Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

Issue date:  April 02, 2020

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on March 11, 2020.

 

In a previous Office action(s) dated September 11, 2019 the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:  Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark. 

 

Applicant’s arguments in response to this refusal have been carefully reviewed and considered, however, in light of the evidence of record and applicable law, this refusal is maintained and is made FINAL.

 

Accordingly, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in the summary of issues below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:

• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

 

Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

 

This refusal is maintained and is made FINAL.

Registration of the applied-for mark continues to be refused and is made FINAL because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3059429.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the previously attached registration of record.

 

Applicant’s applied-for mark is for the standard character mark “FITWELL”.  Applicant’s identified goods are “Bodysuits; Bras; Hosiery; Leggings; Lingerie; Panties; Shapewear; Sleepwear; Sports bras; Undergarments; Yoga pants; Women's athletic tops with built-in bras”.

Registration No. 3059429 is for the standard character mark “FITZWELL”.  This registration is for “Shoes and footwear”.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods and/or services, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods and/or services. 

 

Comparison of the Marks,

 

Under the first step in analysis under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, a comparison must be made between registrant’s standard character mark, “FITZWELL” and applicant’s standard character mark, “FITWELL”.

 

Applicant’s and registrant’s marks are highly similar because they share the elements “FIT” and “WELL” – the dominant features of both marks.  Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Greater weight is often given to the dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar.  See In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1058, 224 USPQ at 751.  These shared dominant features make applicant’s and registrant’s marks highly similar in sound, appearance, and resulting commercial impression.

 

Further, applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark both start with the element “FIT” making it more significant in this determination.  Consumers are also generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F. 3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered” when making purchasing decisions). 

 

Although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark, as applicant has merely removed the letter “Z” present in the middle of registrant’s mark.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains 7 of 8 letters of in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.  This mere deletion of the letter “Z” in the middle of registrant’s mark does little to obviate the overall similarity of these marks.

 

Lastly, when comparing marks, the test is not whether the marks can be distinguished in a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their overall commercial impression that confusion as to the source of the goods offered under the respective marks is likely to result.  Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d 1046, 1053, 103 USPQ2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1813 (TTAB 2014); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  United Global Media Grp., Inc. v. Tseng, 112 USPQ2d 1039, 1049, (TTAB 2014); L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (TTAB 2012); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In this instance the differences between “FITZWELL” and “FITWELL” are slight, and both marks have a highly similar commercial impression.   Both marks, as a whole, convey a source of clothing goods associated with the wording “FIT…WELL”.  Thus, the minor difference in sound and appearance as a result of applicant deleting the letter “Z” in the middle of registrant’s mark does not sufficiently obviate the otherwise great similarity between these marks.   

 

Given the highly similar appearance, sound, and commercial impression of these marks, they are substantially similar to cause a likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d).

 

Comparison of the Goods,

 

The goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). 

 

The respective goods and/or services need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

 

Neither the application nor the registration(s) contains any limitations regarding trade channels for the goods and therefore it is assumed that registrant’s and applicant’s goods are sold everywhere that is normal for such items, i.e., clothing and department stores.  Thus, it can also be assumed that the same classes of purchasers shop for these items and that consumers are accustomed to seeing them sold under the same or similar marks.  See Kangol Ltd. v. KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc., 974 F.2d 161, 23 USPQ2d 1945 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Smith & Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531 (TTAB 1994); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).

 

Decisions regarding likelihood of confusion in the clothing field have found many different types of apparel to be related goods.  Cambridge Rubber Co. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 286 F.2d 623, 624, 128 USPQ 549, 550 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (women’s boots related to men’s and boys’ underwear); Jockey Int’l, Inc. v. Mallory & Church Corp., 25 USPQ2d 1233, 1236 (TTAB 1992) (underwear related to neckties); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991) (women’s pants, blouses, shorts and jackets related to women’s shoes); In re Pix of Am., Inc., 225 USPQ 691, 691-92 (TTAB 1985) (women’s shoes related to outer shirts); In re Mercedes Slacks, Ltd., 213 USPQ 397, 398-99 (TTAB 1982) (hosiery related to trousers); In re Cook United, Inc., 185 USPQ 444, 445 (TTAB 1975) (men’s suits, coats, and trousers related to ladies’ pantyhose and hosiery); Esquire Sportswear Mfg. Co. v. Genesco Inc., 141 USPQ 400, 404 (TTAB 1964) (brassieres and girdles related to slacks for men and young men).

