Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  August 26, 2019

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion – Partial Refusal
• U.S Counsel Requirement
• Advisory: Consent Statement Will Not Be Printed
• Response Guidelines

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

PARTIAL REFUSAL AS TO THE GOODS SPECIFIED HEREIN

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration Nos. 2988957 & 5565356.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations. 

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Applicant seeks to register the mark “MODE” in design form for, in relevant part, “belt conveyors; Conveyors being machines; electric jacks; Engines for air cushion vehicles; Pneumatic jacks; Pneumatic transporters; Pneumatic tube conveyors; power-operated lifting and moving equipment, namely, pipe layers, fork lifts, telehandlers, and lifts” in International Class 007. 

 

Registrants’ marks are:  

 

• U.S. Reg. No. 2988957: “L-MODE” in standard characters for “engines for personal watercraft and structural parts therefor” in International Class 007. 
• U.S. Reg. No. 5565356: “AUTTOMODE” in standard characters for “Back pressure valves as parts of machines; Engine parts, namely, contact points; Filters for motors and engines; Pistons for engines; Pneumatic controls for machines, motors and engines; Pneumatic transporters; Pneumatic tube conveyors; Pressure regulators being parts of machines; Taps; Valves being parts of machines” in International Class 007. 

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Applicant’s mark is “MODE” in design form.

 

Registrants’ marks are:  

 

• U.S. Reg. No. 2988957: “L-MODE” in standard characters. 
• U.S. Reg. No. 5565356: “AUTTOMODE” in standard characters. 

 

Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34).

 

First, with regard to the design elements in the applied-for mark, when evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).  Therefore, the dominant portion of the applied-for mark is the wording “MODE.”

 

Second, the dominant part of the applied-for mark, “MODE” as set forth above, is fully encompassed in both registered marks, “L-MODE” and “AUTTOMODE”.  Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part as to the wording “MODE”.

 

Further, although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.  Thus, the applied-for mark could appear to consumers as the shortened form of either registrants’ marks because the applied-for mark is fully encompassed in both registered marks. 

 

Accordingly, applicant’s mark is confusingly similar in commercial impression with registrants’ marks. 

 

As set forth above, Applicant’s mark “MODE” is confusingly similar with registrants’ marks in U.S. Reg. Nos. 2988957 & 5565356.  Next, the goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. 

 

Similarity or Relatedness of the Goods

 

The compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and services stated in the application and registrations at issue, not on evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

Here, the relevant goods identified by Applicant are “belt conveyors; Conveyors being machines; electric jacks; Engines for air cushion vehicles; Pneumatic jacks; Pneumatic transporters; Pneumatic tube conveyors; power-operated lifting and moving equipment, namely, pipe layers, fork lifts, telehandlers, and lifts” in International Class 007.

 

The relevant goods identified by registrants are:

 

• U.S. Reg. No. 2988957: “engines for personal watercraft and structural parts therefor” in International Class 007. 
• U.S. Reg. No. 5565356: “Back pressure valves as parts of machines; Engine parts, namely, contact points; Filters for motors and engines; Pistons for engines; Pneumatic controls for machines, motors and engines; Pneumatic transporters; Pneumatic tube conveyors; Pressure regulators being parts of machines; Taps; Valves being parts of machines” in International Class 007. 

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

 

The attached Internet evidence from Encyclopedia.com, Renegade Hovercraft, Hoverstream, and Hammacher Schlemmer shows that “air cushion vehicles” are hovercraft, and that one type of hovercraft are personal watercraft because they can go over water in addition to land.  Therefore, the application uses broad wording to describe “engines for air cushion vehicles,” which presumably encompasses, or is related to, all goods of the type described, including registrant’s more narrow “engines for personal watercraft and structural parts therefor.”  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

• http://www.encyclopedia.com/science-and-technology/technology/technology-terms-and-concepts/air-cushion-vehicle
• http://www.renegadehovercraft.com/
• http://www.hoverstream.com/hovercraft/marlin-iii/
• http://www.hammacher.com/product/two-person-60-mph-hovercraft

 

Similarly, the attached Internet evidence from Servo-Lift, Vestil, and Toyota shows that one type of pneumatic jack is a pneumatic pallet jacks, and that pneumatic and electrical systems are often integrated into a single pallet jack or fork lift, which are used to transport pallets.  Therefore, the registration uses broad wording to describe “pneumatic transporters,” which presumably encompasses or is sufficiently related to all goods of the type described, including Applicant’s more narrow “electric jacks; Pneumatic jacks; power-operated lifting and moving equipment, namely, pipe layers, fork lifts, telehandlers, and lifts,” respectively.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

