| To: | ChildServe, Inc. (brian.laurenzo@brickgentrylaw.com) |
| Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88472095 - BUBBLE BALL - 28654.007 |
| Sent: | September 06, 2019 09:53:25 AM |
| Sent As: | ecom123@uspto.gov |
| Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
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U.S. Application Serial No. 88472095
Mark: BUBBLE BALL
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Correspondence Address: |
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Applicant: ChildServe, Inc.
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Reference/Docket No. 28654.007
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: September 06, 2019
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
· Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
· Section 2(e)(1) Refusal – Merely Descriptive
· U.S.-Licensed Attorney Bar Information and Attestation Required
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4438705 (BUBBLE). Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registration.
The Applicant’s mark is BUBBLE BALL for “Charitable fundraising services by means of an entertainment event”.
The Registrant’s mark is BUBBLE (+design) for “Charitable fundraising services by means of organizing and conducting fashion shows for children, dinner parties, and lectures on nutrition for the purposes of promoting nutrition and physical fitness in disadvantaged children”.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the services of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by-case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the services, and similarity of the trade channels of the services. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
COMPARISON OF THE MARKS
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Applicant's mark is BUBBLE BALL.
Registrant's mark is BUBBLE (+design).
As the first or only term in each mark, the common wording “BUBBLE” is the dominant feature upon which consumers will focus. Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).
The applicant’s addition of the generic term “BALL” to the common wording will not avoid a likelihood of confusion here. Adding a term to a registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER and design confusingly similar); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1269 (TTAB 2009) (finding TITAN and VANTAGE TITAN confusingly similar); In re El Torito Rests., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002, 2004 (TTAB 1988) (finding MACHO and MACHO COMBOS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). In the present case, the marks are identical in part.
The inclusion of a design element in the registered mark will not obviate a likelihood of confusion here. When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the services. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Nevertheless, the design in the registered mark represents bubbles, and only bolsters the common commercial impression of bubbles and children’s activities created by each mark.
COMPARISON OF THE SERVICES
The services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi). The compared services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
In this case, the application uses broad wording to describe its charitable fundraising services, which presumably encompasses all services of the type described, including the registrant’s narrower charitable fundraising services. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, the services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are related.
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
In light of the similarities between the marks and the relatedness of the services, it is likely that consumers who encounter the parties' services will falsely conclude that they originate from the same source.
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusals by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. If applicant responds to the refusals, applicant must also respond to the requirements set forth below.
SECTION 2(e)(1) REFUSAL – MERELY DESCRIPTIVE
A mark is merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of an applicant’s services. TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re TriVita, Inc., 783 F.3d 872, 874, 114 USPQ2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920)).
The applicant's mark is BUBBLE BALL for "Charitable fundraising services by means of an entertainment event".
“Whether consumers could guess what the product [or service] is from consideration of the mark alone is not the test.” In re Am. Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985).
Here, the Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “BUBBLE” as “a small globule typically hollo and light: such as . . . a thin film of liquid inflated with air or gas[, or] something (such as a plastic or inflatable structure) that is hemispherical or semicylindrical”, and “BALL” as “a large formal gathering for social dancing” (See attached evidence from merriam-webster.com). In addition, the specimen of use indicates that the services are a charity gala featuring bubble wrap creations. In this case, the wording "BUBBLE BALL" immediately conveys and merely describes a feature of Applicant's identified services, namely, that it is a charity ball featuring bubble and bubble wrap creations.
Each word in Applicant's composite mark, when considered individually and as a whole, immediately conveys this feature of Applicant's services. Generally, if the individual components of a mark retain their descriptive meaning in relation to the services, the combination results in a composite mark that is itself descriptive and not registrable. In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1516 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Tower Tech, Inc., 64 USPQ2d 1314, 1317-18 (TTAB (2002)); TMEP §1209.03(d); see, e.g., In re Cannon Safe, Inc., 116 USPQ2d 1348, 1351 (TTAB 2015) (holding SMART SERIES merely descriptive of metal gun safes, because “each component term retains its merely descriptive significance in relation to the goods, resulting in a mark that is also merely descriptive”); In re King Koil Licensing Co., 79 USPQ2d 1048, 1052 (TTAB 2006) (holding THE BREATHABLE MATTRESS merely descriptive of beds, mattresses, box springs, and pillows where the evidence showed that the term “BREATHABLE” retained its ordinary dictionary meaning when combined with the term “MATTRESS” and the resulting combination was used in the relevant industry in a descriptive sense); In re Associated Theatre Clubs Co., 9 USPQ2d 1660, 1663 (TTAB 1988) (holding GROUP SALES BOX OFFICE merely descriptive of theater ticket sales services, because such wording “is nothing more than a combination of the two common descriptive terms most applicable to applicant’s services which in combination achieve no different status but remain a common descriptive compound expression”). Only where the combination of descriptive terms creates a unitary mark with a unique, incongruous, or otherwise nondescriptive meaning in relation to the services is the combined mark registrable. See In re Colonial Stores, Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 551, 157 USPQ 382, 384 (C.C.P.A. 1968); In re Positec Grp. Ltd., 108 USPQ2d 1161, 1162-63 (TTAB 2013). In this case, Applicant's mark does not seem to create any additional non-descriptive meaning in relation to the services.