 

The previously attached Internet evidence of record, and additional evidence attached to the present Office Action, consisting of webpages, establishes that the same entities commonly provides the relevant goods and market such goods under the same marks, the relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use, and the goods are similar or complementary in terms of purpose or function.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

Third parties commonly provide shoes and footwear as well as applicant’s identified clothing goods including undergarments, hosiery, leggings, lingerie, shapewear, sleepwear, bodysuits, yoga pants, and/or athletic tops under the same marks.  Several representative examples are noted below and supported by evidence of record.  See previously attached evidence of record.

 

CALVIN KLEIN

http://www.calvinklein.us/en.

 

NIKE

http://www.nike.com/. 

 

VICTORIA’S SECRET/PINK

http://www.victoriassecret.com/.

 

J.CREW

http://www.jcrew.com/.

 

GUESS

http://shop.guess.com/en/.

 

Additional evidence attached to the present Office Action demonstrates that applicant’s and registrant’s identified goods are commonly offered under the same marks via the same channels of trade:

 

ADIDAS

http://shop.nordstrom.com/brands/adidas.

 

NIKE

http://www.macys.com/shop/b/nike/Gender/Women?id=79471.

 

UNDER ARMOUR

http://www.dickssportinggoods.com/c/under-armour.            

See attached evidence.

 

Further, the trademark examining attorney has attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of a representative number of third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar goods and/or services as those of both applicant and registrant in this case.  This evidence shows that the goods and/or services listed therein, namely, footwear and/or shoes and “Bodysuits; Bras; Hosiery; Leggings; Lingerie; Panties; Shapewear; Sleepwear; Sports bras; Undergarments; Yoga pants; Women's athletic tops with built-in bras,” are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark.  See In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1737 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).

 

Generally, the greater degree of similarity between the applied-for mark and the registered mark, the lesser the degree of similarity between the goods and/or services of the parties is required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.  In re C.H. Hanson Co., 116 USPQ2d 1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001)); In re Thor Tech, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1636 (TTAB 2009). 

 

Rebuttal to Arguments in Applicant’s March 11, 2020 Response

 

In response to the previous Office Action of record, applicant’s principal argument is that applicant’s and registrant’s goods are not confusingly similar.  The fact that the goods of the parties differ is not controlling in determining likelihood of confusion.  The issue is not likelihood of confusion between particular goods, but likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of those goods.  In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1316, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01.  Here, the evidence of record clearly demonstrates that third parties routinely offer the goods offered by both applicant and registrant at issue, under the same marks.  Further, evidence of record does demonstrate that the same parties routinely offer high heels and other types of footwear and bras under the same marks. 

 

Applicant also argues that the channels of trade may differ with respect to the relevant goods.  As additional evidence attached to the present Office Action demonstrates, these goods are commonly available from the same retailers’ stores and even on the same sections of retailers’ webpages.  This evidence demonstrates that such goods travel through the same channels of trade.  The fact that such goods are worn on different parts of the body is not particularly probative under a likelihood of confusion analysis.

 

Next, applicant argues that applicant’s and registrant’s marks “are not the same word” and are “not phonetically the same”.  This, however, is not the relevant standard under a likelihood of confusion analysis.  As argued in greater detail above, applicant’s and registrant’s marks are highly similar in sound, appearance, and resulting commercial impression as a result of applicant’s mark being nearly identical to registrant’s mark, but for the deletion of a single letter in the middle of registrant’s mark.

 

Lastly, applicant contends that a finding of likelihood of confusion is inappropriate without evidence demonstrating that registrant offers goods under applicant’s mark, “fitwell”.  This is not the relevant standard.  “‘[A] showing of actual confusion is not necessary to establish a likelihood of confusion.’”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(ii).  “[T]he relevant test is likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion.”  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1309, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original).  “Uncorroborated statements of no known instances of actual confusion . . . are of little evidentiary value,” especially in ex parte examination.  In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1317, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  For the reasons noted above and supported by appropriate evidence, applicant’s and registrant’s marks, goods, and channels of trade are sufficiently similar to be refused for likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d).

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Accordingly, with the contemporaneous use of highly similar marks with highly related goods, that are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers, consumers are likely to conclude that such goods and services are related and originate from a common source.  As such, registration must be continued to be refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d).

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and additional arguments in support of registration.  

 

 Response Guidelines

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although an examining attorney cannot provide legal advice, the examining attorney can provide additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. 

 

The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a request for reconsideration of this final Office action that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals and/or click to file a timely appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) with the required filing fee(s).

 

 

/Dustin T. Bednarz/

Examining Attorney

USPTO Law Office 121

dustin.bednarz@uspto.gov

571-270-1151

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on April 02, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88470340

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Dustin T. Bednarz/

Examining Attorney

USPTO Law Office 121

dustin.bednarz@uspto.gov

571-270-1151

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from April 02, 2020, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”