Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  March 06, 2020

 

 

 

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INTRODUCTION

 

This Office action is supplemental to and supersedes the previous Office action issued on September 6, 2019 in connection with this application.  Based on information and/or documentation in applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney now issues the following new disclaimer requirement in light of the applicant's Section 2(f) acquired distinctiveness claim.  See TMEP §§706, 711.02. 

 

In a previous Office action dated September 6, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:  (1) Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark, and (2) Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1) for mere descriptiveness.  In addition, applicant was required to provide the bar information and an attestation of its attorney.

 

Based on applicant’s sufficient Section 2(f) claim, the Section 2(e)(1) refusal has been obviated.  See TMEP §713.02. 

 

In addition, the requirement to provide the bar information and the attestation of the attorney of record is satisfied.  See id. 

 

The following is a SUMMARY OF ISSUES that applicant must address:

 

•        NEW ISSUE:  Disclaimer Required

•        Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion (MAINTAINED AND CONTINUED)

 

Applicant must respond to all issues raised in this Office action and the previous September 6, 2019, Office action, within six (6) months of the date of issuance of this Office action.  37 C.F.R. §2.62(a); see TMEP §711.02.  If applicant does not respond within this time limit, the application will be abandoned.  37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).

 

 

NEW ISSUE:  DISCLAIMER REQUIRED

 

Applicant was previously advised that, if the application is amended to seek registration on the Principal Register under Trademark Act Section 2(f), applicant would be required to disclaim "BALL" as the wording appears to be generic in the context of the applicant's services.  See 15 U.S.C. §1056(a); In re Wella Corp., 565 F.2d 143, 144, 196 USPQ 7, 8 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Creative Goldsmiths of Wash., Inc., 229 USPQ 766, 768 (TTAB 1986); TMEP §1213.03(b).

 

Applicant must provide a disclaimer of the unregistrable part of the applied-for mark even though the mark as a whole appears to be registrable.  See 15 U.S.C. §1056(a); In re Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 65 USPQ2d 1972, 1981-85 (TTAB 2003); TMEP §§1213, 1213.03(a).  A disclaimer of an unregistrable part of a mark will not affect the mark’s appearance.  See Schwarzkopf v. John H. Breck, Inc., 340 F.2d 978, 979-80, 144 USPQ 433, 433 (C.C.P.A. 1965).

 

In this case, applicant must disclaim the wording “BALL” because it is not inherently distinctive.  This unregistrable term is generic for applicant’s services and is thus an unregistrable component of the mark.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); In re Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 65 USPQ2d 1972, 1981-85 (TTAB 2003); TMEP §§1212.02(e), 1213.03(b). 

 

“A mark is generic if its primary significance to the relevant public is the class or category of goods or services on or in connection with which it is used.”  TMEP §1209.01(c)(i) (citing H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 989-90, 228 USPQ 528, 530 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re ActiveVideo Networks, Inc., 111 USPQ2d 1581, 1600 (TTAB 2014)).  Determining whether a mark is generic requires a two-step inquiry:

 

(1)       What is the genus of services at issue?

 

(2)       Does the relevant public understand the designation primarily to refer to that genus of services?

 

H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d at 989-90, 228 USPQ at 530; In re Meridian Rack & Pinion, 114 USPQ2d 1462, 1463 (TTAB 2015); TMEP §1209.01(c)(i). 

 

Regarding the first part of the inquiry, the genus of services is often defined by an applicant’s identification of services.  In re Meridian Rack & Pinion, 114 USPQ2d at 1463.  An applicant’s website may assist in clarifying or refining the genus by providing the context for the terms in the identification.  In re Reed Elsevier Props. Inc., 482 F.3d 1376, 1379, 82 USPQ2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Katch, LLC, 2019 USPQ2d 233842, at *3 (TTAB 2019) (quoting In re DNI Holdings Ltd., 77 USPQ2d 1435, 1439 (TTAB 2005)).  Here, the application identifies the services as follows:  "Charitable fundraising services by means of an entertainment event".  The applicant's specimen of use showing an excerpt of its website further clarifies the genus by indicating that its services feature a Bubble Ball, which is described as a "unique event[]" and a "signature gala".

 

Regarding the second part of the inquiry, the relevant public is the purchasing or consuming public for the identified services.  Sheetz of Del., Inc. v. Doctor’s Assocs. Inc., 108 USPQ2d 1341, 1351 (TTAB 2013).  In this case, the relevant public comprises ordinary consumers who purchase applicant’s services and take part in the applicant's entertainment events, because there are no restrictions or limitations to the channels of trade or classes of consumers.  The attached evidence from the Merriam-Webster Dictionary shows that the wording “BALL” is defined as "a large formal gathering for social dancing" and thus the relevant public would understand this designation to refer primarily to the genus of services, namely, a formal gala or event for charitable fundraising.

