Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive Applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  September 03, 2019

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned Trademark Examining Attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES TO WHICH APPLICANT MUST RESPOND:

 

• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
• Section 2(e)(1) Refusal – Merely Descriptive

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4769953.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by Section 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

Applicant's mark is SUPERSOFT.

 

Registrant's mark is ASHLEY SUPER SOFT.

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Here, the compared marks are highly similar because they share the common wording “SUPER” and “SOFT”. In particular, Applicant’s mark is entirely incorporated in Registrant’s mark with respect to these terms. Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part.

 

The term “ASHLEY” in Registrant’s mark fails to obviate this refusal. Adding a house mark to an otherwise confusingly similar mark will not obviate a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See In re Fiesta Palms LLC, 85 USPQ2d 1360, 1366-67 (TTAB 2007) (finding CLUB PALMS MVP and MVP confusingly similar); In re Christian Dior, S.A., 225 USPQ 533, 534 (TTAB 1985) (finding LE CACHET DE DIOR and CACHET confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  It is likely that goods sold under these marks would be attributed to the same source.  See In re Chica, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1845, 1848-49 (TTAB 2007). 

 

Further, the stylization and design elements in Applicant’s mark do not detract from the confusing similarity in this case, because Registrant’s mark is in standard character form. A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii).  Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display.  See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).

 

The compared marks are identical with respect to the terms “SUPER” and “SOFT” except for a slight difference in appearance between Applicant’s mark, which appears as a compound word with no space separating the words, that is, “SUPERSOFT”; and Registrant’s mark, which appears as multiple words with space separating the words, that is, “SUPER SOFT”.  As such, the marks are identical in sound and virtually identical in appearance with respect to these terms, and are thus confusingly similar for the purposes of determining likelihood of confusion.  See, e.g., Seaguard Corp. v. Seaward Int’l, Inc., 223 USPQ 48, 51 (TTAB 1984) (“[T]he marks ‘SEAGUARD’ and ‘SEA GUARD’ are, in contemplation of law, identical [internal citation omitted].”); In re Best W. Family Steak House, Inc., 222 USPQ 827, 827 (TTAB 1984) (“There can be little doubt that the marks [BEEFMASTER and BEEF MASTER] are practically identical”); Stock Pot, Inc., v. Stockpot Rest., Inc., 220 USPQ 52, 52 (TTAB 1983), aff’d 737 F.2d 1576, 222 USPQ 665 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“There is no question that the marks of the parties [STOCKPOT and STOCK POT] are confusingly similar.  The word marks are phonetically identical and visually almost identical.”). 

 

Further, even if potential purchasers realize the apparent differences between the marks, they could still reasonably assume, due to the overall similarities in sound, appearance, connotation, and commercial impression in the respective marks, that Applicant's goods sold under the “SUPERSOFT” mark constitute a new or additional product line from the same source as the goods sold under the “ASHLEY SUPER SOFT” mark with which they are acquainted or familiar, and that Applicant’s mark is merely a variation of the Registrant’s mark.  See, e.g., SMS, Inc. v. Byn-Mar Inc. 228 USPQ 219, 220 (TTAB 1985) (the applicant’s marks ALSO ANDREA and ANDREA SPORT were “likely to evoke an association by consumers with the opposer's preexisting mark [ANDREA SIMONE] for its established line of clothing.”).

 

For the reasons set forth more fully above, the compared marks are confusingly similar.

 

Comparison of the Goods

 

Applicant's goods are Paper towels; Toilet paper; Paper napkins.

 

Registrant's goods are Bath tissue, facial tissue, paper napkins, disposable towels comprised primarily of paper; toilet paper and paper towels.

 

The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

When analyzing Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

In this case, the goods in the application and registration are identical in part. Specifically, Applicant’s goods consist of “paper towels”, “toilet paper”, and “paper napkins”, and Registrant’s goods include each of those items. Therefore, Applicant’s goods are completely encompassed by those set forth in the registration.  Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and classes of purchasers are the same for these goods.  See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 27 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 

 

Therefore, Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. 

 

Conclusion

 

For the foregoing reasons, registration of the applied-for mark is refused pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

Although Applicant’s mark has been refused registration, Applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.

 

SECTION 2(e)(1) REFUSAL - MERELY DESCRIPTIVE

 

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark merely describes a feature of Applicant’s goods.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); see TMEP §§1209.01(b), 1209.03 et seq.

 

Applicant's mark is SUPERSOFT for Paper towels; Toilet paper; Paper napkins.

 

A mark is merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of Applicant’s goods.  TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re TriVita, Inc., 783 F.3d 872, 874, 114 USPQ2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920)). 

