an applicant’s goods.  See TMEP §1209.01(b).  The identified goods, “Pet food”, necessarily must be sold in some form. As demonstrated by previously attached evidence, it is not uncommon for pet food to be sold in a pouch.  A term that describes the shape or form of a product is merely descriptive.  In re Metcal Inc., 1 USPQ2d 1334 (TTAB 1986) (holding SOLDER STRAP merely descriptive of self regulating heaters in the form of flexible bands or straps); In re H.U.D.D.L.E., 216 USPQ 358 (TTAB 1982) (holding TOOBS merely descriptive of bathroom and kitchen fixtures in the shape of tubes).

 

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has previously held that terms which describe the packaging of applied-for goods are descriptive when used in relation to the goods themselves. See In re Charcoal Box USA, L.L.C, Serial Nos. 86532794 and 865336461 (March 22, 2017) [not precedential] (holding THE BOX merely descriptive of applicant’s charcoal and charcoal packaged in charcoal starter goods); In re Stacked Wines, LLC, Serial No. 85129206 (September 4, 2013) [not precedential] (holding STACKED merely descriptive of a feature of applicant’s wine, i.e., applicant’s wine is sold in vertically “stacked” glasses); see also J. Kohnstam, Ltd. v. Louis Marx & Co., 280 F.2d 437, 126 USPQ 362 (CCPA 1960) (finding that the term MATCHBOX SERIES is merely descriptive of model toy vehicles sold in boxes the size and appearance of matchboxes).

 

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has stated that decisions designated as not precedential are not binding upon the Board but may be cited and considered for whatever persuasive value they might have.  In re Soc’y of Health & Physical Educators, 127 USPQ2d 1584, 1587 n.7 (TTAB 2018); TBMP §§101.03, 1203.02(f); TMEP §705.05.

 

Registration is therefore refused under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1) because the applied-for mark merely describes a feature of applicant’s goods. 

 

Advisory – Supplemental Register

Although an amendment to the Supplemental Register would normally be an appropriate response to this Section 2(e)(4) refusal(s), such a response is not appropriate in the present case.  The instant application was filed under Trademark Act Section 1(b) and is not eligible for registration on the Supplemental Register until an acceptable amendment to allege use meeting the requirements of 37 C.F.R. §2.76 has been timely filed.  37 C.F.R. §2.47(d); TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03.

 

If applicant files an acceptable allegation of use and also amends to the Supplemental Register, the application effective filing date will be the date applicant met the minimum filing requirements under 37 C.F.R. §2.76(c) for an amendment to allege use.  TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03; see 37 C.F.R. §2.75(b).  In addition, the undersigned trademark examining attorney will conduct a new search of the USPTO records for conflicting marks based on the later application filing date.  TMEP §§206.01, 1102.03.

 

Based on the foregoing, the refusals of registration under Sections 2(d) and 2(e)(4) of the Trademark Act are made FINAL.

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this final Office action and/or appeal it to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB)

 

 

Shinn, Lauren

/Lauren D. Shinn/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 128

(571) 270-5230

Lauren.Shinn@USPTO.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on October 24, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88473396

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

Shinn, Lauren

/Lauren D. Shinn/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 128

(571) 270-5230

Lauren.Shinn@USPTO.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from October 24, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond.

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”