Section 2(e)(1) Refusal Response Options
Section 2(f) Acquired Distinctiveness
To seek registration on the Principal Register based on a claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f), applicant generally may (1) submit actual evidence that the mark has acquired distinctiveness of the services, (2) claim ownership of an active prior U.S. registration for the same mark for sufficiently similar services, or (3) provide the following verified statement of five years’ use: “The mark has become distinctive of the goods and/or services through the applicant’s substantially exclusive and continuous use of the mark in commerce that the U.S. Congress may lawfully regulate for at least five years immediately before the date of this statement.” See 15 U.S.C. §1052(f); 37 C.F.R. §2.41(a); TMEP §§1212.03-.06 et seq.
However, in this case, the USPTO will not accept a verified statement of five years’ use alone to establish distinctiveness because applicant’s mark is highly descriptive of applicant’s services. See In re Kalmbach Publ’g Co., 14 USPQ2d 1490, 1491-92 (TTAB 1989); TMEP §1212.05(a). An applicant’s evidentiary burden of showing acquired distinctiveness increases with the level of descriptiveness of the mark sought to be registered; a more descriptive term requires more evidence. Royal Crown Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 892 F.3d 1358, 1365, 127 USPQ2d 1041, 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1300, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
To support this claim of acquired distinctiveness, applicant may submit evidence of “advertising expenditures, sales success, length and exclusivity of use, unsolicited media coverage, and consumer studies (linking the name to a source).” In re Change Wind Corp., 123 USPQ2d 1453, 1467 (TTAB 2017) (quoting In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1300, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). A showing of acquired distinctiveness need not consider all of these types of evidence; no single factor is determinative. In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1300, 75 USPQ2d at 1424; see TMEP §§1212.06 et seq. Rather, the determination involves assessing all of the circumstances involving the use of the mark. See In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1300, 75 USPQ2d at 1424 (citing Thompson Med. Co., Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 217, 225 USPQ2d 124, 131-32 (2d Cir. 1985)).
Supplemental Register
To amend the application to the Supplemental Register, applicant must provide a written statement requesting that the application be amended to the Supplemental Register. TMEP §816.01; see 15 U.S.C. §1091; 37 C.F.R. §2.47.
Although registration on the Supplemental Register does not afford all the benefits of registration on the Principal Register, it does provide the following advantages to the registrant:
(1) Use of the registration symbol ® with the registered mark in connection with the designated goods and/or services, which provides public notice of the registration and potentially deters third parties from using confusingly similar marks.
(2) Inclusion of the registered mark in the USPTO’s database of registered and pending marks, which will (a) make it easier for third parties to find it in trademark search reports, (b) provide public notice of the registration, and thus (c) potentially deter third parties from using confusingly similar marks.
(3) Use of the registration by a USPTO trademark examining attorney as a bar to registering confusingly similar marks in applications filed by third parties.
(4) Use of the registration as a basis to bring suit for trademark infringement in federal court, which, although more costly than state court, means judges with more trademark experience, often faster adjudications, and the opportunity to seek an injunction, actual damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs.
(5) Use of the registration as a filing basis for a trademark application for registration in certain foreign countries, in accordance with international treaties.
See 15 U.S.C. §§1052(d), 1091, 1094; J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair Competition §§19:33, 19:37 (rev. 4th ed. Supp. 2017).
Disclaimer Advisory
Applicant is advised that, if the application is amended to seek registration on the Principal Register under Trademark Act Section 2(f) or on the Supplemental Register, applicant will be required to disclaim “BALL” because such wording appears to be generic in the context of applicant’s services. See 15 U.S.C. §1056(a); In re Wella Corp., 565 F.2d 143, 144, 196 USPQ 7, 8 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Creative Goldsmiths of Wash., Inc., 229 USPQ 766, 768 (TTAB 1986); TMEP §1213.03(b).
Applicant may submit a disclaimer in the following format:
No claim is made to the exclusive right to use “BALL” apart from the mark as shown.
TMEP §1213.08(a)(i).
For an overview of disclaimers and instructions on how to satisfy this issue using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), see the Disclaimer webpage.
U.S.-LICENSED ATTORNEY BAR INFORMATION AND ATTESTATION REQUIRED
Attorney bar information required. Applicant’s attorney must provide the following bar information: (1) his or her bar membership number, if the bar provides one; (2) the name of the U.S. state, commonwealth, or territory of his or her bar membership; and (3) the year of his or her admission to the bar. 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(3). This information is required for all U.S.-licensed attorneys who are representing trademark applicants at the USPTO. Id. If the attorney’s bar does not issue bar membership numbers, applicant must state this for the record. See id.
To provide bar information. Applicant’s attorney should respond to this Office action by using the appropriate TEAS response form and provide his or her bar information in the “Attorney Information” page of the form, within the bar information section. See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(1)(ii). Bar information provided in any other area of the form will be viewable by the public in USPTO records.
Attorney statement required. Applicant’s attorney must provide the following statement: “I am an attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of a U.S. state (including the District of Columbia and any U.S. Commonwealth or territory).” See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(3). This is required for all U.S.-licensed attorneys who are representing trademark applicants at the USPTO. Id.
If the applicant has any questions or requires assistance in responding to this Office Action, please contact the examining attorney at the contact information provided below. Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action. Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
Yi, Crystal
/Crystal H. Yi/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 123
571.270.0763
crystal.yi@uspto.gov
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action
RESPONSE GUIDANCE