 

In the present case, the applied-for mark consists of the combined terms “SUPER” and “SOFT”. Where, as here, the individual components of a mark retain their descriptive meaning in relation to the goods, the combination results in a composite mark that is itself descriptive and not registrable.  In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1516 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Tower Tech, Inc., 64 USPQ2d 1314, 1317-18 (TTAB (2002)); TMEP §1209.03(d); see, e.g., Apollo Med. Extrusion Techs., Inc. v. Med. Extrusion Techs., Inc., 123 USPQ2d 1844, 1851 (TTAB 2017) (holding MEDICAL EXTRUSION TECHNOLOGIES merely descriptive of medical extrusion goods produced by employing medical extrusion technologies); In re Cannon Safe, Inc., 116 USPQ2d 1348, 1351 (TTAB 2015) (holding SMART SERIES merely descriptive of metal gun safes); In re King Koil Licensing Co., 79 USPQ2d 1048, 1052 (TTAB 2006) (holding THE BREATHABLE MATTRESS merely descriptive of beds, mattresses, box springs, and pillows). 

 

Only where the combination of descriptive terms creates a unitary mark with a unique, incongruous, or otherwise nondescriptive meaning in relation to the goods is the combined mark registrable.  See In re Colonial Stores, Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 551, 157 USPQ 382, 384 (C.C.P.A. 1968); In re Positec Grp. Ltd., 108 USPQ2d 1161, 1162-63 (TTAB 2013).

 

In this case, both the individual components and the composite result are descriptive of Applicant’s goods and do not create a unique, incongruous, or nondescriptive meaning in relation to the goods. 

 

Specifically, the term “SUPER” is merely laudatory and the term “SOFT” describes a principal component of Applicant’s goods.

 

The attached dictionary evidence defines “SUPER” as “superior, as in size, quality, degree, or ability”. See http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=super. “Marks that are merely laudatory and descriptive of the alleged merit of a product are . . . regarded as being descriptive” because “[s]elf-laudatory or puffing marks are regarded as a condensed form of describing the character or quality of the goods.”  DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1256, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1759 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re The Boston Beer Co., 198 F.3d 1370, 1373, 53 USPQ2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); TMEP §1209.03(k). 

 

The additional attached dictionary evidence defines “SOFT” as “smooth or fine to the touch”. See http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=soft. The attached Internet evidence demonstrates that third parties commonly use the term “SOFT” to advertise or describe goods similar to those of Applicant.

 

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has determined that “if the word ‘super’ is combined with a word [that] names the goods, or a principal component, grade or size thereof, then the composite term is considered merely descriptive of the goods.”  In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 63 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (TTAB 2002) (holding SUPER SILK merely laudatory and descriptive of applicant’s shirts being of an excellent, first-rate, or superior grade of silk fabric), quoted in In re Positec Grp. Ltd., 108 USPQ2d 1161, 1172 (TTAB 2013) (holding SUPERJAWS merely descriptive of applicant’s various machine tools, hand tools, and heavy-duty workbench accessories as superior vice systems for grasping and holding work pieces); see In re Carter-Wallace, Inc., 222 USPQ 729, 730 (TTAB 1984) (holding SUPER GEL merely laudatory and descriptive of applicant’s shaving gel being of superior quality). Such is the case here where Applicant’s mark consists of the laudatory term “SUPER” and the term “SOFT”, which immediately conveys a key feature of Applicant’s paper goods.

 

Moreover, the applied-for mark shows the wording in stylized lettering.  Stylized descriptive or generic wording is registrable only if the stylization creates a commercial impression separate and apart from the impression made by the wording itself.  See In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594, 606, 118 USPQ2d 1632, 1639-40 (Fed. Cir. 2016); In re Northland Aluminum Prods., Inc., 777 F.2d 1556, 1561, 227 USPQ 961, 964 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1209.03(w).  Common and ordinary lettering with minimal stylization, as in this case, is generally not sufficiently striking, unique, or distinctive as to make an impression on purchasers separate from the wording.  See In re Sadoru Grp., Ltd., 105 USPQ2d 1484, 1487 (TTAB 2012). 

 

Conclusion

 

For the foregoing reasons, the applied-for mark is merely descriptive of a feature of Applicant's goods and registration is refused pursuant to Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act.

 

Although Applicant’s mark has been refused registration, Applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

HOW TO RESPOND

 

For this application to proceed, Applicant must explicitly address each refusal in this Office action.  For a refusal, Applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above.  Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.

 

Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action  

 

ASSISTANCE

 

Please call or email the assigned Trademark Examining Attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although the Trademark Examining Attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about Applicant’s rights, the Trademark Examining Attorney can provide Applicant with additional explanation about the refusals in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an Examiner’s Amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

Samantha Sherman

Examining Attorney

Law Office 123

571-270-0903

samantha.sherman@uspto.gov

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

 

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or Notice of Appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect Applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If Applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If Applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on September 03, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88454841

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

Samantha Sherman

Examining Attorney

Law Office 123

571-270-0903

samantha.sherman@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from September 03, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond.

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”