To: | Pride Manufacturing Company, LLC (uspt@polsinelli.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88470607 - CHAMP - 086394628388 |
Sent: | August 30, 2020 06:38:07 PM |
Sent As: | ecom122@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88470607
Mark: CHAMP
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Correspondence Address: ONE EAST WASHINGTON, SUITE 1200
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Applicant: Pride Manufacturing Company, LLC
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Reference/Docket No. 086394628388
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: August 30, 2020
This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on January 22, 2020 (the “Response”).
In a previous Office action dated July 22, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following: Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark. In addition, Applicant was given an advisory that a prior pending application may have posed a bar to registration.
Based on applicant’s response, the refusal below is maintained and continued. See TMEP § 713.02.
In addition, the advisory that a prior pending application may have posed a bar to registration is withdrawn because the pending application has since matured into a registration and is now the subject of the New Section 2(d) Refusal set forth below.
The following is a SUMMARY OF ISSUES that applicant must address:
• NEW ISSUE: New Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
• Response Guidelines
Applicant must respond to all issues raised in this Office action within six (6) months of the date of issuance of this Office action. 37 C.F.R. §2.62(a); see TMEP §711.02. If applicant does not respond within this time limit, the application will be abandoned. 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).
NEW SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration Nos. 5547485 & 5986287. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registrations.
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Applicant seeks to register the mark “CHAMP” in standard characters for “golf tees, golf club grips, golf ball markers, golf divot repair tools” in International Class 028.
Registrants’ marks are:
Similarity of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Applicant’s mark is “CHAMP” in standard characters.
Registrants’ marks are:
Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34).
First, with regard to the wording “CLUB” in the mark in U.S. Reg. No. 5986287, “CLUB CHAMP”, this wording has been disclaimed as descriptive. Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).
Therefore, the dominant portion of this registered mark is the word “CHAMP”, which is identical to the entirety of the applied-for mark. These marks are identical in dominant part in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Additionally, because they are identical in dominant part, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services. Id.
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
Further, the entirety of the applied-for mark, “CHAMP”, is encompassed in each of the registered marks, “CHAMPKEY” and “CLUB CHAMP”, which each has additional wording to distinguish themselves from each other. Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). In the present case, the marks are identical in part.
In the Response, Applicant asserted that it objects to the refusal of the mark based on a likelihood of confusion with mark in U.S. Reg. No. 5547485, but did not present any specific arguments. Therefore, to the extent that the response is an argument that the marks themselves are not sufficiently similar, this Response is unpersuasive at this time.
As set forth above, Applicant’s mark “CHAMP” is confusingly similar with registrants’ marks in U.S. Reg. Nos. 5547485 & 5986287. Next, the goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.
Similarity or Relatedness of the Goods
Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and services stated in the application and registrations at issue, not on evidence of actual use. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
Here, the goods identified by Applicant are for “golf tees, golf club grips, golf ball markers, golf divot repair tools” in International Class 028.
The goods identified by registrants are:
In this case, some of the goods in the application and registrations are identical, namely, “golf tees, golf club grips, golf ball markers.” Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and class(es) of purchasers are the same for these goods and/or services. See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1372, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.
Further, in addition to the evidence attached to the Prior Action from Callaway, Taylormade, and PING, the additional Internet evidence from Pitchfix, Team Golf, and Birdicorn, attached to this current Office Action, establishes that the same entity that commonly produces golf divot repair tools also makes at least some of the types of goods identified by registrants, and markets the goods under the same mark, sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use, and the goods are similar or complementary in terms of purpose or function. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
In the Response, Applicant asserted that it objects to the refusal of the mark based on a likelihood of confusion with mark in U.S. Reg. No. 5547485, but did not present any specific arguments. Therefore, to the extent that the response is an argument that the goods themselves are not sufficiently similar, this Response is unpersuasive at this time.
Accordingly, Applicant’s goods are sufficiently related to the goods identified in U.S. Registration Nos. 5547485 & 5986287.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, registration of the applied-for mark is refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d) due to a likelihood of confusion with U.S. Trademark Registration Nos. 5547485 & 5986287.
RESPONSE GUIDELINES
Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action. Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
Respond online to this letter. Use the TEAS “Response to Office Action” online form to file a response
If Applicant does not respond to this Office action within six months of the issue/mailing date, or responds by expressly abandoning the application, the application process will end and the trademark will fail to register. See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.65(a), 2.68(a); TMEP §§718.01, 718.02. Additionally, the USPTO will not refund the application filing fee, which is a required processing fee. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(i)-(iv), 2.209(a); TMEP §405.04.
When an application has abandoned for failure to respond to an Office action, an applicant may timely file a petition to revive the application, which, if granted, would allow the application to return to active status. See 37 C.F.R. §2.66; TMEP §1714. The petition must be filed within two months of the date of issuance of the notice of abandonment and may be filed online via the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) with a $100 fee. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(15)(ii), 2.66(a)(1), (b)(1).
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
Roth, Benjamin
/Benjamin H. Roth/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 122
(571) 272 -5266
benjamin.roth@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE