Offc Action Outgoing
Trademark
Ultra PRO International, LLC
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88456884 - N/A
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
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U.S. Application Serial No. 88456884
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Correspondence Address: |
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Applicant: Ultra PRO International, LLC
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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FINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: March 16, 2020
This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on 02/24/2020. The new drawing is acceptable and made of record. The examining attorney has considered applicant’s arguments regarding the likelihood of confusion and has found them unpersuasive. Therefore, for the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No(s). 5062196. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.64(a).
SECTION 2(d) LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION REFUSAL
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
“‘[A] showing of actual confusion is not necessary to establish a likelihood of confusion.’” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(ii). “[T]he relevant test is likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion.” In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1309, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original). “Uncorroborated statements of no known instances of actual confusion . . . are of little evidentiary value,” especially in ex parte examination. In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1317, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Regarding Registration No. 5062196
Applicant seeks registration of a design mark composed of a cube with a triangular shape extruding from one side of the bottom of the cube, all on a shaded square, looks like
this: 
for
“Downloadable software in the nature of a mobile application for presenting and managing conversation starter questions” and “Games, namely card games; Games, namely a parlor game with question cards”
The cited registration is a design mark composed of a cube with a triangular shape extruding from one side of the bottom of the cube, looks like this: 
, for
“Computer games software; Computer application software for mobile telephones, namely, software for interactive games; Computer software applications, downloadable, namely, software for interactive games; Games software; Computer games software”; “Dice games; Parlour games; Games relating to fictional characters, namely, story-telling dice games; Toys, namely, dice; games, namely, story-telling dice games” and “Entertainment services, namely, games classes and workshops in the fields of creative writing and story-telling; Entertainment in the nature of story-telling; Education services, namely, providing classes in the field of creative writing and story-telling; Entertainment in the nature of story-telling dice games; Organizing sporting and cultural activities; Providing on-line computer games; Games services provided on-line from a computer network; Providing interactive multi-player computer games via the internet and electronic communication networks”
Regarding the first prong of the test, the design marks are highly similar in their appearance. The marks both consist of a cube with a triangular protrusion on the bottom of the cube. The marks both resemble and create a commercial impression of a cube shaped thought or speech bubble.
Applicant argues that there are distinct differences between the marks, however the examining attorney cannot agree. When the marks at issue are both design marks, similarity of the marks is determined primarily on the basis of visual similarity. See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Rose ‘Vear Enters., 592 F.2d 1180, 1183, 201 USPQ 7, 9 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (quoting In re ATV Network Ltd., 552 F.2d 925, 929, 193 USPQ 331, 332 (C.C.P.A. 1977)); Ft. James Operating Co. v. Royal Paper Converting Inc., 83 USPQ2d 1624, 1628 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(c). However, a side-by-side comparison is not the test. See Grandpa Pidgeon’s of Mo., Inc. v. Borgsmiller, 477 F.2d 586, 587, 177 USPQ 573, 574 (C.C.P.A. 1973). When comparing design marks, the focus is on the overall commercial impression conveyed by such marks, not on specific differences. See Grandpa Pidgeon’s of Mo., Inc. v. Borgsmiller, 477 F.2d at 587, 177 USPQ at 574; In re Triple R Mfg. Corp., 168 USPQ 447, 448 (TTAB 1970); TMEP §1207.01(c).
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Turning to the second prong of the analysis, the goods and services are closely related. Both the applicant and registrant have identified downloadable software and games, in particular parlour games. Further, applicant’s downloadable software are goods that often originate with a common source as registrant’s online game services.
Applicant contends that consumers will not be confused by the marks because the goods offered under each mark differ. Specifically, applicant’s games consist of conversation starters whereas the registrant’s games are in the field of story-telling. The attached Internet evidence, establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures, produces, or provides the relevant goods, specifically various types of games including dice games, card games and story-telling games, and markets the goods under the same mark/the relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009). Therefore, consumers are likely to be confused based on the use of the highly similar design marks used in association with games.
In this case, the application and registration use broad wording to describe some of the goods and services, which presumably encompasses all goods and services of the type described. Therefore, the application and registration include goods that are mutually encompassing. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, the goods and/or services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and services are related.
Therefore, with the similar nature of the marks and the closely related goods and services, consumers are likely to reach the mistaken conclusion that the goods and services are related and originate with a common source. As such, registration must be refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d).
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
How to respond. Click to file a request for reconsideration of this final Office action that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals and/or click to file a timely appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) with the required filing fee(s).
If the applicant has any questions or needs assistance in responding to this Office Action, please contact the assigned examining attorney.
/Katherine Weigle/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 101
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
(571) 270-1506
katherine.weigle@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE
- Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon. A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period. TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.
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