• http://servo-lift.com/pallet-jacks/robusto-2300
• http://www.vestil.com/product.php?FID=336
• http://www.toyotaforklift.com/lifts/electric-motor-rider-forklifts/electric-pneumatic-forklift

 

Likewise, the application uses broad wording to describe “Conveyors being machines,” which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including registrant’s more narrow “Pneumatic tube conveyors.”  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Additionally, the attached Internet evidence from Bastian Solutions and GlobalSpec.com establishes that the same entity commonly produces belt and pneumatic tube conveyors and markets the goods under the same mark, through the same trade channels and to the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use, and the goods are similar or complementary in terms of purpose or function.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

• http://www.bastiansolutions.com/store/conveyors/
• http://www.globalspec.com/SpecSearch/SearchForm/material_handling_packaging_equipment/material_handling_equipment/industrial_conveyors

 

Further, the goods in the application and registration are identical as to “Pneumatic transporters; Pneumatic tube conveyors.”  Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and class(es) of purchasers are the same for these goods and/or services.  See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 27 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.  

 

Finally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.

 

Accordingly, Applicant’s goods are sufficiently related to the goods identified in U.S. Registration Nos. 2988957 & 5565356. 

 

Conclusion

 

Based on the foregoing, registration of the applied-for mark is refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d) due to a likelihood of confusion with U.S. Trademark Registration Nos. 2988957 & 5565356. 

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  However, if applicant responds to the refusal, applicant must also respond to the requirement set forth below.

 

U.S. COUNSEL REQUIREMENT

 

Applicant must be represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney.  The application record indicates that applicant’s domicile is outside of the United States in China, but no attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a U.S. State or territory has been appointed to represent the applicant in this matter.  All applicants whose permanent legal residence or principal place of business is not within the United States or its territories must be represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney at the USPTO.  37 C.F.R. §§2.2(o), 2.11(a).  Thus, applicant is required to be represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney and must appoint one.  37 C.F.R. §2.11(a).  This application will not proceed to registration without such appointment and representation.  See id.  See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.

 

To appoint or designate a U.S.-licensed attorney.  To appoint an attorney, applicant should (1) submit a completed Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Revocation, Appointment, and/or Change of Address of Attorney/Domestic Representative form and (2) promptly notify the trademark examining attorney that this TEAS form was submitted.  Alternatively, if applicant has already retained an attorney, the attorney can respond to this Office action by using the appropriate TEAS response form and provide his or her attorney information in the form and sign it as applicant’s attorney.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(1)(ii).

 

For more information on this rule, see Requirement of U.S. Licensed Attorney for Foreign Trademark Applicants and Registrants and the U.S. Counsel Rule FAQs Webpage.  Failure to comply with this requirement is grounds for refusing registration.  In re Harley, 119 USPQ2d 1755, 1757-58 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §814.  Merely stating that the attorney’s bar information is available on a state bar’s website is an insufficient response and will not make the relevant information of record.  See In re Planalytics, Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1453, 1457-58 (TTAB 2004).

 

Applicant should also note the following advisory.

 

Advisory: Consent Statement Will Not Be Printed

 

Applicant’s statement regarding the name, portrait or signature of a living individual identified in the mark will not be printed on any registration that may issue from this application.  The statement is unnecessary because the mark on its face would not reasonably be perceived as the name or likeness of a specific living individual.  TMEP §§813.01(b), 1206.05.

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action.  For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above.  For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements.  Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.

 

Respond online to this letter.  Use the TEAS “Response to Office Action” online form to file a response

 

If Applicant does not respond to this Office action within six months of the issue/mailing date, or responds by expressly abandoning the application, the application process will end and the trademark will fail to register.  See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.65(a), 2.68(a); TMEP §§718.01, 718.02.  Additionally, the USPTO will not refund the application filing fee, which is a required processing fee.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(i)-(iv), 2.209(a); TMEP §405.04.

 

When an application has abandoned for failure to respond to an Office action, an applicant may timely file a petition to revive the application, which, if granted, would allow the application to return to active status.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.66; TMEP §1714.  The petition must be filed within two months of the date of issuance of the notice of abandonment and may be filed online via the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) with a $100 fee.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(15)(ii), 2.66(a)(1), (b)(1).

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action  

 

 

Roth, Benjamin

/Benjamin H. Roth/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 122

(571) 272 -5266

benjamin.roth@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on August 26, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88451867

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

Roth, Benjamin

/Benjamin H. Roth/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 122

(571) 272 -5266

benjamin.roth@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from August 26, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond.

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”