 

Applicant may respond to this issue by submitting a disclaimer in the following format: 

 

No claim is made to the exclusive right to use “BALL” apart from the mark as shown. 

 

For an overview of disclaimers and instructions on how to provide one using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), see the Disclaimer webpage. 

 

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

(MAINTAINED AND CONTINUED)

 

Registration of the applied-for was previously is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4438705 (BUBBLE).  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  The registration was previously attached.

 

The Applicant’s mark is BUBBLE BALL for “Charitable fundraising services by means of an entertainment event”.

 

The Registrant’s mark is BUBBLE (+design) for “Charitable fundraising services by means of organizing and conducting fashion shows for children, dinner parties, and lectures on nutrition for the purposes of promoting nutrition and physical fitness in disadvantaged children”.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by-case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the services, and similarity of the trade channels of the services.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Applicant’s arguments have been considered and found unpersuasive for the reasons set forth below.

 

COMPARISON OF THE MARKS

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Applicant's mark is BUBBLE BALL.

 

Registrant's mark is BUBBLE (+design).

 

In this case, both marks feature the wording “BUBBLE”.  Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

 

As the first or only term in each mark, the common wording “BUBBLE” is the dominant feature upon which consumers will focus.  Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).

 

The applicant’s addition of the term “BALL” to the common wording will not avoid a likelihood of confusion here.  Adding a term to a registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER and design confusingly similar); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1269 (TTAB 2009) (finding TITAN and VANTAGE TITAN confusingly similar); In re El Torito Rests., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002, 2004 (TTAB 1988) (finding MACHO and MACHO COMBOS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part.

 

Moreover, the additional term "BALL" does not alter the commercial impression of the applicant's mark here because the wording is generic for the services and must be disclaimed (See disclaimer requirement above).  It is noted that the applicant has already conceded that the wording is not inherently distinctive and is merely descriptive of the services by nature of its acquired distinctiveness claim.  Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  As such, the common wording "BUBBLE" remains the dominant feature of the applicant's mark, and the applicant has not indicated how the commercial impression of the marks would be different, even with the inclusion of this additional generic wording.  The applicant discusses other potential meanings of the wording "BUBBLE", but does not posit in what way the applicant's mark would create a different commercial impression than the registrant's mark in relation to the services such that consumers would not likely be confused as to the source of these legally identical services and identical-in-part marks.

 

The applicant also contends that the common wording "BUBBLE" in the marks is weak and is entitled to a narrower scope of protection.  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board have recognized that marks deemed “weak” or merely descriptive are still entitled to protection under Section 2(d) against the registration by a subsequent user of a similar mark for closely related services.  TMEP §1207.01(b)(ix); see King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 1401, 182 USPQ 108, 109 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Max Capital Grp. Ltd., 93 USPQ2d 1243, 1246 (TTAB 2010). 

 

As the applicant is aware, when comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).  In fact, the applicant asserts that marks should not be dissected.  Nevertheless, the applicant appears to proceed to dissect the marks based on the number of letters in each mark, and claims that the marks are different simply by nature of the addition of a generic word, namely, "BALL".  Again, marks are considered as a whole based on the general commercial impression of the marks, and not through a side-by-side comparison of the number of letters in each mark.

 

Moreover, the inclusion of a design element in the registered mark will not obviate a likelihood of confusion here.  When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the services.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).  Nevertheless, the design in the registered mark represents bubbles, and only bolsters the common commercial impression of bubbles and children’s activities created by each mark.

 

Furthermore, where the services of an applicant and registrant are legally identical, the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding that confusion is likely declines.  See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

COMPARISON OF THE SERVICES

 

The services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).  The compared services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). 

 

In this case, the application uses broad wording to describe its charitable fundraising services by means of an entertainment event, which presumably encompasses all services of the type described, including the registrant’s narrower charitable fundraising services by means of specific entertainment events.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Additionally, the services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are related.

 

It is noted that the applicant does not dispute the relatedness of the services here.

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

The applicant notes that the owner of the cited registration has not yet filed a Section 8 Affidavit.  However, as the grace period to file these maintenance documents has not yet expired, this application will not be suspended because the registration is still valid.

 

In light of the similarities between the marks and the relatedness of the services, it is likely that consumers who encounter the parties' services will falsely conclude that they originate from the same source.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusals by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although an examining attorney cannot provide legal advice, the examining attorney can provide additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

 

Yi, Crystal

/Crystal H. Yi/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 123

571.270.0763

crystal.yi@uspto.gov

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.    

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on March 06, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88472095

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

Yi, Crystal

/Crystal H. Yi/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 123

571.270.0763

crystal.yi@uspto.gov

 

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from March 06, 2020, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”