To: | Zaninovich, John (mlabauve@lip-law.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88460246 - RAZZLE - 1189-05 |
Sent: | August 30, 2019 05:50:22 PM |
Sent As: | ecom121@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88460246
Mark: RAZZLE
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Correspondence Address: 1100 PEACHTREE STREET, SUITE 250
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Applicant: Zaninovich, John
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Reference/Docket No. 1189-05
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: August 30, 2019
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Comparison of the Marks
Concerning U.S. Reg. No. 5151245 (RAZZLE)
In the present case, applicant’s mark is the sole term “RAZZLE” in standard characters, and the mark in U.S. Reg. No. 5151245 is the sole term “RAZZLE” in standard characters. These marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods. Id.
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar, and the first prong of the likelihood of confusion test is met as to U.S. Reg. No. 5151245.
Concerning U.S. Reg. No. 1341340 (RAZZLE BERRY)
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In this case, applicant’s mark is the sole term “RAZZLE” in standard characters. The mark in U.S. Reg. No. 1341340 is the composite mark featuring the typed wording “RAZZLE BERRY” in standard characters. Applicant’s mark is highly similar to registrants’ marks in appearance, sound, and connotation.
In addition, although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).
In this case, registrant has disclaimed the wording “BERRY” because it is descriptive of its fruit juice products. This renders the dominant wording in the mark to be “RAZZLE,” the identical element in applicant’s mark. Although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark. See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)). Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion. See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.
Furthermore, marks have been found to be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).
In addition, and as fully discussed below, where the goods of an applicant and registrant are “similar in kind and/or closely related,” the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as in the case of diverse goods. In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987); see Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1242, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Because highly similar, purchasers are likely to believe that the goods emanate from the same source. Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar, and the first prong of the likelihood of confusion test is met as to U.S. Reg. No. 1341340.
Comparison of the Goods
The second prong of the likelihood of confusion test is a comparison of applicant’s and registrant’s goods.
Applicant’s goods are: table grapes.
Registrant’s goods are:
In this case, applicant’s table grape goods are closely related to registrants’ wine and fruit juice goods.
See:
Grapes and fruit juice:
- Chiquita: http://www.amazon.com/CHIQUITA-TROPICALS-Banana-Strawberry-Non-GMO/dp/B00LK0JRF8 and http://dev.chiquita.com/Products/Healthy-Snacks/Chiquita-Bites.aspx (showing that Chiquita sells fresh fruit, including apples and grapes, and fruit juice under the same mark).
- Dole: http://www.dole.com/en/products/categories/fresh-fruit and http://dolesunshine.com/products/juice (showing that Dole sells fresh fruit, including apples and grapes, and fruit juice under the same mark).
- Russell Orchards: http://www.russellorchards.com/en/crops/fruits.php, http://www.russellorchards.com/en/winery/varieties.php, and http://www.russellorchards.com/en/store/cider.php (showing that Russell Orchards sells grapes, juice, and wine under the same mark).
- Welch’s: http://www.russellorchards.com/en/store/cider.php and http://www.welchs.com/ (showing that Welch’s sells grapes and fruit juice under the same mark).
Grapes and wine:
- Lincoln Peak Vineyard: http://lincolnpeakvineyard.com/about-us/vineyard-grapes/ and http://lincolnpeakvineyard.vinespring.com/purchase (showing that Lincoln Peak sells grapes and wines under the same mark).
- Rocky Pond: http://rockypondwinery.com/grape-purchases/ and http://rockypondwinery.orderport.net/wines/Current-Releases (showing that Rocky Pond sells grapes and wines under the same mark).
- Still Waters Vineyards: http://www.stillwatersvineyards.com/purchase-grapes/ and http://stillwatersvineyards.orderport.net/wines/Red-Wines (showing Still Waters sells grapes and wines under the same mark).
The evidence shows that purchasers are accustomed to encountering the goods of the applicant and registrant offered under the same mark. And in the case of U.S. Reg. No. 5151245, “RAZZLE,” where the marks of the respective parties are identical or virtually identical, the degree of similarity or relatedness between the goods needed to support a finding of likelihood of confusion declines. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993)), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017); TMEP §1207.01(a).
Therefore, purchasers are likely to believe the goods emanate from the same source. Accordingly, the goods of applicant and the registrants are considered related for purposes of the likelihood of confusion analysis, and the second prong of the test is met.
Conclusion
Because the marks are highly similar and the goods are closely related, there is a likelihood of purchaser confusion as to the source of the goods. Therefore, registration is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act. 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
However, applicant should also note and respond to the requirement that follows.
IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS REQUIRES AMENDMENT
Applicant may substitute the following wording, if accurate (changes in bold):
Scope Advisory
Applicant may amend the identification to clarify or limit the goods, but not to broaden or expand the goods beyond those in the original application or as acceptably amended. See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06. Generally, any deleted goods may not later be reinserted. See TMEP §1402.07(e).
For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual. See TMEP §1402.04.
For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action
/Matthew D. McClellan/
Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 121
Phone: (571) 272-5148
Matthew.McClellan@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE